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FOREWORD AND BACKGROUND--This web site contains substantive
(theory testing) research
on responses to problems in "business" relationships such as businessto-business
buyer-seller relationships, and salesperson-employer relationships.
Currently, it contains several of my theory testing papers in this area, and
it is intended to help stimulate additional thoughts and research on this
topic.
Relationship termination in Sociology and Social Psychology (e.g., in
romantic or friendship
relationships) has been heavily researched. There, it is believed that
relationships go
through stages that include creation and growth, and end with
dissolution or termination.
However, it is well known that there are dissatisfactory relationships
that are maintained
instead of terminated.
However, comparatively little is known relationship termination
about "business-to-business"
relationships. For example, in economics it is assumed that
dissatisfactory business relationships
are simply terminated. However, it is easy to find unsatisfactory
business relationships that are
not terminated; at least not right away. Sometimes these relationships
continue for quite awhile,
even indefinitely, just like in marriages.
However, the list of "knowledge gaps" in business-to-business
relationship termination, and in the
larger venue of responses to relationship problems, is considerable and,
in my opinion, interesting.
For example, as far as I know, theoretical research on responses to
problems in "business"

relationships such as buyer-seller relationships, and
salesperson-employer relationships (what
could be termed Hirshman-based models) focuses on "explanation" and
possibly prediction of
responses to relationship problems such as Loyalty (the beginning of
the relationship),
Voice (Complaining), relationship Neglect and Exiting. However, anyone
with "real world" business
experience might say: "OK, but what about relationship repair? Do
business ever try to fix important
relationships?"
Further, when I do statistical cluster analysis on Exit, Voice, etc.
data there are always hints of
another cluster of respondents that is somewhere "in between" Voice
and Neglect. I suspect these
informants are wanting/trying to repair their business relationship.
However, I am not aware of any research in the business literature
on relationship repair. Several
topics in this venue might include antecedents of business relationship
repair (i.e., its explanation or
prediction), or conceptualizing intervention/repair constructs. (I have
spent embarrassingly
little time on these matters, but there might be a plausible model of
repair with antecedents such as
Dissatisfaction, Alternatives, Investment, Switching Costs,
Commitment, Social Constraints,
Relationship Partner Responsiveness, Self Interest, etc.)
(I recently became aware of John Gottman's work on marriages.
While the monograph I saw
was in the "pop," rather than academic, literature, Gottman does
publish academically, and the
title specifically mentioned relationship repair.) (Further, although it is
now dated, S. Duck and
R. Gilmore's Personal Relationships Volume 5, Academic Press, and
citations in that
monograph might also be useful, especially for conceptualization.) (In
addition, there is a robust
literature on relationships, and presumably their maintenance and
repair, in the international
relations literature. However, my brief look at this literature was
confusing, perhaps because I
found a lack of emphasis on "studies," only what appeared to be
opinions and anecdotes. Still,
the current interest in Realpolitik (political self-interest and realism, as
opposed to ideology,
morality, ethics or emotion) and the writings of Hans Morgenthau, for
example, might lead
to some original relationship repair theory.)
Returning to the cluster analyses mentioned above, while it is also
possible that the "outlier"
respondents between Voice and Neglect in this cluster analysis are

simply being
opportunistic (self-interest seeking with guile), some of these
respondents didn't fit an
opportunist profile (see the papers below for more on opportunism).
There also is considerable confusion about the construct "Loyalty."
The problems range from
conceptualizing loyalty, to its operationalization in buyer-seller
relationships, and they include its
maintenance and restoration, and its antecedents. These matters are
different, in my opinion, from
relationship repair. The maintenance and restoration of relationship
Loyalty should occur early in a
relationship, whereas relationship repair should occur late in a
relationship. Again, Gottman may be a
starting point. Further, cluster analysis and respondent scores in my
(brief) post hoc analyses
suggest that in business, relationship Loyalty is a comparatively "rare
bird." However, this may
simply be a measurement artifact.
Similarly, relationship neglect, and its possible
antecedents/covariants including imbalanced
relationship power, and attempts at relationship equity restoration
ranging from lawsuits to
opportunism also are not well understood in my opinion. At the risk of
overdoing comments
about cluster analysis, "neglecters" are usually the largest cluster in a
study. (Again however,
this may be a measurement artifact.)
In addition, relationship repair could be described as moving away
from relationship neglect. What
about actually maintaining relationship neglect? As cynical as this may
sound, how does one keep
business relationship partners from exiting, regardless of how they feel
about the relationship? As
one colleague put it, "a customer is a customer, no matter how they
feel."
Please email me with your thoughts, and any and all questions--I
would be delighted to
discuss these matters further.
Please note: If you have visited this web site before, and the latest
"Updated" date (at the top of the page)
seems old, you may want to click on your browser's "Refresh" or
"Reload" button on the browser toolbar
(above) to view the current version of this web page.
All the material on this web site is copyrighted, but you may save it
and print it out. My only request is
that you please cite any material that is helpful to you using the individual
citations for each of the papers
shown below.

Don't forget to Refresh: Many of the links on this web page are in
Microsoft WORD. If you have viewed one
or more of them before, the procedure to view the latest (refreshed)
version of them is tedious (The
browser's "Refresh" button may not work for Word documents on the
web). With my apologies for the
tediousness, to refresh any (and all) Word documents in Chrome, for
example, please click on the
"three dots," then "more Tools," "Clear browsing data," and check
"Cashed images and files." After
that, close the browser window, then re-launch it so the latest versions
of all the WORD documents
are forced to download.
Your questions are encouraged; just send an e-mail to
rping@wright.edu. Don't worry about being an
expert in relationship termination, or using "correct terminology" (or
perfect English, for that matter).
A Table of Contents or Index to this website is not available. In the
meantime,
please consider using your browser's search capability to go to the
relevant material. For example, to find
material on Relationship Neglect in Chrome, for example, depress "Ctrl"
and "f" together, then type the word
"neglect" in the search box.
Selected Papers on Relationship Termination...
(PLS. CLICK ON A RED DOT)

"Notes on Salesperson-Employer Relationships: Responses to
Relationship Problems and
their Antecedents" (An earlier version of Ping 2007, J. of
Personal Selling and Sales
Mgt., revised December 2006).
The paper investigates the Hirschman-Rusbult model of responses to
relationship problems in a
salesperson-employer context.

"Unexplored Antecedents of Satisfaction in a Marketing
Channel" (An earlier version of
Ping 2003, J. of Retailing, revised December 2006).
The paper investigates several antecedents of satisfaction from the HirschmanRusbult model of
responses to relationship problems in a buyer-seller relationship context.

"Relationship Commitment and Opportunistic Behavior" (An
earlier version of Ping 2002,
Summer Am. Mktng. Assn. Educators Conf. Proceedings,
revised December 2006).
The paper investigates opportunism in retailers.

"Taking Another Look at Organizational Commitment" (An
earlier version of Ping 2001,

Acad. of Mktng. Sci. Conf. Proceedings, revised December
2006).
The paper investigates organizational commitment in salespersons.

"Exiting in a Marketing Channel" (An earlier version of Ping
1999," J. of Retailing, revised
December 2006).
The paper investigates Hirschman's sequence of responses to relationship
problems that begins with
Loyalty and ends with Exiting in retailers.

"Voice in Business-to-Business Relationships: Cost-of-Exit
and Demographic
Antecedents" (An earlier version of Ping 1997, J. of
Retailing, revised December 2006).
The paper investigates several antecedents of Voice in a marketing channel
context.

"Some Uninvestigated Antecedents of Retailer Exit Intention"
(An earlier version of Ping
1995, J. of Bus. Res., revised December 2006).
The paper investigates several demographic antecedents of Exiting in retailers.

"Does Satisfaction Moderate the Association Between
Alternative Attractiveness and Exit
Intention in a Marketing Channel?" (An earlier version of
Ping 1994, J. of The Academy
of Mktng. Sci., revised December 2006).
The paper investigates the interaction between Satisfaction and Alternative
Attractiveness in their
association with Exiting in a marketing channel context.

"The Effects of Satisfaction and Structural Constraints on
Retailer Exiting, Voice,
Loyalty, Opportunism, and Neglect" (An earlier version of
Ping 1993, J. of Retailing,
revised December 2006).
The paper investigates the Hirschman-Rusbult model of responses to
relationship problems in a
marketing channel context.
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AND THEIR ANTECEDENTS

Abstract
Responses to problems in committed relationships, those characterized by an implicit or
explicit pledge of relationship continuity, have received attention in several literatures outside of
personal selling. There it is argued that an offended party will exit the relationship as a last resort.
First they are likely to respond with loyalty, remaining silent with confidence that things will get
better, or with voice, constructive attempts to change objectionable relationship conditions.
Relationship neglect, allowing the relationship to deteriorate, and opportunism, surreptitious selfinterest seeking, also have been proposed as responses to relationship problems. Antecedents of
these responses include relationship satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, past relationship
investment, and the cost to switch relationships.
This research proposes that organizational commitment and goal congruency are
uninvestigated antecedents of these responses, that several previous hypotheses are incorrect, and
there are uninvestigated linkages among the antecedents. These proposals are explored using
salespersons, and the results shed new light on responses such as turnover.

1

What

do salespersons do when they experience problems with their employer, such as

territory reduction, commission caps, or being passed over for a promotion? While salespersons'
responses to problems with their employer have not been formally studied as far as we know, it is
easy to guess what they might do: they might complain, or they might think about working
somewhere else.
The situation may be more complex, however. In the economics literature Hirschman (1970)
proposed that instead of simply exiting a (committed) relationship, offended parties are likely to
either complain first, which he termed voice, or they could be optimistically silent, which he
termed loyalty. He described voice as complaining to the relationship partner with the
expectation that the problem would be remedied and the relationship would survive. This has
been termed positive complaint behavior (see Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982) to distinguish
it from more negative complaint behavior (e.g., Singh 1990). Later research characterized voice
as constructive attempts by the subject to change objectionable relationship conditions; actively
seeking problem removal by contacting the relationship partner in a positive, relationship
preserving, manner, and cooperatively discussing and working with the relationship partner to
improve the situation (see Ping 1993).
Hirschman was equivocal in his discussions of loyalty, alternately characterizing it as either
"remaining silent, confident that things will get better" or "not exiting." Since then, Hirschman's
loyalty has been generally characterized as "optimistic silence" in the responses-to-relationshipproblems literature, but the concept remains somewhat enigmatic (see Goodwin 1991).
Researchers typically characterize Hirschman's loyalty as a predisposition to overlook problems
because they fix themselves. Problems are viewed as transitory phenomena: they work
themselves out or are fixed by others, so the subject ignores them.

2

Nevertheless, as Ping (1993) pointed out, most marketing literatures, including personal
selling, focus on relationship formation and maintenance, and what could be termed motivation
within the relationship. These literatures implicitly assume that subjects (eventually) simply exit
a dissatisfactory relationship. As a result, they typically pay little attention to other responses to
relationship problems besides exiting, or turnover as it is termed in personal selling. However,
these and other responses to relationship problems may occur ahead of exit and thus provide, as
Hirschman (1970) argued, useful "early warnings." Thus, because of the economic importance of
relationship maintenance in personal selling, recognition of these responses and appropriate
interventions are or should be important to maintaining employer-salesperson relationships.
In addition to proposing alternatives to exiting, Hirschman also proposed that exit, voice and
loyalty had antecedents that included the respondent's overall satisfaction with the relationship,
their investment in the relationship, and the attractiveness of alternative relationships. While he
had plans to do so (see Hirschman 1970:146), apparently he never tested his proposals.
However, Rusbult and her colleagues, among others, have tested Hirschman's proposals in
romantic relationships (e.g., Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982; see also Rusbult 1980), and
employment relationships (e.g., Farrell and Rusbult 1981, Rusbult and Farrell 1983). Based on
multidimensional scaling, she also proposed and tested an additional response to relationship
problems in romantic relationships, relationship neglect, which she characterized as passively
letting the relationship deteriorate (Rusbult and Zembrodt 1983; see Rusbult, Zembrodt and
Gunn 1982). Farrell (1983) also proposed and tested this response to problems in employment
relationships (see Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous 1988). Relationship neglect involves not
caring about the relationship, expending no effort to maintain it, and a willingness to let the
relationship deteriorate. Ping (1993) characterized neglect as emotional exiting without physical
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exiting. Farrell (1983) stated that employee neglect behaviors included lax and disregardful
behaviors, and suggested they included lateness and absenteeism (also see Rusbult, Farrell,
Rogers and Mainous 1988).
The Hirschman-Rusbult model of responses to relationship problems has been extended to
include opportunism, self interest seeking with guile, that could be viewed as an aggressiveretaliatory response to relationship problems (Ping 1993) (see Rosse and Miller 1984; also see
Homans 1974; Walster, Berscheid and Walster 1976). An individual's opportunism occurs within
a relationship the opportunist usually wishes to continue. Thus, an opportunist must hide their
self-interest maximizing from the relationship partner. It was introduced in the economics
literature to explain the "failure of markets," firms choosing to cease external contracting for
their inputs or outputs in response to opportunism, and vertically integrating instead to obtain
these inputs or outputs (see Williamson 1975). Despite arguments that it should be rare in
individuals (e.g., Hill 1990), it has been self-reported in several contexts, including salespersons
(see Anderson 1988).
Based on Porter's work on exit barriers (e.g., Porter 1980), among others (Levinger 1979,
Johnson 1982), an additional antecedent of the responses to relationship problems was proposed,
the cost to switch to an alternative relationship (Ping 1993). The resulting Hirschman-RusbultPing model has been tested in a marketing channel context (see Ping 1993).
The present research extends this model by proposing that goal congruency, the subject's
perception that what is beneficial to one party is beneficial to the other, and organizational
commitment are antecedents of the responses to relationship problems. Anderson (1988) studied
goal congruency in salespersons as an antecedent of opportunism. Goal congruency, the subject
and the organization are both working for the same goals and objectives, was introduced in the
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agency-theory literature (see Jensen and Meckling 1976). There it is viewed as a desirable
organizational trait that should be cultivated because it is a substitute for bureaucratic
surveillance (Ouchi 1980). Organizational commitment, identification with and involvement in
an organization, has been well studied and it is believed to be an antecedent of exiting or
turnover in several literatures (see Brown and Peterson 1993, Mathieu and Zajac 1990).
There are also uninvestigated linkages among the antecedents of responses to relationship
problems. Ping (2003) studied some of these linkages, including the direct linkages between
satisfaction and alternative attractiveness and investment. The present research proposes that all
the antecedents of responses to relationship problems are linked, in some cases in novel ways.
The present research investigates the Hirschman-Rusbult-Ping model with the additional
antecedents organizational commitment and goal congruency, and the linkages among the model
antecedents, in a salesperson context. Along the way it proposes an alternative theoretical view of
employee opportunism in order to generate several novel hypotheses. This research also proposes
that several hypotheses in the Hirschman-Rusbult-Ping model have been incorrectly stated in the
past. The model-test results include unexpected findings such as the performance of
organizational commitment, and overall it is offered as a small step toward further understanding
salesperson responses to employment relationship problems.
LITERATURE
Hirschman's proposal of other responses to relationship problems besides exiting (Hirschman
1970) and their antecedents, and the research of Rusbult and her colleagues on her extension of
Hirschman's model (Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1983) have generated considerable research in
several literatures. For example, when this article was written the Social Science Index listed
more than 2000 citations of Hirschman (1970), and more than 150 citations of Rusbult and her
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colleagues application of the Hirschman-Rusbult model to employer-employer relations (Rusbult
and Farrell 1983) (see Dowding, Mergoupis and Van Vught 2000; Hagedoorn, Van Yperen, Van
de Vliert and Buunk 1999; and Goodwin 1991 for summaries). Within Marketing, Ping's
extension of the Hirschman-Rusbult model (Ping 1993) was cited more than 30 times.
Literature directly or indirectly related to the model is summarized in Bansal, Taylor and
James (2005); De Wulf and Odekerken-Schroder (2001); Ping (1993), and Ping (2003). For
example, the Hirschman-Rusbult model (Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1983) was proposed and
tested in two steps. Rusbult (1980) proposed what she termed an investment model that
contained satisfaction, alternatives, investment and exiting. Similar proposals have been made by
other authors (e.g., Johnson 1982; Ko, Price and Mueller 1997; Brown and Peterson 1993).
Several of the responses to relationship problems and their antecedents have been studied
individually, some of them in personal selling. Exiting or turnover has been extensively studied
in many literatures including personal selling (e.g., Bansal, Taylor and James 2005; see Brown
and Peterson 1993 for a summary). However, voice and opportunism have received
comapratively less attention in Marketing (see Ping 1997 for a summary of voice research, and
Jap and Anderson 2003 for a summary of opportunism). The investment model antecedents,
satisfaction, alternatives and investment, have been extensively studied (see Geyskins,
Steenkamp and Kumar 1999; Le and Agnew 2003), and these antecedents have received
considerable attention in personal selling (see Brown and Peterson 1993 for summaries).
Switching costs have also received attention (Ping 1993; Lam, Shankar, Erramilli and Murthy
2004; Burnham, Frels and Mahajan 2003; Jones, Mothersbaugh and Betty 2002). However,
Hirschman's loyalty as a response to relationship problems, and Rusbult's neglect have received
comparatively little attention in Marketing. (Customer) loyalty, for example is typically
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conceptualized in Marketing as simply not exiting, with little or no consideration of relationship
problems (see for example the citations in Bell, Auh and Smalley 2005).
In addition to those with exiting or turnover, most of the linkages in the Hirschman-RusbultPing model have been observed (e.g., Sinclair and Fehr 2005; Sverke and Goslinga 2003;
Maitland 1995; Derlega, Winstead, Lewis and Maddux 1993; Goodwin 1991; Singh 1990;
Whitney and Cooper 1989; Lyons and Lowery 1989; Anderson 1988; and Farrell and Rusbult
1981; Ping 1993, 1999; Rusbult 1980; Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982; Rusbult and Farrell
1983; Rusbult and Zembrodt 1983; Rusbult, Johnson and Morrow 1986; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers
and Mainous 1988). However, the results have been mixed for several responses (see Table 3).
While other explanations are plausible, some of the hypothesized associations appear to be
sensitive to differences in study context. For example, relationship neglect and alternative
attractiveness have been unassociated, or negatively or positively associated, depending on
context. Thus, an objective of the present research is to test the Hirschman-Rusbult-Ping model
in the salesperson context.
RESPONSES TO RELATIONSHIP PROBLEMS
IN SALESPERSON-EMPLOYER RELATIONSHIPS
We will argue the antecedents of the responses to relationship problems satisfaction,
organizational commitment, goal congruency, alternative attractiveness, past relationship
investments, and switching costs are associated with the responses, loyalty, voice, opportunism,
neglect and exiting. We will then argue the antecedents are themselves linked to each other.
Beginning with the responses to relationship problems, authors have argued that relationship
satisfaction should be positively associated with responses to relationship problems that are
relationship positive: loyalty, the subject remaining silent with confidence that things will get
better, and voice, constructive attempts by the subject to change objectionable relationship
7

conditions. Specifically, as relationship satisfaction increases and the relationship becomes more
valuable (Thibaut and Kelly 1959) relationship "positive" responses to relationship problems,
those that do no harm to the relationship, should be likely (see Hirschman 1970, Rosse and Hulin
1985, Rusbult and her colleagues, Ping 1993). Similarly, as relationship satisfaction increases
and the relationship becomes more valuable, relationship "negative" responses to relationship
problems, those that allow or cause harm to the relationship should be less likely. Thus,
satisfaction should be negatively associated with relationship neglect, allowing the relationship to
deteriorate (Ping 1983, Rosse and Hulin 1985, Rusbult and her collegues); opportunism,
surreptitious self-interest seeking at the expense of the relationship partner (Anderson 1988,
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Ping 1983; and exiting (see the citations in Brown and Peterson 1993,
Hirschman 1970, Rusbult and her colleagues, Ping 1993).
Formally,
H1a: satisfaction is positively associated with loyalty, voice and organizational
commitment, and negatively associated with opportunism and neglect.
Similarly, attributes of a satisfactory relationship, including goal congruency and
organizational commitment, should also be associated with responses to relationship problems.
Specifically because goal congruency and organizational commitment also make a relationship
perceptually more valuable, they should be positively associated with responses to relationship
problems that do no harm to the relationship, loyalty and voice. Similarly, as goal congruency
and organizational commitment increase and the relationship becomes more valuable, responses
to relationship problems that allow or cause harm to the relationship should be less likely. Thus,
goal congruency and organizational commitment should be negatively associated with
relationship neglect, opportunism, and exiting (also see the citations in Brown and Peterson
1993).
8

Satisfaction has been observed to be negatively associated with exiting when organizational
commitment is not measured (e.g., Netemeyer, Johnson and Burton 1990). However, based on
Williams and Hazers 1986 and other studies (e.g., Davy, Kinicki and Scheck 1991, see Brown
and Peterson 1993 and Mathieu and Zajac 1990 for summaries) the satisfaction-exiting
association should be mediated by organizational commitment (however, see Sager 1994, and
Curry, Wakefield, Price and Mueller 1986--as Brooke, Russell and Price (1988) suggested, the
link between these two variables may be more complex than previous thought and empirical
research have suggested). Specifically, satisfaction should increase organizational commitment,
which then decreases exiting. The relationship is similar to clouds creating rain in order to create
puddles, but clouds not necessarily directly creating puddles. Thus, we should withdraw the
prediction that there is a direct link between satisfaction and exiting, and hypothesize instead that
satisfaction is positively associated with organizational commitment, which in turn is negatively
associated with exiting. Thus, satisfaction should not be directly associated with exiting when
organizational commitment is measured. This is consistent with Rosse and Millers (1984)
arguments that dissatisfied employees first withdraw emotionally before they withdraw
physically.
In summary,
H1b: goal congruency and organizational commitment are positively associated with
loyalty and voice, and negatively associated with opportunism, exiting and neglect.
Previous studies have hypothesized that alternative attractiveness should be negatively
associated with loyalty and neglect, and positively associated with voice, opportunism and exit.
As the attractiveness of alternatives increases and the subject becomes less likely to be passive
when there are relationship problems (Ping 1993), they subject should be more inclined to be
vocal (Rusbult and her collegues, Ping 1993), "even the score up a bit" (opportunism) (Ping
9

1993, Provan and Skinner 1989), or exit (see the citations in Brown and Peterson 1993, Ping
1993, and Rusbult and her collegues). They should also be less inclined to be passive by being
loyal, optimistic silence (Hirschman 1970, Rusbult and her collegues, Ping 1993), or pessimistic
silence, neglect (Rusbult and her collegues, Ping 1993).
However, we disagree with previous arguments that alternative attractiveness should be
positively associated with voice. For example, Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous 1988 and
others have argued that subjects are likely to be active rather than passive in their responses to
relationship problems when there are alternatives, and they should be vocal. Nevertheless, that
alternatives to the present relationship should decrease the likelihood of voice was one of the
reasons for Hirschman's monograph (see Hirschman 1970:44). He argued that, other things being
equal, one is likely to be vocal when there are few alternatives to the present relationship, not
when there are more. Thus, we propose that alternative attractiveness should be negatively
associated with voice.
Thus,
H2: alternative attractiveness is negatively associated with voice, loyalty and neglect, and
positively associated with opportunism and exiting.
Previous research has also argued that relationship investment and switching cost should be
positively associated with the positive responses to relationship problems (loyalty and voice) and
negatively associated with the negative responses (relationship neglect, opportunism and exit).
When sunk costs such as relationship investments, or future costs, switching costs, are high,
subjects should prefer positive responses to relationship problems that safeguard or avoid these
costs (Hirschman 1970, Rusbult and her collegues, Ping 1993), and they should avoid negative
responses that risk losing or incuring these costs (see the citations in Brown and Peterson 1993,
Rusbult and her colleagues, and Ping 1993).
10

However, we disagree that opportunism should be negatively associated with investment and
switching cost (e.g., Ping 1993). Opportunism at the level of an individual could plausibly be
viewed as an equity restoring behavior (see Walster, Berscheid and Walster 1976). Equity as it is
used here, has been characterized as "keeping score" of partner's rewards and costs in a
relationship, relative to the subject's rewards and costs. Equity has been heavily researched, and
the evidence suggests that in high quality relationships partners do not "keep score." However, in
lower quality relationships one or both relationship partners should be acutely aware of any
imbalance of relationship rewards and costs. There, opportunism might unilaterally reduce the
opportunist's relationship cost, and increase their rewards, and/or increase partner's relationship
cost and/or decrease their rewards. While there is always a risk of discovery, if this risk is low
enough or far enough in the future, an opportunistic salesperson, for example, could falsify call
reports (a cost reduction for the salesperson) or inflate expense reports (an increased reward to
the salesperson with an increased cost to the employer) to "even the score up a bit" (improve
equity). Thus, we hypothesize that past relationship investment and the cost to switch
relationships should increase equity restoring activities such as opportunism.
Formally,
H3: investment and switching cost are positively associated with opportunism, loyalty and
voice, and negatively associated with exit and neglect.
Turning to the linkages among the antecedents of responses to relationship problems, agency
theory predicts that principals (e.g., firms) and their agents (e.g., employees) should have
divergent goals (e.g., the firm maximizes its profit while employees maximize their profit) (see
Eisenhardt 1985, Leibenstein 1982). To the extent the organizations goals and objectives
approximate those of the individual (goal congruency) the individual should be attracted to the
organization (Byrne 1969). Over time, sharing similar goals and objectives should be rewarding
11

to the individual. These rewards should increase the subject's satisfaction and strengthen their
identification with the organization, and thus increase an individual's efforts to maintain and
build the relationship (Ouchi 1980), which captures Mowday, Steers and Porters (1979)
definition of the concept of organizational commitment (p. 226). Thus,
H4: goal congruency is positively associated with satisfaction and organizational
commitment.
Using several theoretical arguments, Johnson and Rusbult (1989) proposed that relationship
satisfaction should reduce the attractiveness of alternatives. Because the subject's comparison
level for alternatives (CLalt) with respect to satisfaction should have been increased in a
satisfactory relationship (Thibaut and Kelly 1959), the satisfaction available in alternative
relationships should appear less attractive in comparison. Using similar logic, attributes of a
satisfactory relationship such as goal congruency should raise the subject's CLalt for goal
congruency, and the goal congruency available in alternative relationships should also appear less
attractive. Similarly, using other authors' logical arguments (see Scanzioni 1979) Dwyer, Schurr
and Oh (1987) proposed that in committed relationships alternative relationships should be less
attractive. Johnson and Rusbult (1989) also concluded that greater commitment was associated
with what they termed alternative devaluation. Thus,
H5: satisfaction, organizational commitment and goal congruency are positively associated
with alternative unattractiveness.
Similarly, a satisfactory relationship should perceptually magnify the cost to switch
relationships. Johnson (1982) implied that exiting obtains when cost to stay exceeds the cost to
leave. This hints that when satisfaction is high switching costs may be perceived as high. Rusbult
(1980, p. 174) stated that as satisfaction increases, relationship costs should decrease. Using
comparison level logic (Thibaut and Kelly 1959), because a subject's CLalt for costs in their
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satisfactory relationship should be low (e.g., Walster et al. 1976), the additional costs to switch
relationships should appear unattractive in comparison (e.g., Ping 1990). Depth interviews with a
convenient sample of salespersons suggested no one voluntarily would incur these unnecessary
costs if they are satisfied with their present employer. Using dissonance logic (Festinger 1957),
switching costs that are unnecessary and unattractive are likely to be evaluated as perceptually
high, rather than perceptually low.
Thus, the costs to switch from a satisfactory relationship should appear unattractive (Ping
1990), and satisfaction and switching cost should be positively associated.
Using similar logic, the attributes of satisfactory relationships, including goal congruency and
organizational commitment, should lower the subject's CLalt for costs, and switching costs
should also appear less attractive and thus likely to be judged as high. Thus, the attributes of a
satisfactory relationship, including goal congruency and organizational commitment, should be
positively associated with switching cost.
In summary,
H6: satisfaction, organizational commitment and goal congruency are positively associated
with switching cost.
Using consistency arguments (Festinger 1957), Ping (2003) argued that past investments in a
relationship should be likely to increase the subject's satisfaction with their relationship. Subjects
tend to alter their feelings to be consistent with their past actions (Festinger 1957), in this case
past investments. Since subjects are likely to seek satisfaction rather than dissatisfaction
(Homans 1961), increased investments should be likely to increase satisfaction (rather than
dissatisfaction). This effect should also extend to other feelings in a satisfactory relationship,
such as goal congruency and organizational commitment. Thus,
H7: investment should be positively associated with satisfaction, organizational
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commitment, and goal congruency.
Ping (2003) argued that investments also increase alternative unattractiveness and switching
cost. Investment should be a combination of those investments that are transferable to another
relationship and those that are not. Investments that are nontransferable to alternative
relationships should increase the unattractiveness of these alternatives and the cost to switch to
these alternatives because subjects should not want to lose them and be forced to incur the costs
in time, money and effort to replace them. In turn, the magnitude of the time, money and effort to
replace the nontransferable switching costs should increase the unattractiveness of alternative
relationships (Porter 1980). Thus investment increases alternative unattractiveness and switching
costs, and switching costs increase alternative unattractiveness.
In summary,
H8: investment should be positively associated with alternative unattractiveness and
switching cost; and
H9: switching cost should be positively associated with alternative unattractiveness.
Previous studies lend empirical support to some of these proposals (see Table 3), and the
proposals are summarized in Figure 1.
A TEST OF THE PROPOSED MODEL USING SALESPERSONS
The Figure 1 model was tested using a mailed-out survey of salespersons.
Sampling

The study population was U.S. salespersons who represented a single firm that

also employed them--it excluded independent agents and brokers. The sampling frame was the
subscription list of a major personal selling publication, and the sample was selected using n-th
name selections of 100 pretest salesperson names and addresses, then 900 final-test salesperson
names and addresses.
Pretesting

The final-test mailing was preceded by several scenario analyses that were used to
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preliminarily evaluate the measures. 1 These were followed by the pretest mailing used to gauge
the response rate, and to further assess the psychometric properties of the measures.2 While the
study measures were judged sufficiently reliable and valid for the final test mailing, minor
changes were made to the cover letter, and the questionnaire instructions and format.
Final Test

Two hundred seventy eight usable responses resulted from the final-test mailing, a

31% usable response rate. Based on a comparison of the demographics of the responses and
published salespersons' demographics, the responses were judged to be representative of the
study population.
Measures

The study concepts were measured used existing scales or adaptations or existing

scales. The conceptual and operational definitions of these measures are shown in Table 1. For
example, satisfaction was conceptualized as the subject's global evaluation of relationship
fulfillment (see Brown and Peterson 1993). The conceptual domain of satisfaction was the
overall evaluation of the relationship; an appraisal of the relationship attributes that are rewarding, profitable or instrumental. Its operational definition was the belief that the relationship is
satisfactory, and items included, "All in all, my relationship with my company is very
satisfactory." Satisfaction was initially measured using two scales, one developed by Bagozzi
(1980), and one adapted from a measure developed by Ping (1993). Based on their scenario
analysis, pre- and final-test performances, the second measure was chosen to estimate the Figure
1 structural model.3
Exiting was operationalized as exit propensity, the disinclination to continue the current
relationship, and it was initially measured using two scales, one developed by Bluedorn (1982),
and another adapted from a measure developed by Ping (1993). Based on the scenario analysis
and pretest results the second measure was selected for use in the final test.4
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Goal congruency and opportunism were measured using scales developed by Anderson
(1988), and the measures for alternative attractiveness, switching cost and voice, were adapted
from measures developed by Ping (1993).
Organizational commitment was measured using a scale developed by Mowday, Steers and
Porter (1979). However, it was multidimensional.5 The measures for loyalty, investment, and
neglect, which were adapted from measures developed by Ping (1993), and the opportunism
measure, were also multidimensional. For these multidimensional measures the Factor 1 items of
each scale were used instead of the full measure.6
Reliability and Validity

After minimal item weeding to attain internal consistency,7,8 the

measures were judged to be internally and externally consistent. The reliabilities of the study
variables were above .85, which suggested they were reliable (see Table 2). Example items for
these measures are shown in Table 1.
Each measure was judged to be content or face valid, and each latent variable was correlated
with other latent variables in theoretically plausible directions (see Table 2), which suggested
their construct validity. With one exception, each measure had an Average Variance Extracted
(AVE, the percentage of variance not due to measurement error) (see Fornell and Larker 1981)
above 0.5, which suggested their convergent validity (see Table 2). With the same exception,
each measure's squared correlation, or percentage covariance, with each of the other study
variables was less than their error-free variance percentages, AVE's, of both variables involved in
the correlation, which suggested their discriminant validity (i.e., they were empirically distinct
from one another) (see Fornell and Larker 1981).
Organizational commitment (OC), however, was not convergent or discriminant valid, and it
produced estimation difficulties in the Figure 1 structural model. Its percentage error-free
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variance, AVE, was less than 0.5 (0.47) suggesting it was composed primarily of error variance,
and thus not convergent valid. In addition, its percentage covariance, its squared correlation, with
at least two other study variables, satisfaction and goal congruency, was greater than the
percentage error-free variance, AVE's, of both variables involved in the correlation, suggesting it
was empirically indistinct from these variables--all its error-free variance was involved in
covariance.9 Thus, because OC was composed of more than 50% error variance and it was
empirically identical to several other study variables, retaining OC in the Figure 1 model was
judged to be inappropriate on validity grounds.
Measurement and Structural Models

Nevertheless, two Figure 1 models were estimated

using LISREL 8 and maximum likelihood estimation. Specifically, the revised measurement and
structural models for Figure 1, without Organizational Commitment, were estimated and judged
to fit the data (see Tables 4 and 5).10 And, because of organizational commitment's prominence
in the selling and employment literatures, the Figure 1 model was also estimated with
organizational commitment.
However, lack of discriminant validity usually produces subtle, to obvious, estimation
difficulties because of the higher correlations between one or more latent variables that
frequently attends discriminant invalidity. Estimating the Figure 1 structural model with
organizational commitment initially produced standardized structural coefficients for
organizational commitment that were greater than 1 in absolute value ( |1| ) (see Table 6),
probably because of its near-collinearity with several variables (see Table 2). Standardized
structural coefficients are related to correlations and should be less than or equal to |1| (see
Blalock 1979), suggesting the initial estimates were improper. However, in this case the
standardized structural coefficients greater than |1| could be "remedied" by correlating the
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structural disturbances (ζ's) among the responses to relationship problems and re-estimating (see
Table 7).
Results

The results of estimating these two models, the (remedied) Figure 1 model with

Organizational Commitment (the OC model), and the Figure 1 model without organizational
commitment (the non-OC model), are shown in Tables 7, 4 and 5, and they are summarized in
Table 3. The hypotheses were generally supported by both these estimations. Specifically, each
of the responses to employer problems was significantly associated with one or more proposed
antecedents. In addition, each of the proposed antecedents was associated with one or more
responses to relationship problems, and one or more of their hypothesized antecedents. The
explained variances (R2) ranged from low to comparatively high. The explained variances for of
opportunism and exit, for example, were comparatively high (59% and 69-70% respectively), but
the explained variances of voice, neglect and loyalty were lower (21-24%, 35-40% and 4-8%
respectively) (see Table 4).
DISCUSSION
RESPONSES TO RELATIONSHIP PROBLEMS
Several of the observed direct associations were significant, but their total associations (direct
plus indirect associations) were not, and vice versa. For example, investment's (INV) direct
association with neglect (NEG) was not significant (see Table 3), while its total association, or
total effect, was significant (see Table 8). Because these total effects reflect, for example, INV's
effect on NEG via all the model paths between INV and NEG--the INV --> NEG path, plus the
indirect INV --> satisfaction --> NEG path, plus the indirect INV --> alternatives (ALT) --> NEG
path, plus the indirect INV --> switching cost --> NEG path--we will interpret the Table 8 total
effects.
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The Figure 1 model with Organizational Commitment (OC), the OC model, and the Figure 1
model without organizational commitment, the non-OC model, were interpretationally equivalent
in most cases; their structural coefficients agreed in significance and, for significant structural
coefficients, in sign, except for the ALT-voice association, and the ALT-opportunism and ALTneglect associations. Nevertheless, we primarily will rely on the non-OC model estimates for
interpretation, for the reasons previously mentioned: OC failed to be convergent and discriminant
valid, and its structural model required remediation with correlated structural disturbances to
remove its infeasible standardized structural coefficients greater than 1 in absolute value.
However, we will return to the OC model later.
Discouraging Turnover
In the study, turnover (exiting) was likely to be discouraged by alternative unattractiveness,
investments, switching costs, goal congruency, organizational commitment, and indirectly by
satisfaction. These results support the well-worn prescription in sales management to increase
salespersons' satisfaction in order to reduce the likelihood of turnover. However, increased
relationship-specific investment, from, for example, more product training, and increased
switching cost, with, for example, improved medical or dental insurance, were also likely to play
a (lesser) role in discouraging turnover in the study.
The significant satisfaction, investments and switching costs associations with alternatives
suggested that alternative attractiveness was reduced by increased satisfaction, investments and
switching costs, which in turn were likely to reduce turnover in the study. However, alternative
attractiveness was positively correlated with exiting (see Table 2), so directly reducing alternative
attractiveness instead of relying on satisfaction, investment or switching cost to reduce it may
have directly reduced the likelihood of turnover in the study. This might have been accomplished
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using, for example, "success stories" of clients who switched from the competition.
However, based on the magnitude of their (standardized) total effects, satisfaction and
organizational commitment, followed by goal congruency were most important in discouraging
turnover (see Table 8). Alternatives and switching costs were a distant second, followed by
investment. Thus, busy sales managers in the study should probably have attended first to
satisfaction and goal congruency in their sales force. Once these were progressing satisfactorily,
increasing switching costs and possibly alternative unattractiveness should have been next, and
increasing sales force investments should have been last.
For emphasis, unattractive alternatives, investments and switching costs were (somewhat)
likely to discourage turnover in the study. This was one of the arguments that Allen and Meyer
1990, among others (see Levinger 1979), made regarding relationship commitment: individuals
stay in (appear to be committed to) a relationship either because they want to (i.e., relationship
quality is high) or because they have to (e.g., the alternatives are not attractive, etc.). In this case
salespersons were more likely to stay in their relationship because they wanted to, than because
they had to.
However, this was true only for salespersons with levels of satisfaction and alternative
attractiveness that were at the study average. Ping (1994) proposed there was an interaction
between satisfaction and alternative attractiveness in their association with exiting. This was also
true in the present study. As a result, as satisfaction declined the magnitude of the (positive)
effect of alternative attractiveness on exiting became larger. Eventually, salespersons who had
levels of satisfaction below the study average were likely to stay in their relationship because
they had to--the effect of alternative attractiveness on exiting (its structural coefficient) for these
salespersons was now larger than either the satisfaction or goal congruency effect. As a result, for
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low satisfaction salespersons in the study direct alternative attractiveness reduction efforts by
sales managers may have been more likely to be efficacious than their satisfaction or goal
congruency management.
In a re-estimation of the model containing organizational commitment with the satisfactionto-exiting path free, the direct path between satisfaction and exiting was non significant (β =
-0.193, t = -1.93). While this association might have been significant with a larger sample, its
comparatively small structural coefficient is consistent with other satisfaction-organizational
commitment-exiting studies, and such results add to the evidence that there may be minimal or
no direct relationship between satisfaction and exiting in the presence of organizational
commitment in employee relations.11 However, in the present study this result should be
considered provisional--organizational commitment was empirically indistinct from both
satisfaction and exiting. Nevertheless, for emphasis, in the model containing organizational
commitment, satisfaction was significantly but indirectly associated with exiting, and it was the
"driver" of non-exiting for salespersons with average or above average levels of satisfaction.
We shall return to managing turnover later under Increasing Satisfaction.
Avoiding Employment-Relationship Neglect
As previously discussed, there appears to be a response to relationship problems where the
subject withdraws emotionally from the relationship (Ping 1993) without physically exiting,
relationship neglect. It was conceptualized in the present study as not caring about the
relationship, expending no effort to maintain it, planning to do nothing to improve relationship
conditions, and willingness to let the relationship die. While exiting and opportunism have been
studied at least once in a personal selling context, neglect is unstudied in this context as far as we
know.
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Neglect was negatively correlated with voice in the study, which suggested salespersons who
are neglecting the relationship are not likely to be vocal (complain). Neglect was comparatively
rare in the study. About 7% of the sample did not disagree they were neglecting the relationship,
and in focus groups conducted before the study neglect seemed to be a pessimistic silence about
the likelihood of things getting better, as opposed to loyalty's optimistic silence.
In these focus groups, there may have been two types of neglect: one that attends exiting-mentally "moving on" to the alternative relationship as part of the exiting process. And, there
may have been another type of neglect that was emitted by dissatisfied salespersons who did not
want to exit, possibly because of structural constraints (Ping 1993) such as the alternative
required relocating the family against their will. This was also suggested in the study. Neglect
was positively correlated with exiting (see Table 2), and among salespersons who did not
disagreed they were neglecting the relationship, 66.7% agreed or strongly agreed they intended to
exit the relationship.
However, 33.3% of salespersons in the sample who did not disagreed they were neglecting
the relationship also did not agree they intended to exit. The focus groups results hinted that
among those who were neglecting their relationship but did not intend to exit, structural
constraints may have been perceived as high. Indeed in the study for salespersons who did not
disagree they were neglecting the relationship but did not agree they intended to exit, 66.7%
agreed or strongly agreed switching cost was high.
These results support Rosse and Hulin's (1985) assertions that subjects first emotionally
withdraw from a dissatisfactory committed relationship. However, these results suggest that
exiting may be a separate matter, at least for some--33.3% of salespersons who did not disagree
they were neglecting the relationship were neutral or disagreed they were exiting.
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This had management implications in the study. While as a percentage of the sample neglect
was comparatively rare, it attended exiting for most of those in neglect. Stated differently,
neglect, lax behaviors such as lateness and absenteeism, and disregardful behavior such as
avoidance and lack of contact, was for most salespersons in the study an indicator of those who
were exiting. Parenthetically, salesperson silence might also have suggested relationship neglect
for those salespersons who have been with the organization long enough to perceive they have a
large investment in the relationship--14.8% of the sample were loyal and also silent.
The significant alternatives-neglect (total) association was in an unexpected direction in the
study. Specifically, while its effect was minor when compared to satisfaction and goal
congruency, neglect was increased by alternative attractiveness instead of decreased as
hypothesized. However, this association has been observed to be variously nonsignificant
(Rusbult, et al. 1988), positive (Ping 1993) or negative (Rusbult, et al. 1982) in previous studies,
suggesting it may be sensitive to study context. Specifically, recalling the interviews where
neglect may have attended "moving on," these results suggest that salespersons in the study who
were neglecting their relationship may have been mentally "moving on" to an alternative
relationship and neglecting the relationship as part of their exiting process. Indeed, for
salespersons who did not disagree they were neglecting their relationship, 77.8% agreed the
alternatives were attractive. More important, the positive alternatives-neglect (total) association
suggested these salespersons might not have been concerned about appearances and the attendant
possibility of organizational retaliation as they exited.
For emphasis, it was not the case that structural constraints had little affect on neglect in the
study. Based on the relative magnitudes of their structural coefficients, dissatisfaction and lack of
goal congruency precipitated neglect. However, given relationship neglect (neglect > 3), 77.8%
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of the sample viewed alternatives as attractive, and in a re-estimation of the non organizational
commitment model restricted to salespersons in relationship neglect, alternatives were only the
"driver" of neglect (standardized beta = 0.823, t-value = 2.33)--the other antecedents were nonsignificant. Parenthetically, this effect was so strong that it showed up in the full sample. Thus,
given relationship neglect, alternative attractiveness was likely to have aggravated it.
As an aside, while investment decreased neglect in the full sample and switching cost had no
effect on neglect, given relationship neglect, 88.9% of the sample did not disagree their
relationship investment as high (investment ≥ 3), and 66.7% viewed switching cost as high
(switching cost ≥ 3), suggesting these may have slowed exiting.
Fortunately, satisfaction and goal congruency had the major attenuating effects on neglect
(see Table 8). Thus, primary activities aimed at managing exiting in the study were also likely to
have managed neglect in the study.
We will discuss the positive correlation between neglect and opportunism (see Table 2), a
relationship equity restoring behavior, later.
Cultivating Voice
As previously discussed, voice is positive complaining by those who are willing to
cooperatively work to improve the situation. Voice alerts an organization to its errors of omission
and commission (Hirschman 1970), and it should be negatively associated with exiting
(Hirschman 1970; see Table 2). Thus, it may be desirable to cultivate voice in salespersons.
In the present study voice was likely to be increased by relationship investment, goal
congruency and unattractive alternatives (see Table 8). Of these, the primary drivers of voice
were goal congruence and investment.
Alternative attractiveness was negatively associated with voice as Hirschman (1970)
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predicted. However, in other studies this association has been observed to be either
nonsignificant (Ping 1993, Rusbult et al. 1982) or positive (Rusbult et al. 1988). While other
explanations are plausible, the varied alternative attractiveness-voice associations across studies
suggest this association may depend on context. Specifically, there may be an interaction in the
alternatives-voice association. An interaction can produce a positive association in one study, a
non-significant association in another, and a negative association in a third study. This result will
become clearer later.
Probing the possibility of an interaction with alternatives, we found that satisfaction and
alternatives interacted in their association with voice. The effect of this interaction was that, as
the level of overall satisfaction varied across subjects in the sample, for subjects with low overall
satisfaction alternatives were positively associated with voice. However, for subjects with overall
satisfaction near or above the study average alternatives were negatively associated with voice.
In studies where this interaction was not specified the observed alternatives-voice association
would be approximately the association at the study average of satisfaction (see Aiken and West
199?). Thus, in studies where this association has been nonsignificant (Ping 1993, Rusbult et al.
1982), the study average of overall satisfaction may have been low. This is suggested by the
subjects with low overall satisfaction in the present where alternatives were positively associated
with voice. In another study where the association was positive (Rusbult et al. 1988), the study
average of overall satisfaction may have been higher than the present study. This is suggested by
the subjects with higher overall satisfaction in the present where alternatives were negatively
associated with voice.
We speculate that in the present salesperson context when overall satisfaction was
comparatively high, attractive alternatives may have made it easier to ignore relationship
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problems, thus reducing voice. In that case, one could always change selling organizations if
things were not fixed.
For emphasis, Hirschman (1970) predicted that subjects would become more vocal when
there were few alternatives to the present relationship. Based on the interaction, this may have
applied only to satisfied subjects in the study. However, Hirschman's discussions of voice
suggest his prediction may have assumed satisfied subjects as well. His "voice" was emitted by
subjects willing to cooperatively work to improve the situation. In different terms, they expected
repair. However, Rusbult's predictions that alternative attractiveness should increase voice may
have assumed less satisfied subjects, although this was not apparent in their discussions of voice.
In the consumer literature, Singh (1990) observed several voice "styles" ranging from passive, to
"irate" and "activist," and this may have reflected varying levels of overall satisfaction and
alternatives.
Thus, assuming there are always at least minor employment problems in selling
organizations, and recalling that increasing voice is desirable because it alerts management to
organizational lapses, increasing goal congruency (see the discussion of this topic under
Increasing Satisfaction below), and to a lesser extent increasing relationship investment, with for
example more product training may have been efficacious the study. In addition, assuming a high
satisfaction salesforce, increasing alternative unattractiveness, with for example a newsletter
containing success stories of customers who made the switch from a competitor, might have been
employed to increase voice.
Fornell and Wernerfelt (1987) suggested directly influencing voice in consumers using 800
numbers and quick and competent complaint processing. Variations on this theme for employees
such as cell phone calls, which are difficult to trace, to an 800 number that simply records
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messages, suggestion boxes, or a managerial "open door" policy for complaints might also have
increased voice in the study. Sales managers may also have wished to publicize to their
salespersons successful outcomes proceeding from other salespersons' use of voice. They may
also have actively solicited salesperson voice by asking for their "number one complaint" in sales
meetings or in private. They may also have considered using salesperson satisfaction surveys to
facilitate voice.
The Enigma of Relationship Loyalty
As previously discussed, Hirschman's loyalty, remaining silent, confident that things will get
better, has been characterized as a predisposition to overlook relationship problems because they
fix themselves. These loyal subjects view problems as transitory phenomena; problems work
themselves out or are fixed by others, so they ignore them. In the study, loyalty was positively
associated with satisfaction and switching costs. However, the variance in loyalty explained by
these variables was low. Rusbult et al. (1988) also observed low explained variance in loyalty (R2
= 0.123). Thus, in this context Hirschman's loyalty remains enigmatic (Goodwill 1991) because
its antecedents or drivers, "causes," are not accounted-for by the proposed model. Stated
differently, the proposed model does not convincingly suggest how loyalty is "created" or
maintained in this context.
However, Hirschman (1970) argued that (relationship) loyal subjects should first attempt
voice, and they should exit only if that fails to improve matters. Indeed, freeing the loyalty-tovoice path in the non-organizational commitment model suggested it was significant
(standardized betaloyalty to voice = - 0.451, t-value = -7.67), however the direction of this path could
not be determined.12 Nevertheless, Hirschman's argument hints that subjects might begin a
(committed) relationship with loyalty. Indeed, while there was no overall relationship between
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loyalty and the number of years the subject had been with their present company, tenure was
significantly associated with loyalty among subjects with 2 or fewer years with their present
company (standardized betayears to loyalty = - 0.384, t-value = -2.14). Thus, study subjects may have
begun their relationship as loyal, but were likely to become vocal after about 2 years. Stated
differently, relationship loyalty may have been a dispositional response to relationship problems
in the study attendant to being newly committed to the relationship.
Parenthetically, we probed loyal subjects to determine their "profile" using their average
satisfaction, and their perceived alternative attractiveness, investment, and switching costs.
Salespersons reporting higher loyalty (loyalty greater than 3) also reported above average
satisfaction, alternative unattractiveness, investment, and switching costs. In addition, because
the study subjects may have been loyal for only the first few years, their percentage of the sample
was comparatively small (7%).
Bearing in mind that relationship loyal salespersons may be a small segment, and based on
Hirschman's (1970) and others arguments in effect that efforts to increase loyalty may also
decrease the positive aspects of voice, sales managers interested in preserving loyal behavior in
the study may have maintained high satisfaction and the perception of high switching costs
among those who have recently joined the organization within the last few years.
Holding Opportunism at Bay
Opportunism, surreptitious self-interest seeking, is not new to the personal selling literature.
Anderson (1988) investigated it and found the primary influence on opportunism in salespersons
was goal congruency. This was also true in the present study. However, unattractive alternatives
also decreased opportunism, and the investment-opportunism direct effect was significant and its
total effect approached significance, suggesting that in a larger study it might be significant (see
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Table 8). In fact, these variables explained nearly 60% of the variance in opportunism.
The proposed view of opportunism as an equity-balancing mechanism received some
support. It was positively associated with alternatives, and negatively associated with goal
congruency as hypothesized. However, while investment and switching cost were directly
associated with opportunism as hypothesized, the indirect paths from investment and switching
cost via alternative and goal congruency suppressed these associations because they were
negative in sign. As a result, their combined or total effects were nonsignificant, although the
investment-opportunism effect approached significance suggesting that in a larger sample it
might have been significant. Thus, as past or sunk costs (investments in the relationship)
increased, opportunism may have been (weakly) likely to increase. This suggests that subjects
may have been (weakly) likely to have compensated for some of their past relationship costs
using opportunism, and thus opportunism may have been a (weak) sunk cost re-balancing
mechanism for some subjects in the study context.
Anderson (1988) also observed an hypothesized quadratic in goal congruency (Ouchi 1979).
This quadratic (goal congruency squared) was significant in the present study and it intensified
the investment and switching cost effects so they were significant in total. However, their
comparative effect size when compared to goal congruency still suggested that investments and
switching costs were considerably less important in the study context when compared to goal
congruency and alternative attractiveness. Thus, while the opportunism associations with goal
congruency and investment are predicted by Transaction Cost Analysis (see Anderson 1988), the
alternative association is not, and a fair comparison of the two perspectives on opportunism,
Equity versus Transaction Cost Analysis, is that an equity view generates several novel
hypotheses, one or two of which were weakly "confirmed" in the present study, in that they were
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not strongly disconfirmed.
In study of buyers and suppliers, Jap and Anderson (2003) observed an interaction with
opportunism. In that study, among respondents reporting low opportunism, the goal congruencyopportunism association was nonsignificant, and investment, among other variables, was
significant. With high opportunism, goal congruency was significant, and investment was less so.
In the present study, with high opportunism, alternatives, investment, and goal congruency were
significant and the quadratic in goal congruency was nonsignificant. However, with low
opportunism, satisfaction and the quadratic in goal congruency were significant and goal
congruency was nonsignificant. While other explanations are plausible, this suggests the
antecedents of opportunism may be context dependence.
Turning to the nature of opportunism, 34.8% of the sample disagreed or strongly disagreed
they were opportunistic, suggesting that opportunism may have been common in the sample.
This percentage was reduced to 20% for subjects with high goal congruency and few attractive
alternatives. However, this suggests that while opportunism was likely to have been attenuated
for some in the study, it may also have been an innate human tendency as Williamson (1975),
among others argued.
Opportunism has been characterized as unlikely in individuals (e.g., Hill 1990), and others
have argued that tolerating it may be less expensive than the sacrifices required to reduce it
(Williamson 1981). Nevertheless, recalling that opportunism, for example padded expense
reports, when discovered, might be viewed by outsiders as grounds for dismissal in this era of
Sarbanes-Oxley, it now may be increasingly important to hold opportunism at bay in selling
organizations. Fortunately several management activities that might have increased voice in the
study, and reduced exiting and neglect were also likely to reduce opportunism. Specifically,
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increasing goal congruency and alternative attractiveness reduced the reported opportunism
percentage in the present study to 20%. Of these, increasing the salespersons' perceptions of goal
congruency had the largest effect on opportunism.
Parenthetically, it may have been fortunate that investment had a small effect on opportunism
in the study. These results suggest that investment may be a two-edged sword. Increasing it
should reduce subject mobility (Jackson 1985, Klemperer 1987) and thus their exiting. However,
in the study higher investment appeared to be (weakly) associated with higher opportunism.
Thus, while lower investment might have produced lower opportunism in the study, its effect
may not have been strong enough to dissuade managers in the study from maintaining or
increasing investment because of the mobility reduction effects it should produce.
ANTECEDENTS
Increasing Satisfaction
The hypothesized linkages among antecedents of the responses to relationship problems were
all significant in the hypothesized directions. Investment and goal congruency, for example, were
antecedents of satisfaction. In fact these two antecedents of the responses to relationship
problems explained more than 60% of the variance in satisfaction (see Table 4). However, goal
congruency by far had the largest effect on satisfaction (see Table 8).
The maintenance of relationship satisfaction is obviously desirable in salesperson-employer
relationships. It has been reported to be strongly and positively associated with organizational
commitment in other studies, and it was empirically identical to organizational commitment in
the present study. Because organizational commitment, and indirectly, satisfaction, have been
negatively related to exit intention (see Brown and Paterson 1993), and satisfaction reduced
exiting and neglect, and increased voice and loyalty, in the present study, several new strategies
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for salesperson satisfaction management in the study were suggested. Sixty-one percent of the
variance in relationship satisfaction was explained primarily by goal congruency and to lesser
extent investment (see Table 3). This suggests that satisfaction management activities aimed at
increasing goal congruency and relationship investment may be important to relationship
maintenance in this context.
However, there is little in the personal selling literature on the management of goal
congruency. Thus, it may be instructive to look at the items that composed opportunism. The
logic for looking at opportunism is, using Aristotelian logic, if A implies B, then not B implies
not A. Or, in this case if goal congruency is likely to imply not opportunism, then not
opportunism is likely to imply (not not) goal congruency. Factor 1 of opportunism was composed
primarily of items involving the company's lack of candor, and the requirement for altered facts
and exaggerated needs to get what is needed. Other opportunism items included the requirement
for presenting facts so the subject looks good, and that honesty does not pay. Thus goal
congruency in this context might have been increased, for example, by improved management
candor and reduced difficulty in getting what is needed, presumably for selling or the customer.
Unfortunately, the items of goal congruency are less revealing. The strongest loading item on
goal congruency was the sense of team effort between the subject and the company. Thus, goal
congruency in this context might have been increased using, for example, "beat the boss" golf
outings. Investment might have been increased by increasing relationship specific investments in,
for example, product training, and by emphasizing longevity with valuable awards for longevity.
Parenthetically, the logic involving the items of opportunism suggest a novel approach to
managing turnover using goal congruency. Specifically, since goal congruency was likely to
reduce exiting, improved management candor, reduced difficulty in getting what is needed, and

32

rewarding honesty may have been likely to attenuated exiting.
Reducing Alternative Attractiveness
The Figure 1 satisfaction-alternatives path and the paths to alternatives from investment,
switching cost and goal congruency were all significant in the hypothesized directions (see Table
8). In fact more than half of the variance in alternatives was explained by these variables.
Specifically, satisfaction followed by goal congruency were most likely to decrease alternative
attractiveness in the study. These results suggest that salespersons in the study were likely to
devalue their alternatives, as Johnson and Rusbult (1989) and others argued, primarily as the
relationship quality variables, satisfaction and goal congruency, increased, and secondarily as
structural constraints such as investments and switching costs increased.
Sales managers in the study interested in reducing alternative attractiveness and thus reducing
exiting, neglect and opportunism, and cultivating voice may have considered two approaches:
indirectly by increasing satisfaction, investment, switching costs and goal congruency, and
directly by, for example, tailoring promotional activities specifically for their sales persons in
order to reduce alternative attractiveness. Promoting superior sales support, comparatively or
unilaterally, for example, may be efficacious. Providing "success stories" in newsletters,
ostensibly aimed at customers but directed to sales persons, that tell of other customers who
switched from the competition firms may also be useful.
Increasing Switching Costs
Switching costs had the antecedents satisfaction, investment and goal congruency. Of these
antecedents satisfaction and investment were largest, followed by goal congruency. Thus,
managers in the study interested in increasing switching costs and thus increasing loyalty and
decreasing exiting may have done so by increasing its antecedents, and, for example, increasing
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benefits that would be lost in exiting such as improved educational benefits for the subject or
their family.
Organizational Commitment
Organizational commitment did not perform well in the study. Its discriminant validity has
not been previously investigated as far as we know, and it was discriminant invalid, empirically
indistinct from several other constructs, in the study. For example, organizational commitment's
association with satisfaction in the study may have been due to the fact that all of its variance was
shared with satisfaction or due to measurement error (see Endnote 9 for details). Stated
differently, organizational commitment contained no error-free variance that was not shared with
satisfaction--its squared correlation with satisfaction. This was also true for organizational
commitment and exiting, alternatives and goal congruency in the study (see Table 2).
We probed the itemization of organizational commitment by omitting the six negatively
worded items as Mowday, Steers and Porter (1979) suggested, and by omitting the exiting items
to reduce the overlap with exiting (e.g., Davy, Kinicki and Scheck 1991). Unfortunately, it was
still discriminant invalid, and it produced discriminant invalidity results that were nearly identical
to those reported in Table 2.
We elected not interpret the results of the Figure 1 model with organizational commitment
because the model was difficult to estimate without remediation, and the remediated model's
coefficient estimates did not always agree with those from the Figure 1 model without
organizational commitment. For example, several coefficient estimates involving satisfaction and
alternatives, variables with which organizational commitment was indistinct, were different in
the Figure 1 model with organizational commitment. However, for associations involving
variables with which organizational commitment was distinct, in total it strongly increased voice
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and it strongly decreased neglect, as hypothesized (see Table 8). While such results should be
considered provisional because of the difficulties with organizational commitment just discussed,
this hints that salespersons who are organizationally committed may be likely to be vocal, and by
implication salespersons who are not vocal may also be not likely to be organizationally
committed. In addition, since organizational commitment was subsumed by exiting, salespersons
who are not vocal may also be likely to be exiting.
However, lack of empirical distinctness could be viewed as suggesting alternative
operationalizations of organizational commitment. The rationale is that since all the error-free
variance of organizational commitment is shared with, for example, alternatives, decreasing that
variable should have increased organizational commitment in the study, even though the
association was postulated to be in the opposite direction.
Goal Congruency
While its single hypothesized antecedent, investment, was significantly associated with goal
congruency, this association was comparatively small and it explained little variance in goal
congruency. Nevertheless, goal congruency was a powerful antecedent in the study. It produced
several of the largest associations in the study. For example, its association with satisfaction, and
with opportunism and exiting were second only to the satisfaction association with alternatives
(see Table 8). The management of goal congruency in this study was mentioned previously
during the discussion of satisfaction.
IMPLICATIONS
While generalizing from a single study is risky, most of the plausible implications of the
study results have been discussed above. Nevertheless, most of the structural constraint (Ping
1993) associations with the responses to relationship problems, those involving alternatives,
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investments and switching costs, were significant or approached significance. But, as a group
their effects on the responses were comparatively minor compared to the relationship quality
variables of satisfaction, goal congruency and possibly organizational commitment in the study.
This suggests that busy managers in the study may have preferred to manage relationship quality
before tackling structural constraints.
As far as we know, this is the first investigation of discriminant validity in the Mowday,
Steers and Porter's (1979) organizational commitment scale. As previously discussed,
organizational commitment was operationally the same construct as satisfaction and goal
congruency in the present study, and it was operationally subsumed by alternative attractiveness,
exiting, and perhaps opportunism. While organizational commitment's indistinctness from other
relationship variables might have been remedied by a different operationalization (e.g., Allen and
Meyer 1990), this may be a daunting task. As previously mentioned, re-itemizations of
organizational commitment produced the same lack of discriminant validity in the present study.
Further, Allen and Meyer (1990) have suggested that satisfaction and organizational commitment
are facets of a higher order construct, affective commitment. If this is correct (see Ko, Price and
Mueller 1997), it means that organizational commitment and satisfaction should be highly
correlated: their items should measure the same higher order construct, affective commitment.
While the distinctness or lack thereof in organizational commitment and satisfaction is unknown
in other studies involving them jointly, it may be empirically incorrect to continue to specify
organizational commitment, in the Mowday, Steers and Porter's (1979) sense, with satisfaction,
without first checking their discriminant validity (i.e., to verify that they are empirically distinct
variables).
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FUTURE RESEARCH
Hirschman (1970) implied there is a progression of responses to relationship problems that
begins with his notion of loyalty. Ping (1999) proposed that loyalty is likely to be followed voice,
then neglect and finally exiting. Although loyalty was not highly correlated with voice in the
present study, it might be interesting and instructive to investigate further the correlations among
loyalty, voice, neglect and exit shown in Table 2.
Most of variance in loyalty, voice, neglect, switching cost and goal congruency were
unexplained in the present study. As the satisfaction-alternatives interaction in voice suggested,
interactions and quadratics do not usually explain much variance. Nevertheless, other
(hypothesized) interactions and quadratics might account for some additional variance in loyalty,
voice and neglect. In addition, modeling the plausible linkages among the responses to
relationship problems just mentioned might account for more variance in voice and neglect.
However, we suspect that more theoretical work is needed on loyalty, voice, neglect,
switching cost and goal congruency. For example, the variability in the alternatives-voice
association should probably be investigated further. Post hoc probing uncovered an interaction
with satisfaction in that association. However, based on the low explained variance in voice,
additional variability may be due to the absence of important explanatory variables--the missing
variables problem (see James 1980, Ping 2004). There was also evidence of two sub segments of
neglect based on whether or not they intended to exit the relationship. Turning to voice, although
there was little evidence of it in the present study, vocal subjects may return to being loyal if
voice is efficacious. In addition, Hirschman's loyalty may be a personality trait for some: Singh
(1990) found some consumers were passive when it came to voice, and in the present study 28%
of the sales persons with more than 15 years with the same employer agreed they were loyal.
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The study results suggest the notion of organizational commitment may also need more work.
Summarizing recent arguments by several authors (e.g., Allen and Meyer 1990) and our own
thoughts on relationship commitment, it should be a combination of wanting to stay in the
relationship, and having to stay in the relationship (Johnson 1982). Wanting to stay in a
relationship may have several facets including satisfaction and affective attachment, and possibly
a moral belief that one ought to stay in the relationship, and a contribution to one's identity
provided by the relationship. Affective attachment may have facets including the acceptance of
relationship norms and values, a willingness to exert effort on behalf of partner, and the desire to
remain in the relationship. Having to stay in a relationship may have several facets including
alternatives, investments and switching costs. However, recent attempts to operationalize a
multifaceted (organizational) commitment have suggested its operationalization and specification
also may need work (e.g., Ko, Price and Mueller 1997).
Little is known about interventions to reduce neglect and turnover (exiting). While its
comparatively large associations suggest that goal congruency may provide a fresh approach to
attenuating neglect and turnover, there are no studies that address the efficacy of what might
work.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This research investigated a revised Hirschman-Rusbult-Ping model of responses to
relationship problems, loyalty, voice, opportunism, neglect, as well as turnover (exit) propensity
in a personal selling context. The model included the new antecedents, organizational
commitment and goal congruency, in addition to satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, past
relationship investment and switching cost, and it contained proposed linkages among the model
antecedents.
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The research also proposed an alternative theoretical view of employee opportunism, as an
equity-restoring mechanism, to generate several unexplored associations. Further, it argued that
several hypotheses in the Hirschman-Rusbult-Ping model were incorrectly stated in the past.
The model test suggested additional insight into Hirschman's loyalty, and Rusbult et al.'s
(1982) neglect. In addition, the magnitude of the goal congruency associations hinted at a fresh
approach to managing turnover using goal congruency. It also produced unexpected findings
such as the discriminant invalidity of organizational commitment in the study. Specifically, the
relationship between salesperson overall satisfaction and their organizational commitment was
more complex in the study than previous research has suggested. Relationship satisfaction was
empirically indistinct from organizational commitment using two measures of satisfaction and a
well-researched measure of organizational commitment. While it may yet be possible to
operationally separate these constructs, the present results hint there may be little practical
difference between these two mental constructs for salespersons.
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Figure 1- (Abbreviated) Hypothesized Models
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Organizational commitment (OC) was excised from the final structural model because it was
empirically indistinct from satisfaction (SAT) and Goal Congruency (GCon), and it was subsumed by
several other model variables (see Footnote b in Table 2).
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Table 1- Summary of the Study Measures
Construct

Conceptual
Definition

Satisfaction
(SAT)

A global evaluation of
relationship fulfillment.

Organizational
Commitment
(OC)
Goal
Congruency
(GCon)

Identification and involvement in an organization.

Alternative
Attractiveness
(ALT)
(Past)
Investment
(INVST)
Switching
Cost
(SCost)

The perception that what
is beneficial or harmful to
one relationship party is
beneficial or harmful to
the other.
A global evaluation of the
relationship fulfillment available in the best
available alternative relationship.
The cost to build and
maintain the current relationship in anticipation
of future exchanges
The cost to change to an
alternative relationship.

Loyalty
(LOY)

Abiding
relationship
problems in silence with
confidence that things will
get better.

Voice
(VOI)

Constructive attempts by
the subject to change
objectionable relationship
conditions.

Neglect
(NEG)

Allowing the relationship
to deteriorate.

Exit
Propensity
(EXI)
Opportunism
(OPP)

The disinclination to continue the current relationship.
Self interest seeking with
guile.

Conceptual Domain

Operational
Definition

Sample Item

Overall rating of the relationship;
an appraisal of the relationship
attributes that are rewarding,
profitable, or instrumental.
The degree to which the individual
identifies and is involved with the
organization.

The belief that the
relationship is satisfactory.

All in all, my relationship with
my company is very satisfactory.

Belief that the employer
is the best possible
choice of employers.

I really care about the fate of
this organization.

Common beliefs, actions, etc.
between the relationship partners.

The belief that the
salespersons' and the
company's goals and
objectives are comparable.
Satisfaction
believed
available in the best
alternative relationship,
above that available in
the current relationship.
Magnitude of the cost
that went into building
and maintaining the
current relationship.
The cost and loss that
would be required to
terminate the current relationship and secure an
alternative relationship.
The predisposition to
overlook problems because they fix themselves.

Our salespeople strongly feel
that they and the company work
for
common
goals
and
objectives.

The intention to notify
constructively and work
with partner to solve relationship problems.

I will suggest changes if I have
problems with the company.

Planning to do nothing
to improve conditions
in the relationship.

If things are not right with my
employer I will consider letting
the relationship die a slow
death.
I will probably consider
working for another company in
the near future.
Our salespeople feel they
sometimes have to exaggerate
their needs in order to get what
they really need from the
company.

An overall evaluation of the most
salient and available alternative
relationship,
and
generalized
perceptions of the rewards
available in that relationship.
Economic (e.g., money), activity
(e.g., effort), and opportunity costs
(e.g., time).
Economic, activity, and opportunity cost to end the current relationship and secure an alternative
relationship, and the psychic cost
to achieve this end.
Viewing problems as transitory
phenomena that fix themselves;
from the subject's perspective,
problems work themselves out or
are fixed by others, so the subject
ignores them.
Actively seeking problem removal
by contacting relationship partner
in a positive relationship preserving manner, and cooperatively
discussing and working with
partner to improve the situation.
Not caring about the relationship,
expending no effort to maintain the
relationship, and willingness to let
the relationship deteriorate.
Thinking of exiting, intending to
search for alternatives, evaluating
alternatives, intending to exit.
Actions that maximize one's selfinterest at the expense of the
relationship partner.

Planning to leave the
relationship.
The
belief
that
salespersons in the
company must deceive
the company to get
what they need.

In general, I would be __ satisfied
with the alternative company
than/as I am with my company. a.
Much more b. Slightly more c. As
d. Slightly less e. Much less

Overall I have invested a lot in
the relationship with my
company.
Considering everything, the
costs to leave my current
employer and join the best
alternative company would be
high.
I will disregard any problem I
have with this organization
because I am sure that things
will be better soon.

Table 2- Correlations, Reliabilities and Average Extracted Variances (AVE) a
SAT
ALT
INVST
SCost
LOY
VOI
OPP
EXI
NEG
GCon
b
OC
2
corr(*,OC)
AVE
Reliability

SAT
-------1.0000
-0.7108
0.2350
0.3442
0.0843
0.2466
-0.5485
-0.7308
-0.5798
0.7718
0.8892
0.7907
0.7252
0.9452

OPP
EXI
NEG
Gcon
b
OC
2
corr(*,OC)
AVE
Reliability

OPP
-------1.0000
0.4362
0.3722
-0.7165
-0.6491
0.4213
0.6048
0.8793

ALT
--------

INVST
--------

SCost
--------

LOY
--------

VOI
--------

1.0000
-0.1411
-0.4409
-0.1229
-0.2497
0.4767
0.7579
0.4718
-0.5533
-0.7296
0.5323
0.7420
0.9400

1.0000
0.3888
-0.0488
0.2782
0.1245
-0.1949
-0.1402
0.1416
0.1715
0.0294
0.8055
0.9610

1.0000
0.1383
0.1091
-0.0218
-0.5093
-0.1386
0.1981
0.2891
0.0836
0.6181
0.8786

1.0000
-0.4479
0.0932
-0.1255
0.1133
0.0328
-0.0050
0.0000
0.5392
0.8518

1.0000
-0.2712
-0.2143
-0.4141
0.3611
0.3653
0.1334
0.7754
0.9651

EXI
--------

NEG
--------

GCon
--------

OC
--------

1.0000
0.5104
-0.5996
-0.7420
0.5505
0.8721
0.9757

1.0000
-0.4289
-0.6049
0.3660
0.7650
0.9476

1.0000
0.8364
0.6995
0.6814
0.9099

1.0000
0.4726
0.8757

________________________
a

Error disattenuated correlations from the Figure 1 measurement model containing organizational commitment
(OC). The correlations in the Figure 1 measurement model without OC differed from those shown in the third
decimal place.
b
Organizational commitment (OC) was judged to be empirically indistinct from SAT, ALT, EXI, and GCon, and
nearly so for OPP (see Table 1 for definitions of SAT, ALT, etc.). OC and SAT for example had more shared or
common variance, the square of their correlation .8892 2 = .7907, than either one had in error-free variance--their
AVE's (= .4726 and .7252 respectively). Stated differently, all of the error free variance of OC, 47.26%, and all of
the error free variance of SAT, 72.52%, was shared between the two variables (the square of their correlation .8892 2
= 79.07%) (i.e., OC and SAT were empirically the same variable). However, because SAT was empirically distinct
from the other study variables while OC was not in several other cases (OC and ALT, for example had more shared

Table 2 (cont'd.)- Correlations, Reliabilities and Average Extracted Variances (AVE)

DISCRIMINANT VALIDITY OF OC…
Squared
Correlation
AVE of:
of:
AVE of:
Conclusion:
SAT
SAT-OC
OC
0.7252
0.7907
0.4726
SAT & OC empirically identical constructs.
ALT
0.7420

ALT-OC
0.5323

OC
0.4726

OC empirically subsumed by ALT.

OPP
0.6048

OPP-OC
0.4213

OC
0.4726

OC almost empirically subsumed by OPP.

EXI
0.8721

EXI-OC
0.5505

OC
0.4726

OC empirically subsumed by EXI.

GC
0.6814

GC-OC
0.6995

OC
0.4726

GCon & OC empirically identical constructs.

________________________
variance, r(ALT,OC)2 = -.72962 = 53.23%, than OC had in error-free variance--i.e., all of OC's error free variance,
47.26%, was shared with ALT), OC was reluctantly removed from the Figure 1 model. The alternative, retaining OC,
was judged to be inappropriate not only because OC was convergent and discriminant invalid, the Figure 1 structural
model containing OC also produced standardized structural coefficients for OC that were greater than 1, probably
because of the near-collinearity between SAT and OC, and inflated standard errors that resulted in many
nonsignificant structural coefficients.

Table 3- Present and Previous Studies' Associations a
Present Study…
Previous Studies…
Observed…
Ping
Rusbult
Hypoth(Total Effects)
(1993)
et al. (1982)
Association
esized
No OC
With OC (Channels) (Romantic)
SAT-LOY
-VOI
-OPP
-EXI
-NEG
-ALT
-INV
-Scost
-OC
ALT-LOY
-VOI
-OPP
-EXI
-NEG
INVST-LOY
-VOI
-OPP
-EXI
-NEG
-ALT
-SCost
SCost-LOY
-VOI
-OPP
-EXI
-NEG
-ALT
GCon-LOY
-VOI
-OPP
-EXI
-NEG
-SAT
-ALT
-INV
-SCost
-OC
OC-LOY
-VOI
-OPP
-EXI
-NEG
-ALT
-INV
-SCost

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

NS(+)
NS
NS
+
+
NS
+
+
+
NS
+
+
NS
NS
NS
+
+
NS
NS
NS
NS
+
+
+
+

NS
NS
NS
+
+
+
NS
NS
NS(+)
+
NS
NS
+
+
NS
NS
NS
+
+
NS
NS
NS
NS
+
+
+
+
+
NS(-)
+
NS
NS

NS
+
NS
-

Rusbult
Anderson
Ping
et al. (1988)
(1988)
(2003)
(Employment) (Sales) (Channels)

+
+

+
+

-

-

b

+

b
+

NS
NS
+
+
+
NS
+
NS
NS
-

NS

+

+
+
+

+
NS
+
+

-

-

+

+
+
NS
NS
NS
NS
-

-

________________________
a

See Table 1 for definitions of SAT, VOI, etc. A + sign denotes a positive association, a - sign indicates a negative
association. NS denotes a nonsignificant association while a + or a - in parentheses indicates that the observed
association "approached" significance in the indicated direction (+ for positive, etc.) (i.e., the association may have
been significant in a larger sample).
b
Directionality was reversed.

Table 4- Figure 1 Structural Model Parameter Estimates without Organizational Commitment
Loadings
Indicator
sa1

SAT
0.8190
16.6972
sa2 1.0000
0.8827
24.2451
0.8740
19.6358
sa5 0.6313
16.2180
sa6 0.8722
23.6800
sa8 0.8719
23.4977

Indicator
al1
al3

sa3

al4

sa4

al5

vo1
vo2
vo3
vo4
vo5

VOI
0.9815
19.2481
0.9843
21.6612
0.9422
22.5981
0.9962
28.4170
1.0000

al6
al7

ALT
0.7853
21.4304
0.8933
21.3655
1.0000
0.8663
27.2304
0.6283
17.3242
0.7216
21.8915

Indicator
INVST
in1 0.8051
19.3949
in3 0.9082
25.4474
in4 0.9467
29.6946
in5 1.0000

Indicator
sc1

in6

sc5

in8

OPP
0.9481
17.7792
op2 1.0000

0.8997
32.6639
0.9886
41.6565

EXI
ex2 1.0000

op1

ex3 0.8634
25.8303
ex4 0.9836
42.4323
ex5 0.9748
40.0606
ex7 0.9301
36.3543
ex8 0.9514
27.7816

op3

0.6279
12.5078
op4 0.8620
14.8718
op5 0.7203
13.1706

vo6

0.9465
25.3691
0.9502
23.3282
vo9 0.9472
22.4012

sc2
sc3
sc4

sc6

SCost
0.3476
6.5969
0.3775
6.7198
0.8802
25.6674
0.9769
29.7372
1.0000

Indicator
lo1
lo2
lo5
lo7
lo11

LOY
0.8430
11.3335
1.0000
0.9580
13.8702
0.9097
12.8223
0.8329
10.8169

0.9115
24.7156

NEG
0.8593
19.6772
ne13 0.9974
28.4627
ne15 1.0000
ne9

ne16 0.9704
27.3460
ne17 0.7886
22.8762
ne18 0.7036
15.7273

gcon1
gcon2
gcon3
gcon4
gcon5

GCon
0.9767
18.3070
0.9403
20.0650
1.0000
0.9584
16.9452
0.7636
14.0048

vo8

Betas (Unstandardized)

SAT

SAT
--

ALT -0.6162
-7.4917
INVST
-Scost
LOY
VOI
OPP
EXI
NEG
GCon

0.3903
3.8333
0.0911
1.1068
-0.1629
-2.2744
0.0515
0.5252
-0.3845
-4.0768
-0.4066
-4.4921
--

ALT
-----0.0260
-0.4207
-0.1185
-2.2083
0.2076
2.8223
0.4836
6.7556
0.1614
2.3975

INV
0.1784
3.0229
0.1573
2.3661
-0.4654
5.6226
-0.1112
-1.8308
0.2444
4.6253
0.2767
3.8350
0.0598
0.8683
-0.0640
-0.9734
0.1924
2.2660

SCT

-0.2564
-5.2689
--0.0908
1.9583
-0.0530
-1.3262
0.1114
2.0335
-0.2716
-5.1283
0.1061
2.1108

GCon
0.7683
13.9322
-0.0472
-0.6008

-0.1446
-1.4064
-0.0894
-1.2786
0.2770
4.4870
-0.7216
-8.0540
-0.1401
-1.7607
0.0108
0.1426

Construct
Beta
t-value
Beta
t-value
Beta
t-value
Beta
t-value
Beta
t-value
Beta
t-value
Beta
t-value
Beta
t-value
Beta
t-value
Beta
t-value

Construct
Loading
t-value
Loading
t-value
Loading
t-value
Loading
t-value
Loading
t-value
Loading
t-value
Loading
t-value
Construct
Loading
t-value
Loading
t-value
Loading
t-value
Loading
t-value
Loading
t-value
Loading
t-value
Loading
t-value
Loading
t-value

Table 4 (con't.)- Figure 1 Structural Model Parameter Estimates without Organizational
Commitment
PSI's
SAT
0.3710
8.5366

ALT
0.4281
9.5264

INVST Construct
0.4937 Psi
11.1461 t-value

SCost
0.8062
10.5637

LOY
0.3428
7.7010

VOI
Construct
0.2798 Psi
9.5952 t-value

OPP
0.4017
7.5283

EXI
0.4694
10.1240

NEG
0.4360
9.6821

GCon
0.8992
8.8693

Construct
Psi
t-value
Construct
Psi
t-value

SQUARED MULTIPLE CORRELATIONS
SAT
ALT
INVST
0.6113
0.5601
--

SCost
0.2262

LOY
Construct
0.0465 R Sqd
GCon Construct
0.0199 R Sqd

VOI
0.2173

OPP
0.5934

EXI
0.6906

NEG
0.3558

Measurement Errors
sa1
0.4717
11.2372
sa8
0.1834
9.9592
al7
0.2071
10.5573
in8
0.0418
8.2910
sc6
0.2873
10.2798
vo1
0.1778
11.1963
vo8
0.0902
10.5962
op5
0.5633
10.7800
ex8
0.3616
11.1240
ne18
0.3001
11.3853

sa2
0.2197
9.7672
al1
0.2601
10.6349
in1
0.2125
11.4538
sc1
0.7715
11.8122
lo1
0.3155
10.3791
vo2
0.1247
10.8904
vo9
0.1033
10.7703
ex2
0.1452
9.7343
ne9
0.2485
10.9714
gcon1
0.3507
9.8059

sa3
0.1655
9.6937
al3
0.3393
10.6455
in3
0.1450
11.0658
sc2
0.8760
11.8090
lo2
0.1905
8.2870
vo3
0.0992
10.7357
op1
0.3649
8.8326
ex3
0.3619
11.2615
ne13
0.0850
8.1671
gcon2
0.2139
8.7069

sa4
0.3401
10.8526
al4
0.1382
8.0028
in4
0.1074
10.6680
sc3
0.2414
10.0906
lo5
0.1831
8.4478
vo4
0.0402
8.6775
op2
0.3110
7.9204
ex4
0.0832
8.2306
ne15
0.1347
9.5406
gcon3
0.3316
9.5745

sa5
0.3025
11.2859
al5
0.1505
9.1967
in5
0.0325
7.2298
sc4
0.1894
8.9385
lo7
0.2384
9.5302
vo5
0.0789
10.2463
op3
0.4913
10.9255
ex5
0.1093
9.1515
ne16
0.0991
8.8625
gcon4
0.4504
10.3370

sa6
0.1780
9.8983
al6
0.2868
11.1691
in6
0.0752
10.2997
sc5
0.0966
6.1108
lo11
0.3553
10.5853
vo6
0.0644
10.0830
op4
0.5695
10.3041
ex7
0.1486
10.0759
ne17
0.1320
10.4193
gcon5
0.5158
11.0381

Indicator
Theta-Eps
t-value
Indicator
Theta-Eps
t-value
Indicator
Theta-Eps
t-value
Indicator
Theta-Eps
t-value
Indicator
Theta-Eps
t-value
Indicator
Theta-Eps
t-value
Indicator
Theta-Eps
t-value
Indicator
Theta-Eps
t-value
Indicator
Theta-Eps
t-value
Indicator
Theta-Eps
t-value

MODEL FIT STATISTICS: a
Chi Square/df/p-value/RMSEA/CFI/GFI/AGFI = 4629/1675/0.0/0.0798/0.8546/0.6487/0.6162

________________________
a

There is little agreement on model-to-data fit statistics (e.g., Bollen and Long 1993). GFI and AGFI may be
inadequate for fit assessment in larger models (see Anderson and Gerbing 1984). A Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of
0.90 or higher suggests acceptable fit (see McClelland and Judd 1993). A Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation (RMSEA) of 0.05 suggests close fit, an RMSEA between 0.051-0.08 suggests acceptable fit (Brown
and Cudeck 1993, Jöreskog 1993).

Table 5- Figure 1 Measurement Model Parameter Estimates without Organizational Commitment
Loadings (see Table 4--loadings were identical to the third decimal place +/- .009)

PHI
SAT

ALT

INVST

Scost

LOY

VOI

OPP

EXI

NEG

GCon

OPP

EXI

NEG

GCon

SAT
0.9529
(0.0978)
9.7464
-0.6847
(0.0758)
-9.0291
0.1609
(0.0435)
3.6959
0.3428
(0.0660)
5.1952
0.0480
(0.0379)
1.2666
0.1437
(0.0374)
3.8443
-0.5299
(0.0728)
(7.2809)
-0.8788
(0.0945)
(9.3021)
-0.4647
(0.0593)
(7.8392)
0.7204
(0.0791)
9.1042
OPP
0.9800
(0.1098)
8.9259
0.5319
(0.0855)
6.2224
0.3022
(0.0563)
5.3678
-0.6793
(0.0800)
-8.4965

ALT

INV

SCT

LOY

VOI

0.9746
(0.0936)
10.4141
-0.0978
(0.0432)
-2.2646
-0.4443
(0.0688)
-6.4553
-0.0719
(0.0386)
-1.8624
-0.1472
(0.0378)
-3.8951
0.4657
(0.0707)
6.5907
0.9216
(0.0955)
9.6502
0.3824
(0.0565)
6.7718
-0.5227
(0.0703)
-7.4307

0.4937
(0.0443)
11.1455
0.2789
(0.0474)
5.8836
(0.0202)
(0.0269)
(0.7495)
0.1167
(0.0268)
4.3592
0.0868
(0.0446)
1.9445
-0.1687
(0.0536)
(3.1466)
-0.0809
(0.0358)
(2.2618)
0.0946
(0.0426)
2.2194

1.0422
(0.0963)
10.8193
0.0836
(0.0399)
2.0940
0.0665
(0.0379)
1.7578
-0.0219
(0.0649)
(0.3373)
-0.6404
(0.0871)
(7.3550)
-0.1163
(0.0525)
(2.2169)
0.1924
(0.0632)
3.0438

0.3494
(0.0458)
7.6289
(0.1581)
(0.0261)
(6.0679)
0.0544
(0.0398)
1.3681
-0.0916
(0.0475)
(1.9287)
0.0549
(0.0319)
1.7193
0.0191
(0.0377)
0.5056

0.3567
(0.0363)
9.8333
-0.1601
(0.0394)
(4.0622)
-0.1577
(0.0460)
(3.4256)
-0.2031
(0.0333)
(6.0946)
0.2060
(0.0389)
5.2914

EXI

NEG

Gcon

1.5174
(0.1395)
10.8791
0.5163
(0.0707)
7.2992
-0.7064
(0.0887)
-7.9638

0.6739
(0.0678)
9.9454
-0.3369
(0.0552)
-6.0980

0.9170
(0.1033)
8.8814

Construct
Phi/Psi
SE
t-value
Phi/Psi
SE
t-value
Phi/Psi
SE
t-value
Phi/Psi
SE
t-value
Phi/Psi
SE
t-value
Phi/Psi
SE
t-value
Phi/Psi
SE
t-value
Phi/Psi
SE
t-value
Phi/Psi
SE
t-value
Phi/Psi
SE
t-value
Construct
Phi/Psi
SE
t-value
Phi/Psi
SE
t-value
Phi/Psi
SE
t-value
Phi/Psi
SE
t-value

Measurement Errors (see Table 4--measurement errors were identical to the third decimal place +/- .010)
MODEL FIT STATISTICS: a
Chi Square/df/p-value/RMSEA/CFI/GFI/AGFI = 4528/1665/0.0/0.0788/0.8591/0.6556/0.6215

________________________
a

There is little agreement on model-to-data fit statistics (e.g., Bollen and Long 1993). GFI and AGFI may be
inadequate for fit assessment in larger models (see Anderson and Gerbing 1984). A Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of
0.90 or higher suggests acceptable fit (see McClelland and Judd 1993). A Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation (RMSEA) of 0.05 suggests close fit, an RMSEA between 0.051-0.08 suggests acceptable fit (Brown
and Cudeck 1993, Jöreskog 1993).

Table 6- Figure 1 Structural Model Results with Organizational Commitment a
BETAS (with t-values)

SAT

SAT
----------

ALT
----------

INVST
----------

SCost
----------

GCon
----------

OC
----------

ALT

---

---

---

---

---

-1.1554
-4.0763

INV

---

---

---

---

---

---

SCost

---

---

---

---

---

---

LOY

1.3675
4.8324

-0.5014
-3.3360

-0.1676
-1.9670

0.0631
0.6625

0.7381
3.4473

-2.3304
-5.1920

VOI

-1.4899
-5.6779

0.2549
1.9023

0.3253
4.2330

-0.0018
-0.0217

-0.4235
-2.2218

2.3153
5.6212

OPP

0.3419
2.1314

0.0904
1.0331

0.1878
3.6374

0.0934
1.6234

-0.4721
-3.8271

-0.5749
-2.3626

EXI

---

0.3157
4.6468

0.0230
0.5809

-0.2438
-5.4478

0.0338
0.3758

-0.4753
-4.0789

NEG

0.3327
1.6686

-0.1350
-1.2235

-0.0762
-1.2019

0.0724
1.0194

0.6529
4.0937

-1.6279
-5.0725

---

---

---

0.0160
0.4875

0.3713
7.0187

---

GCon
OC

--0.6449
11.0894

-----

---0.0384
-1.2318

MODEL FIT STATISTICS:b
Chi Square/df/p-value/RMSEA/CFI/GFI/AGFI = 5929/2166/0.0/0.0792/0.8348/
0.6231/0.5918

________________________
a

Standardized structural coefficients. The table reads from column to row. For example the standardized association
between SAT and VOI was -1.4899, and the corresponding unstandardized association had a significance of t = 5.6779. Because standardized structural coefficients should be between 0 and 1 in absolute value ( |1| ), the
standardized structural coefficients greater than |1| for SAT-LOY, SAT-VOI, OC-ALT, OC-LOY, OC-VOI, and OCNEG suggest there is something wrong. See Table 7 for a revised model and see Table 1 for the definitions of SAT,
VOI, etc.
b
There is little agreement on model-to-data fit statistics (e.g., Bollen and Long 1993). GFI and AGFI may be
inadequate for fit assessment in larger models (see Anderson and Gerbing 1984). A Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of
0.90 or higher suggests acceptable fit (see McClelland and Judd 1993). A Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation (RMSEA) of 0.05 suggests close fit, an RMSEA between 0.051-0.08 suggests acceptable fit (Brown
and Cudeck 1993, Jöreskog 1993).

Table 7- Figure 1 Model Results with Organizational Commitment and Correlated Structural
Disturbances*
BETAS (with t-values)
SAT
----------

INVST
-------0.1284
3.0281

SCost
----------

GCon
-------0.7536
14.0577

OC
----------

---

0.0937
2.0302

-0.2535
-5.1847

0.1764
1.8858

-0.6008
-3.9499

---

---

---

---

SCost

0.3184
2.0487

---

0.3222
5.6350

---

LOY

0.3412
1.8560

-0.1851
-1.6285

-0.1253
-1.7544

VOI

-0.5137
-3.2150

-0.0824
-0.8442

OPP

0.1441
1.1146

EXI

---

SAT
ALT

-0.2458
-2.0371

INV

NEG

-0.2099
-1.4888

GCon
OC

--0.6125
10.0692

ALT
----------

---

---

-0.1709
-1.4192

0.0926
0.4792

0.1271
1.5956

0.1456
0.9986

-0.5804
-2.3142

0.2867
4.6222

-0.0626
-0.9138

0.2406
1.9140

0.5297
2.4569

0.1577
1.9642

0.1953
3.8440

0.1058
1.8785

-0.6037
-5.6631

-0.2216
-1.2694

0.3337
5.2847

0.0226
0.5821

-0.2444
-5.5549

-0.0095
-0.1189

-0.4313
-4.1846

0.0499
0.5627

-0.0550
-0.9877

0.1076
1.7211

0.2874
2.4915

-0.6457
-3.2912

---

0.1415
2.2740

---

---

---

---

-0.0247
-0.7528

---

0.3627
6.2303

---

SQUARED MULTIPLE CORRELATIONS FOR STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS (EXPLAINED VARIANCE)
SAT
-------0.6118

ALT
-------0.6146

INVST
-------- -

SCost
-------0.2281

LOY
-------0.0810

OPP
-------0.5944

EXI
-------0.7024

NEG
-------0.4063

GCon
-------0.0200

OC
-------0.8526

VOI
-------0.2448

________________________
* Standardized structural coefficients. The table reads from column to row. For example the standardized association
between SAT and VOI was -0.5137, and the corresponding unstandardized association had a significance of t = 3.2150. See Table 1 for the definitions of SAT, VOI, etc.

Table 8- Total Effects for Figure 1 Structural Model
Betas from
non-OC

SAT

Fig. 1 Model

SAT

ALT

INV

--

--

0.2346

0.7533 Beta

3.8884

13.9322 t-value

a

ALT -0.7093

--

-8.4980

SCT

GCon

Construct

-0.1407

-0.2653

-0.5441 Beta

-2.3019

-5.2689

-9.2869 t-value

INVST

--

--

--

--

Scost

0.3735

--

0.3888

--

--

Beta
t-value

3.8333
LOY

0.2364

-0.0428

-0.0494

0.1659

0.0147 Beta

2.0897

-0.4206

-0.7652

2.2379

0.2209 t-value

-0.1655

0.2797

-0.0386

-1.6459

-2.2082

4.7138

-0.5997

5.6698 t-value

OPP -0.0528

0.2060

0.1248

0.0597

-0.7527 Beta

-0.6471

2.8223

1.9727

1.1166

-12.8138 t-value

EXI -0.6637

-0.5822 Beta

0.3365 Beta

0.3872

-0.1948

-0.3278

-8.5573

6.7555

-3.2622

-7.2001 -10.4291 t-value

NEG -0.5709

0.1935

-0.1422

0.0802

-0.4372 Beta

-6.2022

2.3975

-2.3361

1.3545

-7.2579 t-value

Betas from

with OC

2.4753 t-value

VOI -0.1612

GCon

Fig. 1 Model

6.7679

0.1456 Beta

SAT

--

0.1411

Beta

2.2660

t-value

SAT

ALT

INV

--

--

0.2350

0.7536

3.8969

14.0577

a

ALT -0.7131

--

-8.5625

SCT

GCon

OC

Construct
Beta
t-value

-0.1411

-0.2535

-0.5441

-0.6243 Beta

-2.3078

-5.1847

-9.3152

-3.9014 t-value

INVST

--

--

--

--

--

Scost

0.3758

--

0.3888

--

0.1459

0.0926 Beta

Beta

2.4811

0.4792 t-value

t-value

3.8572
LOY

6.7680

0.1617

-0.1851

-0.0488

0.1741

0.0407

-0.453 Beta

1.4191

-1.6285

-0.7552

2.3342

0.6064

-1.9648 t-value

VOI -0.1504

-0.0824

0.2784

-0.0417

0.3285
5.5154

0.5754 Beta

-1.5250

-0.8442

4.6902

-0.6506

OPP -0.0657

0.1577

0.1245

0.0659

-0.7492

-0.3102 Beta

-0.7997

1.9642

1.9670

1.2437

-12.7479

-1.9088 t-value

2.8882 t-value

EXI -0.5969

-0.5846

-0.6623 Beta

0.3337

-0.1951

-0.3290

-8.4901

5.2847

-3.2667

-7.3528 -10.5025

-5.4387 t-value

NEG -0.6052

0.0499

-0.1402

0.0943

-0.4178

-0.6669 Beta

-6.5130

0.5627

-2.3032

1.6207

-6.8956

-3.6877 t-value

--

--

0.1415

--

--

--

--

0.8294

--

GCon

2.2740
OC

0.6192
10.0692

--

0.1721
2.7493

Beta
t-value

14.5969

Beta
t-value

________________________
a

Standardized total effects. The table reads from column to row. For example the standardized total effect of SAT on
ALT was -0.7093, and the corresponding unstandardized total effect had a significance of t = -8.4980.

Endnotes

1. A scenario analysis is an experiment using the study questionnaire. The questionnaire is
combined with a written description or scenario of the subject's situation. In the present case one
scenario described a situation in which the student subject was a sales person with low
satisfaction, many alternative employers, etc. In the next subject's scenario their satisfaction was
high, etc. For the six independent variables in the Figure 1 model, there were 26 (= 64) scenarios,
one for each possible combination of high or low independent variables, and each scenario was
duplicated several times to increase sample size.
2. Because the pretest produced only 30 responses, psychometric assessment was limited to
single constructs because factor analysis, etc. requires large samples. Thus, pretest psychometric
assessment consisted primarily of comparing the pretest results to the scenario analysis results for
material differences.
3. The Bagozzi (1980) measure exhibited low reliability and convergent validity in the pretests.
Its Average Variance Extracted (AVE) was especially low, 0.37, suggesting the measure was
63% error (see Fornell and Larker 1981). While more than 50% error variance was unacceptable,
the measure was included in the final test to gauge the results again. However, similar behavior
obtained. Its AVE in the final test was higher, 0.45, but the measure was still composed of more
than 50% error variance, making the results of any covariance analysis untrustworthy.
4. In addition to being multidimensional in the pretests, the Bluedorn (1982) measure exhibited
implausible correlations with other study measures. For example, it was either not significantly
correlated or positively correlated with the satisfaction measures--Michaels and Spector 1982
reported similar results.
5. Organizational commitment was unidimensional in the test that accompanied its proposal (see
Mowday, Steers and Porter 1979). However, it has been multidimensional when used in a
salespersons context (e.g., Sager 1994).
6. Other approaches were possible. For example, a second-order construct could be specified
using the factors as "indicators" (see for example Gerbing, Hamilton and Freeman 1994 for more
on second-order constructs). Alternatively, the indicators within each factor could be summed
and an under-specified latent variable could be specified. These approaches were considered but
rejected because the resulting constructs exhibited low reliability and average extracted variance.
7. Item weeding was done with considerable care to preserve content or face validity--how well
the items appeared to tap the target construct. However, measures used with covariant structure
analysis appear to be limited to about six items (see discussions in Anderson and Gerbing 1984,
Gerbing and Anderson 1993, Bagozzi and Heatherton 1994, and Ping 2004). One explanation is
that correlated measurement errors, ubiquitous in survey data but customarily not specified in
covariant structure analysis, eventually overwhelm (single-construct) model-to-data fit as more
than about six indicators are specified.

8. Other approaches were possible. The unidimensional items could be summed and the Figure 1
model could be estimated using a saturated model (see Williams and Hazer 1986). However, this
approach was rejected for a variety of reasons including that the approach is not well documented
and it is not widely used.
9. For example, in Table 2 the squared correlation between satisfaction (SAT) and organizational
commitment (OC), 0.79, was greater than the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) of either SAT
or OC (0.73 and 0.47, respectively). This squared correlation is the percent covariance SAT and
OC share in common. Because their covariance was greater than the error-free variance of either
SAT or OC, this suggested that SAT and OC were empirically indistinguishable, indistinct, in the
study--they were operationally the same construct in the study (see the discussion under
Organizational Commitment, and the Table 2 Footnote b for more).
10. The Figure 1 structural model without organizational commitment did not fit the data.
However, freeing the satisfaction-exiting path in the Figure 1 model is theoretically justified and
it produced acceptable model-to-data fit.
11. Sager (1994) observed a direct satisfaction-exit association in the presence of organizational
commitment. However, that study's associations did not account for measurement error that can
produce inefficient structural coefficient estimates (i.e., the structural coefficients can vary
widely from study to study).
12. Directionality can sometimes be suggested using modification indices, or by specifying the
path in question with paths in both directions, a non-recursive model (see Bagozzi 1980). In this
case fixing the loyalty-voice path to zero and examining the resulting modification indices for the
loyalty-to-voice and voice-to-loyalty paths was equivocal because the modification indices were
identical. A bi-directional (non-recursive) specification of the loyalty-voice path to see which of
the two paths was significant produced an unidentified model.
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UNEXPLORED ANTECEDENTS OF SATISFACTION IN A MARKETING CHANNEL

ABSTRACT
This paper investigates several antecedents of satisfaction that are managerially actionable in
marketing channel relationships. Using structural equation analysis it tests plausible simultaneous or bidirectional (nonrecursive) satisfaction-alternative attractiveness and satisfaction-voice associations to
shed additional light on whether, for example, increased satisfaction is likely to reduce alternative
attractiveness, as is generally believed, or vice versa. The results also suggest the existence of feedback
loops to satisfaction that operate via investment in the relationship, so that relationship investment and
switching cost may be antecedents of relationship satisfaction. The paper concludes with suggestions for
the management of several study variables that may help maintain customer satisfaction in the study
context.

INTRODUCTION
Much of the research on long-term inter firm relationships (Arndt 1979, Wind 1970) has
concentrated on the creation and maintenance of these relationships (see Wilson 1995; also see Anderson
and Narus 1990; Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Ford 1980; Frazier 1983; Frazier and Rody 1991; Gadde
and Mattsson 1987; Håkansson 1982; Hallén, Johanson and Seyed-Mohamed 1991; Heide and John
1990, 1992; Stern and Scheer 1991; Webster 1979). As a result, it is widely believed that satisfaction is
central to the creation and maintenance of these relationships (see Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Frazier
1983; Ping 1993; Wilson 1995). Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987), for example, suggested that relationship
satisfaction may reduce the buyer-seller relationship subject’s perception of the attractiveness of
alternative exchange relationship partners. Johnson and Rusbult (1989) reported a similar effect in
committed interpersonal relationships, and argued that this was a relationship maintenance mechanism
they termed "devaluation of alternatives." However, satisfaction has been conceptualized to be a result of
comparison to alternatives, as well as relationship reward, cost, and fairness (Johnson 1982; also see
Ajzen 1977; Hatfield and Traupman 1981; Kelley and Thibaut 1978; Rusbult 1980; Thibaut and Kelley
1959). Thus, alternative attractiveness may reduce relationship satisfaction (Anderson and Narus 1984;
Frazier 1983; Rusbult 1980; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). In summary, it is plausible that satisfaction and
alternative attractiveness may also be simultaneously or bi-directionally (nonrecursively) associated.
Similarly Ping (1993) reported that firms’ satisfaction was positively associated with their use of
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voice (attempts to change rather than escape from objectionable relationship conditions) in a marketing
channel. In discussing the study results, he proposed that it was plausible that firms' satisfaction increases
their voice, but that their voice should subsequently increase these firms' satisfaction. Stated differently,
he proposed that satisfaction and voice may also be bi-directionally or simultaneously (nonrecursively)
associated.
This study investigates these bi-directional associations, and thus expands our understanding of
them, because of the implications they have for relationship continuity and therefore (interfirm)
relationship marketing. After discussing the linkages between satisfaction, voice and alternative
attractiveness, the paper summarizes these linkages in a bi-directional or nonrecursive structural model.
To be consistent with the relationship investment model for marketing channel relationships (Ping 1993;
see Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous 1988), and in order to
ensure that the structural model is identified (i.e., the structural coefficient estimates are unique), the
other variables in the relationship investment model for marketing channel relationships (i.e., relationship
investment and switching cost), plus several observed variables (e.g., subject firm revenue, the duration
of the buyer-seller relationship, etc.), are also included in the model. A test of these proposed
associations using a survey involving firms in long term buyer-seller relationships, and structural
equation analysis, is then reported.
The results of the study contribute to several literatures, including relationship marketing and
marketing management. For example, the study fills a gap in the reactions-to-dissatisfaction literature by
providing a deeper understanding of the investment model and antecedents of satisfaction. The study also
contributes to the relationship marketing literature by suggesting several managerially actionable
antecedents of relationship satisfaction. Finally, the study further illuminates the antecedents of voice,
which has been observed to be negatively associated with relationship exiting (Ping 1999, Spencer 1986;
see Fornell and Didow 1980; Fornell and Wernerfelt 1987; Fornell and Westbrook 1984).
SATISFACTION, ALTERNATIVES ATTRACTIVENESS, AND VOICE
SATISFACTION AND ALTERNATIVE ATTRACTIVENESS
In their description of the stages in the development of buyer-seller relationships, Dwyer, Schurr
and Oh (1987) suggested that for exchange relationships in the committed stage of relationship
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development, satisfaction reduces the attractiveness of alternative exchange relationships. They
commented that once a relationship reaches the committed phase where relationship satisfaction is high,
the relationship parties do not stop noticing alternatives, but they maintain their awareness of alternatives
without constant testing of the current relationship (i.e., comparison with alternatives) (p. 19). Using a
comparison level (Thibaut and Kelley 1959) argument, Johnson and Rusbult (1989) proposed there is a
tendency to devalue alternative relationships, that proceeds from a high level of satisfaction with the
present relationship (also see Ping and Dwyer 1988). From this perspective, alternatives should appear
less attractive because the subject’s comparison level (CL) (Thibaut and Kelley 1959) has been increased
as a consequence of involvement in the present satisfying relationship (p. 968).
However using almost the same arguments, alternative attractiveness is regarded by some authors
as an antecedent of satisfaction (see Johnson 1982; Kelley and Thibaut 1978; Thibaut and Kelley 1959).
Johnson (1982) argued that satisfaction grows out of the rewards and costs with the present partner,
comparison of these rewards and costs to those available from other partners, and the relative payoffs
(equity) between the partners (p. 54). In particular, they argued that as alternative attractiveness
increased, overall satisfaction with the incumbent relationship should decline. Thus it is plausible that
satisfaction and alternative attractiveness are bi-directionally related: satisfaction should negatively
influence alternative attractiveness, and as alternative attractiveness declines, this should positively
influence satisfaction. Formally,
H1: Satisfaction negatively influences the attractiveness of alternatives, and
alternative attractiveness negatively influences satisfaction.
SATISFACTION AND VOICE
Hirschman (1970) proposed that members or clients of an organization have three behavioral
options available to them when there are relationship problems: exit the relationship, use voice, or remain
loyal (i.e., refuse to exit the relationship, and suffer in silence, confident that things will get better, p. 38).
Arguing for the importance of voice at a time when exiting was believed to be the primary reaction to
relationship problems, he explained that voice also alerted a firm to its failings. His arguments for the
importance of voice are instructive. First he argued that firms will unavoidably have what he termed
performance lapses in their products or services. However, he noted that losses from customer exiting
will be small for a firm with demand that is highly inelastic with respect to these lapses. However, repair
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of these lapses may not take place because the firm may not be alerted that something is wrong with its
product or service. At the other extreme, he argued that if demand is highly elastic with respect to
performance lapses, repair may also not take place; this time because the firm will cease to exist because
of customer exiting. For repair to be possible he argued, the firm's elasticity of demand with respect to
performance lapses should be neither very large nor very small. Instead, the firm should have a mixture
of what he termed alert and inert customers. Alert customers would make the firm aware of its failings
via exit and voice, but the inert customers would provide it with the time and dollar cushion needed for
repair efforts to come to fruition (p. 24).
Not surprisingly, Hirschman (1970) recommended that firms provide mechanisms to increase
customer voice and thus increase the firm’s likelihood of being alerted to its performance lapses. Another
argument for encouraging voice is that it decreases elasticity with respect performance lapses: some
vocal customers will likely not exit until it is clear that their voice is having no effect. Not surprisingly,
voice has been observed to be associated with reduced relationship exiting (Ping 1999, Spencer 1986).
Other authors have argued deterministicly that voice should be associated with increased market share
and lower costs of obtaining new customers (Fornell and Wernerfelt 1987:345; also see Fornell and
Didow 1980; Fornell and Westbrook 1984).
Echoing the Hirschman-Rusbult proposals, Ping (1993) argued that reactions to problems in
channel relationships included the Hirschman-Rusbult option of voice (see Hirschman 1970; Rusbult,
Zembrodt and Gunn 1982; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous 1988).1 He argued that satisfied firms in
committed relationships should react to inter-firm problems with voice rather than simply exiting their
relationships. However because in committed relationships their partner firms were also likely to be
satisfied with the relationship, these partner firms should be likely to resolve relationship problems in a
1

Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn (1982) conceptualized voice as a combination of Hirschman’s (1970, 1974) original
notion of alerting partner, plus working with partner to improve relationship conditions. This expanded notion of
voice includes constructive actions aimed at relationship improvement beyond alerting partner, and more fully
accounts for “...any attempt at all to change, rather than escape from, an objectionable state of affairs...” in
committed relationships (Hirschman 1970:30). The Hirschman-Rusbult conceptualization of voice is consistent with
Hirschman’s (1970) characterization of voice, but it seems to exclude other perhaps more negative (i.e., less
relationship-maintenance oriented) conceptualizations of voice such as negative word of mouth (Diener and Grayser
1978; see Richins 1983; Singh 1990a,b). As a result, voice in the present paper involves active, constructive (i.e.,
relationship preserving) behavior aimed at partner and intended to change an objectionable state of affairs, including
but not limited to alerting partner of relationship problems.
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mutually satisfactory manner when they are made aware of relationship problems. In this manner firms'
voice should be likely to further increase their satisfaction (Homans 1961), and thereby help to maintain
relationships as others have argued (see Fornell and Wernerfelt 1987). In different words, committed
subject firms' voice should be likely to produce favorable resolutions of relationship problems, which are
then likely to increase the vocal firms' relationship satisfaction.
As a result, satisfaction and voice should also be simultaneously or bi-directionally related. That
is, satisfaction should positively influence voice, and as voice increases as a result, it should positively
influence satisfaction. In particular,
H2: Satisfaction positively influences voice, and voice positively influences
satisfaction.
Because of their importance to the model under consideration, the other investment model
variables (Ping 1993), switching cost and relationship investment, will be included in the model. In
addition, although they appear to take us away from the primary focus of the study, satisfaction, variables
such as subject firm revenue, the number of its employees and competitors, how long they have been
open, and the duration of the buyer-seller relationship will also be included in the model to ensure
structural model identification (see Bagozzi 1980a, Berry 1984, and for example Bagozzi 1980b).
INVESTMENT AND SWITCHING COST ASSOCIATIONS
Satisfaction and Relationship Investment
Satisfaction should be positively associated with investment in the relationship. In long-term
buyer-seller relationships satisfied parties to these relationships should voluntarily invest in them to
maintain and build them in anticipation of future exchanges (Macneil 1980). To explain, as subject firms
become more satisfied with their relationships their attraction to these relationships should increase
(Thibaut and Kelley 1959). Their efforts, cooperation, and thus their inputs to these relationships should
therefore increase (Blau 1964; Hunt and Nevin 1974). In summary, as their satisfaction increases, subject
firms' investments in their relationships should also increase. Formally,
H3: Satisfaction is positively associated with investment.
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Investment and Voice
Hirschman (1970) proposed that investment in the relationship should increase the investor's use
of voice (pp. 37, 40). Ping (1993) explained that increases in firms' relationship investments should make
future exchanges with their partner firms perceptually more valuable (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987;
Frazier 1983; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). Thus, these investments should make them less likely to be
passive when there are relationship problems (Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982; Rusbult, Farrell,
Rogers and Mainous 1988), because they now have more to lose if their relationships are lost (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979; Walster, Berscheid and Walster 1976). As a result, as their relationship investments
increase, firms should respond positively to relationship problems by preferring to contact the partner
firm, and work cooperatively to resolve problems and maintain the relationship. Formally,
H4: Investment is positively associated with voice.
Investment and Switching Cost
Increased investments in relationship should increase the perceived cost of switching to another
exchange relationship. As firms' investment in their relationships increase, some of these investments are
likely to be relationship-specific. These investments are by definition nontransferable to other exchange
relationships. If they are substantial, they should be perceived as indicative of the magnitude of the costs
to establish and maintain an alternative relationship, not only because they are relationship-specific and
thus they would be lost, but also because they would likely have to be reincurred in an alternative
relationship. As a result, increased investment in relationships should perceptually increase the cost of
switching to alternative exchange relationships (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Walster, Berscheid and
Walster 1976), and relationship investment should be positively associated with switching cost. In
summary,
H5: Investment is positively associated with switching cost.
Switching Cost and Alternative Attractiveness
High perceived costs of switching to alternative relationships should decrease the attractiveness
of those alternative relationships. As the costs of exiting the incumbent exchange relationship and
establishing another relationship increase, the perceived costs associated with alternative relationships
should also increase (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Walster, Berscheid and Walster 1976). This in turn
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should reduce the attractiveness of alternative relationships (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987, Frazier 1983),
and thus switching cost should be negatively associated with alternative attractiveness. Formally,
H6: Switching cost is negatively associated with alternative attractiveness.
OBSERVED VARIABLES
Voice Associations with Observed Variables
In addition to these unobserved (latent) variables, observed variables such as subject firm
revenue and the number of their employees should also be associated with their use of voice.2 As in the
satisfaction-voice association, the revenue (a reward) a firm derives from exchanges with their partner
firm should make future exchanges with them more valuable (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Frazier 1983;
Homans 1974; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). As their revenue attributed to the relationship increases, the
subject firm should respond positively to relationship problems by preferring to contact the partner firm
and work cooperatively to resolve problems and maintain the relationship. Hence for firms' important
relationships we hypothesize that,
H7: Revenue is positively associated with voice.
A firm with many employees should also be more vocal when there are relationship problems
with their partner firm. All other factors being equal, firms with many employees should be more
inclined to attempt to work with their partner firms to resolve relationship problems; they may not only
have the personnel resources to do so, but their buyer-seller relationships are likely to be either
maintained by their partner firms or maintained jointly. To explain, their size and any attendant market
power should make them attractive to their partner firms as revenue sources, and this in turn should
produce bilateral or partner-maintained relationships (see Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987). For bilateral
relationships voice should a natural consequence of the relationship when there are problems (Dwyer,
Schurr and Oh 1987; Macneil 1980). In partner-maintained relationships subject firm voice is likely to be
rewarded by partner, and thus it is therefore likely to be repeated (Homans 1974).
2

As mentioned earlier, these and several other observed variables are required for methodological purposes in order
to ensure that the resulting structural model is identified, and thus that the structural coefficient estimates (i.e., ’s)
are unique. These variables were included in the study based on a combination of the plausibility of their
associations with the latent variables and their usefulness in the identification process. Although the paper
concentrates on the latent variable associations, the associations of these observed variables with the latent variables
in the study will be stated as hypotheses for completeness.
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For this reason, firms with many employees should be inclined to exercise the voice option when
there were problems in the exchange relationship, and
H8: Number of employees is positively associated with voice.
Other Associations with Observed Variables
In addition observed variables, such as the length of time a firm has done business with their
partner, how long a firm has been in business, and the number of competitors in a firm’s market, should
be associated with that firm’s investment in their relationship with their partner firm. In particular, the
length of time firms have done business with their partner firms should be positively associated with the
amount of investment made by the subject firms in the relationship. In long-lived economic exchange
relationships, relationship commitment in many of these relationships should have been maintained or
have grown (Blau 1964), the total number of investment opportunities should have increased with the
length of the relationship, and the duration of the relationship itself may be perceived by some firms as a
relationship investment. As a result, investment by firms in long-lived economic exchange relationships
should have increased (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Macneil 1980).
Similarly relationship investment and switching cost should be affected by how long firms have
been in business. Firms that have been in business for many years should be comparatively more
knowledgeable of available alternatives, and relatively more experienced in dealing with the category of
firms represented by their partner firms (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987). In addition, some of these durable
firms may have attractive levels of market power. Because knowledge, experience and any market power
may be sources of countervailing power (Dwyer 1980), these subject firms should be less dependent on
their partner firms (Emerson 1962). This reduced dependency should make these subject firms less
inclined to invest in their current relationships and their costs to switch to alternative supplier
relationships should therefore be less.
Finally, economic theory predicts that as the number of competitors increases, each competitor's
sales and return on investment should decrease (Chamberlin 1933). As a result, firms' investment in their
relationship with their partner firms should decline as the number of their competitors increases. Not only
are the subject firms relatively less able to invest in relationships when there are many competitors, their
outcomes (e.g., sales) are reduced in a crowed market and this may reduce the attractiveness of the
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relationship with their partner. This in turn should reduce their relationship commitment and thus their
inclination to invest in their relationships (Blau 1964). In summary,
H9: Investment is positively associated with relationship duration, and
negatively associated with the number of years in business and the number of
competitors.
and
H10: Switching cost is negatively associated with the number of years in business.
These associations are summarized in Figure 1.
THE STUDY
MEASURES
The observed variables were measured with open-ended questions. These items asked for the
retailer's prior year sales, the number of years the retailer had done business with the primary wholesaler,
the number of years the retailer had been in business, the number of competitive stores in the retailer's
service area, and the retailer's number of employees. Table 1 summarizes these items.
The unobserved variables satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, voice, investment, and
switching cost were measured using balanced five-point Likert scales developed by Ping (1993). These
measures are discussed below using Ping's (1993) conceptualizations, and are also summarized in Table
1.
Voice
Voice, active and constructive attempts by the subject firm to change relationship conditions,
was operationalized as the intention to constructively notify and work with the partner firm to change
relationship conditions (Ping 1993; Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and
Mainous 1988). The conceptual domain of voice includes actively seeking problem removal by
contacting the partner firm in a positive (i.e., relationship preserving) manner, positively confronting the
partner firm with problems, and cooperatively discussing and working with the partner firm to improve
the situation, all with a desire to maintain the relationship.
The four items in the voice measure involved the retailer talking to the wholesaler, suggesting
and discussing changes with them (one item each), and working with the wholesaler to solve mutual
relationship problems.
Satisfaction
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We conceptualized satisfaction as the global evaluation of relationship fulfillment by the subject
firm (Dwyer and Oh 1987). Its domain encompasses attributes of the exchange relationship that the firm
considers rewarding, profitable, or instrumental (Ruekert and Churchill 1984), or unrewarding, costly,
unfair or frustrating (Ping 1993).
The five items in the satisfaction measure assessed the retailer's overall satisfaction with the relationship (two items), perceived fairness in the relationship with the wholesaler (two items), and how
good a company to do business with the wholesaler was.
Alternative Attractiveness
The attractiveness of the best alternative exchange relationship, the subject firm’s perception of
the satisfaction available in the best available alternative relationship, was operationalized as the subject
firm's perception of the overall satisfaction available from the best alternative exchange relationship, in
addition to the overall satisfaction available in the existing exchange relationship (Ping 1993). This
conceptualization includes a firm's generalized perceptions of the rewards and costs available in the most
salient available alternative exchange relationship.
The four items in the alternative attractiveness scale dealt with the retailer's perception of how
good a wholesaler the best available alternative would be: its fairness, its products and services, its
policies, and in general how satisfied the retailer would be with the alternative wholesaler.
Investment
We operationalized investment, the sunk costs a firm expends to build and maintain the exchange
relationship in anticipation of future exchanges, as the perceived magnitude of the relationship assets that
would be lost or no longer useful if the relationship were terminated (Ping 1993). The conceptual domain
of investment includes sunk economic and opportunity costs such as money, time, and effort.
The final-test scale items measured the retailer's overall investment in the relationship with the
wholesaler (two items), and the time, effort and energy the retailer put into building and maintaining this
relationship (two items).
Switching Cost
Switching cost, the perceived magnitude of the costs required to terminate the current economic
exchange relationship and secure the alternative (Porter 1980), was operationalized as the magnitude of
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the additional cost and effort that would be required to change wholesalers (Ping 1993). The domain of
switching cost includes monetary expenses to end the current relationship and secure the alternative, and
the psychic costs to achieve this objective.
The four switching cost scale items involved the amount of retailer time and money, and the
costs and losses, that would be required of the retailer in switching wholesalers.
MEASURE PERFORMANCE IN OTHER STUDIES
The voice, satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, investment and switching cost measures were
reliable, and exhibited construct and discriminant validity in previous studies. For example, the
satisfaction measure was reliable, and it exhibited construct and discriminant validity in Ping (1993),
Dwyer and Oh (1987), Gaski (1986), Gaski and Nevin (1985), and Ruekert and Churchill (1984). The
alternative attractiveness, voice, investment and switching cost measures were similarly reliable, and
exhibited construct and discriminant validity in Ping (1993).
SAMPLE
The study population was hardware retailers. The sampling frame was the subscribers of a
hardware retailing trade publication that was judged to represent the study population. The key informant
in the sampling unit was the store owner, manager, or executive. This sample was obtained specifically
for this study and it has not been used before.
A pre-test and the final test samples were selected randomly using n-th name sampling, and this
produced one hundred and nine pretest names and addresses, and five hundred and ninety two final test
names and addresses. The survey questionnaire was mailed to these pretest and final test samples, and
two post card follow-ups in the final test produced 231 usable questionnaires (39% response). These
responses were then used to determine the reliability and validity of the latent variable measures.
RESULTS
Reliability
The pretest responses were used to assess the psychometric properties of the latent variable
measures. These measures were unidimensional using multiple group analysis (Anderson, Gerbing and
Hunter 1987), they were internally and externally consistent (see Gerbing and Anderson 1984) using
ordered similarity coefficients (Hunter 1973), and had coefficient alphas of .85 or above (see Table 2).
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Using the final test responses, the psychometric properties of the latent variable measures were
re-examined using LISREL 8 and maximum likelihood single and multiple confirmatory factor analysis
(Jöreskog 1993). The final test measures were unidimensional, and internally and externally consistent
(see Table 3). They displayed latent variable reliabilities greater than .91, and average extracted
variances above .73 (Fornell and Larker 1981) (see Table 3).
The investment measure required the deletion of an item to attain internal consistency. This
deletion was based on an examination of its content validity before and after item deletion, and the fit
statistics available in a single factor analysis. The item deletion did not appear to impair the content or
face validity of the investment measure, and it substantially improved its internal consistency.
Validity
The measures for the latent variables were judged to be content valid. In addition, the average
extracted variances for the latent variables suggested convergent and discriminant validity for these
measures (see Fornell and Larker 1981) (also see Table 3).3 The study's latent variables were also
construct valid: they were significantly and plausibly correlated with at least one other study variable
(see Table 3).
Measurement and Structural Models
The Goodness of Fit (GFI) and Adjusted Goodness of Fit (AGFI) indices of the measurement
model were slightly low. However, Anderson and Gerbing (1984) observed that these statistics are
sensitive to model parsimony and thus may be inappropriate for larger models. The measurement model
corresponding to Figure 1 was judged to fit the data based on the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) (Bentler
1990) (see Bollen and Long 1993, McClelland and Judd 1993), and the Root Mean Squared Error of
Approximation (RMSEA) statistic (Steiger 1990, see Browne and Cudeck 1993) (see Table 3). The
Figure 1 structural model was identified and thus it coefficient estimates were unbiased,4 and it was also
judged to fit the data based on CFI and RMSEA (see Table 4).
3

Fornell and Larker (1981) suggested that if the Average Variance Extracted statistic for a latent variable were
greater than .5, then the common variance captured by the variable was greater than its measurement error, and this
was sufficient evidence of convergent validity. They also argued that if the extracted average variances for a pair of
variables were greater than the square of the correlation between these variables, each variable was distinct and this
provided evidence of discriminant validity. In the present case the average extracted variances exceeded .5, and they
exceeded the square of the largest latent variable correlation shown in Table 3.
4

The bi-directional associations were identified because each endogenous variable involved in these associations
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Hypotheses Test Results
The study hypotheses were generally supported (see Table 4). Of the fourteen hypothesized
associations, ten of the direct associations shown in Figure 1 (e.g., voice-to-satisfaction, satisfactioninvestment, etc.) were significant. However, the satisfaction-voice and satisfaction-alternative
attractiveness associations were not bi-directional; the investment association with voice, and the yearsin-business-switching-cost associations were not significant; and the revenue-voice association was
negative instead of positive. The association between voice and satisfaction was from voice to
satisfaction only, and satisfaction did not directly affect voice (although satisfaction was significantly but
indirectly associated with voice via investment, which will be discussed shortly). Similarly, alternative
attractiveness affected satisfaction, and satisfaction did not directly affect alternative attractiveness
(although satisfaction was also significantly but indirectly associated with alternative attractiveness via
investment and switching cost, which will also be discussed shortly).
A second structural model was estimated by trimming the nonsignificant bi-directional paths in
Figure 1 (i.e., the satisfaction-to-voice and satisfaction-to-alternative attractiveness paths were dropped).5
6

The structural model estimation results from this trimmed model are shown in Table 5. Overall, the

interpretation of the structural coefficients changed little between the two models, except for the voice
association with investment, which approached significance in the bi-directional model, and was
significant in the trimmed model. Table 6 shows the total (i.e., direct plus indirect) effects among the
study variables in the trimmed Figure 1 model (see Bollen 1989:376). As this exhibit suggests, while
satisfaction did not significantly affect alternative attractiveness directly in the trimmed model (see Table
(i.e., satisfaction, voice, and alternative attractiveness) had one or more instrumental variables (see Berry 1984). The
Figure 1 structural model can be shown to be identified, but the formal proof is long. A sketch of the proof is as
follows: Bollen (1989) argued that structural equation model identification is a separable process, and it is sufficient
to prove the measurement model is identified, then prove the structural model is identified. The measurement model
is identified using Bollen’s (1989:245) second two-indicator rule, and the structural model is identified using Berry’s
(1984) order condition plus his algorithm.
5

The lack of significant bi-directional associations could be viewed as suggestive of the directions of these
associations in the population, and a trimmed model may be more representative of the population model (see for
example Bagozzi 1980b).
6

This trimmed model is also nonrecursive because of the feedback loops to satisfaction (i.e., the satisfactioninvestment-voice-satisfaction loop and the satisfaction-investment-switching cost-alternative attractivenesssatisfaction loop). This model can also be shown to be identified using the Footnote 4 approach.

15

5), its indirect effect on alternative attractiveness voice via investment and switching cost was significant
(see Figure 1 and Table 6).7 Similarly, the indirect effect of satisfaction on voice via investment in the
trimmed model was also significant (see Figure 1 and Table 6).
DISCUSSION
SATISFACTION AND ALTERNATIVE ATTRACTIVENESS
The association between satisfaction and alternative attractiveness has been specified in previous
research as a correlation (see for example Ping 1993; Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982; Rusbult,
Farrell, Rogers and Mainous 1988), and it has not been specified in a directional manner until now. The
associations between satisfaction and alternative attractiveness were significant when they were specified
as unidirectional (see Table 5 for the results of the unidirectional alternative-attractiveness-to-satisfaction
path specification; the results of a model with the direction of this path reversed is not reported), while in
their joint (bi-directional) specification, the alternative attractiveness-to- satisfaction path was significant,
while the satisfaction-to-alternative attractiveness path was not (see Table 4).8
However, the indirect satisfaction-alternative attractiveness path via investment and switching

7

These remarks depend heavily on the assumption that the direction of satisfaction-investment path is from
satisfaction to investment at least in the sample. While this is arguably a plausible direction for this association, a
Figure 1 trimmed model with this path reversed (i.e., pointing in the opposite direction) also fit the data (not
reported), and the resulting investment-satisfaction path coefficient was significant. It is believed this suggests that
both directions for the satisfaction-investment path are equally likely (see Hershberger 1994 and the citations
therein). Similarly, models with combinations of the directions of the Figure 1 paths from investments or switching
cost reversed also fit the data, and the path coefficients on these reversed paths were also significant. However, we
fixed all of the path coefficients on the paths to and from investment and switching cost at zero and used LISREL's
modification indices to suggest the direction of these paths. With the satisfaction-investment path coefficient fixed at
zero, for example, the modification index for freeing the satisfaction-to-investment path was larger than the
modification index for freeing the investment-to-satisfaction path. This (weakly) suggests that the proper
specification of the satisfaction-investment path is from satisfaction to investment, given this data. In summary, this
approach (weakly) suggested the Figure 1 trimmed model was more appropriate that the other 8 models with
combinations of their paths to and from investment and switching costs paths reversed, given this data set.
8

Significant but opposite unidirectional associations between two latent variables have been previously observed
(see Bagozzi 1980b for citations). In such situations a bi-directional specification has been used to suggest which
unidirectional specification is correct. Bagozzi (1980b) for example in his analysis of salesperson performance and
satisfaction, used a bi-directional specification to sort out opposing unidirectional specifications of these two
variables. He tested a bi-directional specification of the satisfaction-performance association and observed that only
the path from performance to satisfaction was significant. In addition, his subsequent unidirectional specification of
performance to satisfaction was also significant, and it is likely that the unidirectional satisfaction-to-performance
coefficient would also have been significant had he reported it, based on his reported correlation between satisfaction
and performance, and the performance-to-satisfaction structural coefficient also reported.
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cost was (weakly) significant (see Figure 1 and Table 6).9 This result suggests that while all satisfied
firms were not likely to devalue alternative attractiveness in the study (the direct satisfaction-toalternative-attractiveness path was not significant, see Table 4), satisfied firms with high investment in
the relationship and high perceived switching cost were (weakly) likely to devalue their alternatives. As a
result, Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) and others’ proposal that in a committed buyer-seller relationship
the parties to this relationship may devaluate alternatives appears to be true in the study. However, the
effect was indirect and weak compared to the direct alternative-attractiveness-to-satisfaction effect, and
higher investment and switching cost were involved. In different words, satisfied firms were likely to
slightly devalue alternatives when they had invested in the relationship and perceived there were higher
switching costs.
Satisfaction and Voice
Until now, the path between satisfaction and voice has been assumed to be from satisfaction to
voice, and it has been consistently observed to be significant in this specification (see for example Ping
1993; Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous 1988). Indeed, the
(unidirectional) satisfaction-to-voice specification was significant in the present study (not reported).
However in the Figure 1 bi-directional specification, the direct voice-to-satisfaction path was significant
while the direct satisfaction-to-voice path was not significant.
Nevertheless, based on the Table 6 significant satisfaction-to-voice total effect (e.g., via the
satisfaction-to-investment-to-voice path-- see Figure 1),10 satisfaction was still positively (but indirectly)
associated with voice (however, this association was weak in comparison to the voice-satisfaction effect).
These results suggest that while changes in satisfaction were not likely to directly affect voice (the direct
satisfaction-voice association was nonsignificant), satisfaction was likely to increase investment, and this
in turn was likely to increase voice. Stated differently, satisfaction affected voice by first increasing
relationship investment.
The nonsignificant direct path from satisfaction to voice suggests that Ping’s (1993) remarks
about a firm’s satisfied customers being the most likely to be vocal may be misleading. The significant
9

See Endnote 7.

10

See Endnote 7.
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indirect path from satisfaction to voice via investment in the trimmed model suggests that only satisfied
firms with high investment in the relationship were more likely to be vocal.
Other Investment Model Associations and Feedback Loops
These results suggest that the associations among satisfaction, alternative attractiveness,
investment, and switching cost need not be specified as correlations as they have been in the past. In
addition, the significant combined (total) effects shown in Table 6 suggest that satisfaction "fed back" to,
or reinforced itself (i.e., affected itself), via investment, voice, switching cost, and alternative
attractiveness.11 In this feedback loop satisfaction increased investment, which then increased voice and
switching cost. Increased voice was likely to increase satisfaction, and increased switching costs
decreased alternative attractiveness which increased satisfaction (see Figure 1).
While the combined effect of satisfaction reinforcing itself was comparatively weak (.031-- see
Table 6), it suggests the importance of relationship investment in this study. If opportunities to increase
investment in the relationship were not available to satisfied firms in the study, there may have been no
voice or structural constraint feedback loops to satisfaction, and increased overall satisfaction may have
had no synergistic (i.e., feedback or reinforcing) effect on itself. Specifically, management attempts to
increase satisfaction by, for example, satisfactorily resolving relationship problems, may have ended with
only their direct effect on satisfaction in this study. With opportunities to increase investment in the
relationship, increased satisfaction fed back through the voice and alternative attractiveness loops to
further increase satisfaction.12
Of these two feedback loops, the alternative attractiveness loop had the larger effect on
satisfaction (TotalSAT,SAT-INV-SWC-ALT = .021 for the alternative attractiveness loop, TotalSAT,SAT-INV-VOI = .008
for the voice loop). This suggests that any attempts to reduce alternative attractiveness were not only
more directly effective in increasing satisfaction in comparison with attempts to increase voice (see Table
5), they were more indirectly effective as well.
11
12

See Endnote 7.

However this feedback effect died out rapidly in this context. The largest eigenvalue of the indirect coefficient
matrix was .432, which guarantees convergence (of the cycling through the feedback loops) to the total effects matrix
shown in Table 6 (Ben-Israel and Greville 1974; see Bollen 1989). However, the coefficients in the powers of the
coefficient matrix quickly become small (e.g., the largest coefficient in B 5 was 7.45E-08).
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Finally, the two feedback loops also suggest that using voice (weakly) increased the use of voice
(see the voice-voice total effect in Table 5). Similarly, investment increased investment, switching cost
increased switching cost, and alternative attractiveness increased alternative attractiveness.
IMPLICATIONS
While it is very risky to generalize from a single study,13 assuming the maintenance of
relationship satisfaction is desirable for maintaining buyer-seller relationships (Davidow and Uttal 1990;
Dwyer Schurr and Oh 1987; Frazier 1983; Hirschman 1970; Ping 1993; see the Fall 1995 issue of the
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science), these results hint at several strategies for channel
management in this context. Forty-three percent of the variance in relationship satisfaction was explained
primarily by four relationship variables in the present study (i.e., voice, alternative attractiveness,
investment, and switching cost-- see Table 6). This suggests that relationship management activities
aimed at existing channel customers, such as reducing the attractiveness of their alternatives and
cultivating their voice, along with designing and promoting opportunities for their additional relationship
investment, may be important to relationship maintenance in this context (relationship satisfaction has
been reported to be strongly and negatively related to exit intention-- see Ping 1993). We will briefly
discuss reducing alternative attractiveness, cultivating voice, and designing and promoting opportunities
for additional relationship investment by existing channel customers (also see Cravens 1995).
REDUCING ALTERNATIVE ATTRACTIVENESS
Since alternative attractiveness had the largest direct effect on satisfaction, the alternative
attractiveness loop's effect on satisfaction was the larger of the two feedback loops, and both were
negative, this suggests changes in perceptions of alternative attractiveness had the largest effect on their
satisfaction in the study (see Table 6). For managers who may prefer to concentrate on only a few
relationship maintenance factors, alternative attractiveness reduction might be the best strategy to
maintain retailer customer satisfaction in this context.
Wholesalers interested in increasing retailer satisfaction may want to consider activities such as
tailoring some of their promotional activities specifically for their established customers. Although there
13

For example, many of the effects were comparatively weak, and could easily have been non significant in a
different study (also see Endnote 7). However, the set of responses was judged to be representative of the study
population, based on published demographics.
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is little guidance in a marketing channel context, comparative advertising may be effective for this
purpose. In addition, activities such as providing "success stories" in a newsletter directed to retailer
customers, or the company website, telling of other retailers who switched from competitive wholesalers
may also be useful. For example, comparing logistics service levels may be effective (see LaLonde
1985).
ENCOURAGING VOICE
Similarly, since voice had the second largest effect on satisfaction, wholesalers interested in
fostering long term relationships may wish to sincerely solicit retailer complaints and work to resolve
them in a mutually satisfactory manner (Hirschman 1970, 1974; Fornell and Wernerfelt 1987). While
Fornell and Wernerfelt (1987) suggested providing 800 numbers, and quick and competent complaint
processing in a consumer context (p. 344), the situation may be more complex. For example, Laver
(1976) observed that individuals have different sensitivities to quality declines. Hirschman (1970)
explicitly made the same assumption (p. 24). In addition, Hirschman (1970) argued that voice was
affected by the expectation of the success of voice. He elaborated by proposing that the expectation of
the success of voice involves the subject's evaluation of the prospects of the declined firm getting back on
track through a possible combination that firm's actions, the subject’s actions, and the actions of others
(p. 38). He also argued that voice was affected by the advantage to be gained by using voice (see
Banfield 1961). Singh (1990b) conceptualized this advantage as the worthwhileness of complaint: the
costs versus the benefits to the subject.
Hirschman (1970) speculated that the importance of the purchase would also increase voice (p.
41). This suggests that the importance of the relationship to the subject firm may also increase the
likelihood of subject firm voice when there are relationship problems. In the present study the importance
of the exchange relationship was high by design (the questionnaire instructions asked respondents to
think of their primary wholesaler in completing the questionnaire). However, it is plausible that as the
importance of the relationship declines, the picture portrayed in this study could change.
As previously mentioned, Hirschman (1970) argued there are customers that are passive (i.e., not
vocal) when there are relationship problems, and he termed these customers "loyals" (see p. 3). Singh's
(1990a) results suggest there are several consumer voice response styles ranging from passive, to “irate”
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and “activist.” It is therefore plausible that firms may also cluster into voice response styles, and that
there may be passive organizations when it comes to voice.
For these reasons, wholesalers may wish to consider additional means of increasing retailer
voice, beyond 800 numbers, e-mail addresses, user community bulletin boards, and quick and competent
complaint processing, such as publicizing to their retailing partners prior (successful) outcomes
proceeding from the use of voice, having wholesaler sales persons actively solicit retailer voice, and
using wholesaler-sponsored retailer satisfaction surveys to facilitate voice in less vocal retailing firms
(e.g., those with higher revenue in this study-- see Table 6).
INCREASING INVESTMENT
As previously suggested, investment was key to the voice and alternative attractiveness feedback
loops in the present study.14 As a result, wholesalers may wish to consider increased emphasis on
designing and marketing relationship investments to their retailing partners. Prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979) suggests that individuals, and presumably firms, should view additional relationship
investment (a cost) noncumulatively. This in turn suggests that, all other things being equal, retailers with
high and low levels of relationship investment should be equally likely to make additional investments in
the relationship. However, the study results suggest that prior investors in the relationship are more likely
to increase their relationship investment (the Table 6 INV-INV coefficient was significant). In addition,
prospect theory suggests that investment opportunities should be offered as either a single large gain or a
series of small costs (see Nagle and Holden 1995), depending on how the prospective investor might
view the proposed investment. Opportunities for selling relationship investment could be identified using
a series of customer satisfaction surveys, plus a systematic prospecting and follow-up selling activity
aimed at, for example, long-time customers (see Table 6).
FUTURE RESEARCH
There may be more to learn about the antecedents of relationship satisfaction in marketing
channel relationships. While the squared multiple correlation for satisfaction observed in this study was
comparatively high, it suggests that satisfaction has other important antecedents. For example, Johnson
(1982) suggested relationship satisfaction has as antecedents rewards, costs, alternative attractiveness,
14

See Endnote 7.
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and equity. Alternative attractiveness, and several reward/cost related variables (i.e., investment,
switching cost and possibly voice) were investigated in the present study.15
Equity (see Frazier 1983) has been subsumed by the notion of relationship justice in other
literatures (see Tyler 1994 for a summary). Relationship justice has been heavily researched, and is
generally conceptualized as consisting of two facets: distributive justice (i.e., the fairness of the portions
of outcomes received, Adams 1963), and procedural justice (i.e., the fairness of the procedures used to
determine these outcomes, Thibaut and Walker 1975). Both procedural and distributive justice have been
observed to be associated with satisfaction in other contexts (e.g., Folger and Konovsky 1989), and it is
plausible that, with care and attention to established concepts that may be related to procedural justice
(e.g., bureaucratization, see Dwyer and Oh 1987), distributive and procedural justice may be associated
with satisfaction in marketing channel relationships.
Relationship rewards and costs may have important sub-dimensions. Thibaut and Kelley (1959)
proposed that the determinants of rewards and costs in a relationship included the similarity of attitudes
and orientations. Anderson (1988) for example, proposed goal congruency as an antecedent of
opportunism in a personal selling context. Because congruent goals should be rewarding, it is plausible
that this may also be an antecedent of satisfaction in long-term buyer-seller relationships.
Social psychology could be viewed as the study of person and situation (Fiske and Taylor 1991).
As a result, satisfaction could be argued to be the result of these two influences. For example, Johnson
(1982:54) proposed that relationship partners may define themselves in terms of a relationship (see
Goffman 1961). A wholesaler may believe that, for example, they carry “only the best,“ which in turn
might dictate their supplier relationships in each of their product categories. In addition, Rodin (1982)
commented that changes in situation could also be important to satisfaction with the relationship. In the
study context, for example, the appearance of hardware home centers such as Home Depot or Lowes in
the retailer’s service area may effect hardware retailer satisfaction with their wholesaler (also see Dwyer
and Oh 1987).
Another view of satisfaction would be to consider those things that produce dissatisfaction.

15

Voice may be related to rewards and costs in that it could be viewed as an attempt to reduce relationship cost
and/or increase relationship reward.
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Behavior that is compared to that which is expected should affect relationship satisfaction (Thibaut and
Kelley 1959). Macneil (1980) and others have proposed that there are expectations in economic exchange
relationships that they term relational norms (see Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987). In particular, Macneil
(1980, 1983) and others suggest that in committed relationships these norms may include consistent
behavior (i.e., role integrity, behaving as expected); mutuality (i.e., distributive justice-- see the above
remarks regarding justice and Kaufmann and Stern 1988); relationship preservation (i.e., solidarity,
maintaining beliefs and actions that preserve the relationship-- again see Kaufmann and Stern 1988),
which may have as subdimensions, flexibility and harmonizing conflict (Macneil 1980); and supracontract norms (i.e., moral conduct) (also see Noordeweir, John and Nevin 1990). It is plausible that
these and possibly other norms are related to satisfaction. While Frazier (1983) and others have
suggested that mutuality may be the most important of these, it would be interesting and perhaps valuable
to channel relationship managers to know if this is empirically supported, since their performance
relative to these norms should be controllable by these managers.
The results reported in the present study should be considered as suggestive of the satisfaction
associations with alternative attractiveness and voice. More research is obviously required to firmly
establish the lack of direct satisfaction-to-voice and satisfaction-to-alternative attractiveness effects, and
the feedback loops. In particular, experiments and (longitudinal) field studies with observations of lags
between satisfaction, voice and alternative attractiveness should be conducted.
It is plausible that the observed voice-to-satisfaction effect involves an indirect path via partner’s
remedial action. In the present study the satisfied and invested firms that were inclined to react to
relationship problems with voice may also have had partner firms that were very likely to resolve these
problems. Perhaps a future study will specify partner’s remedial action separately from the voicesatisfaction path to test for the possibility that voice may itself be rewarding (see Hirschman 1974; Singh
1990a).16
As a final observation it would be interesting, and perhaps valuable to marketing channel
managers, to investigate the efficacy of advertising that is specifically aimed at existing retailers, and
16

Hirschman (1974) proposed that the exercise of voice itself is satisfying. While his remarks were aimed at the
possibility that it was satisfying to use voice in and with a group (Blau 1964), Singh (1990a) found that consumer
voicers variously reported that it bothered them not to complain, and that it felt good to complain.
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designed to reduce alternative attractiveness. While some marketing practitioners believe comparative
advertising works in a consumer context (see Rossiter and Percy 1987), there is relatively little guidance
for comparative advertising aimed at long term channel partners.
SUMMARY
Because relationship satisfaction is important in the maintenance of long-term buyer-seller
relationships (Davidow and Uttal 1990; Dwyer Schurr and Oh 1987; Frazier 1983; Hirschman 1970; Ping
1993), the paper reported the results of an investigation of the managerially actionable antecedents of
satisfaction proposed in the investment model (Ping 1993; see Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982;
Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous 1988). In the study, hardware retailers' satisfaction in their
relationship with their primary wholesalers had direct antecedents that included their perception of
alternative attractiveness and their use of voice, and indirect antecedents that included their relationship
investment and their switching cost. In particular, retailers' satisfaction was likely to be negatively
affected by their perception of alternative attractiveness, and it was likely to be positively affected by
their use of voice, their relationship investments, and their perceived switching cost.
The study results suggested the existence of a (weak but significant) feedback loop in which
firms' satisfaction was likely to reduce the attractiveness of their alternatives, which in turn further
increased their relationship satisfaction. A second weak feedback loop was also observed, in which firms'
satisfaction was likely to increase their voice, which in turn was likely to further increase their
relationship satisfaction. These feedback loops to satisfaction operated via subject firm investment in the
relationship, which suggested the importance of the availability of relationship investment options, and
opportunities to exercise these options in the study.
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Table 1-- MEASURE SUMMARY
Construct

Conceptual Definition

Operational Definition

Items

Sample Item

Alternative
Attractiveness
(ALT)
wholesaler.

Global evaluation of the
relationship fulfillment
available in the best

Satisfaction believed to be
available in the best
alternative relationship.

4

Overall the alternative wholesaler
would be a much better company to do
business with than the current

available alternative
relationship.
Investment
(INV)

Cost to build and maintain the current relationship in anticipation of
future exchanges.

Magnitude of the cost that
went into building and maintaining the current
relationship.

4

A lot of energy, time and effort have
gone into building and maintaining the
relationship with the current wholesaler.

Satisfaction
(SAT)

Global evaluation of
relationship fulfillment.

Belief that the relationship
is satisfactory.

5

All in all, my relationship with my
primary wholesaler is very satisfactory.

Switching
Cost
(SWC)

Costs to change to an
alternative relationship.

Cost and loss required to terminate the current relationship
and secure an alternative
relationship.

4

Generally speaking the costs in time,
money, effort and grief to switch
primary wholesalers would be high.

Voice
(VOI)

Constructive attempts
to change objectionable relationship
conditions.

Intention to notify constructively and work with the
primary wholesaler to solve
relationship problems.

4

I work with my primary wholesaler to
correct any mutual problems.

Employees
(EMPL)

Retailer's number
of employees.

The number of employees
at your store?

1

Years in
Business
(OPEN)

Number of years
the retailer has
been in business.

How many years has your
store been open?

1

Competitors
(RIVAL)

Number of competitive
stores in retailer's
service area.

The number of competing
stores in your service area?

1

Revenue
(SLS)

Retailer's revenue.

Your last year's sales?

1

Years with
Wholesaler
(WITH)

Number of years
the retailer has
done business
with the supplier.

How many years have you
done business with your
primary wholesaler?

1
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Table 2-- MEASURE PSYCHOMETRIC SUMMARY

Construct
Voice

Satisfaction

Items
Sample Initial Final
Pretest 4
4
Final
4
4
Pretest
Final

5
5

5
5

Alternative
Pretest
Attractiveness Final

4
4

4
4

Investment

Pretest
Final

5
5

5
4

Pretest
Final

4
4

4
4

Switching
Cost

2/df
1.9/2
(p=.49)


.88
.93

.95
5/5
.94
(p=.42)
.91
4.1/2 .93
(p=.11)
.85
9.4/2 .92
(p=.01)
.91
.78/2 .94
(p=.79)

Item
Wording
Changes
After
Pretest
None

None

None

None

None
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Table 3-- MEASUREMENT MODEL RESULTS a
Latent Variable Covariances and Correlations:b
Variable
Variable
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1. SAT
.44* -.52* .32* .25* .29* .10
.06 .02 -.00 -.00
2. ALT
-.30* .74* -.27* -.38* -.10 -.17* -.03 -.12 -.07
.01
3. INV
.16* -.18* .61* .55* .25* .11 -.10 .12
.07 -.13
4. SWC
.16* -.33* .42* .95* .15* .09
.00 .10 -.05 -.05
5. VOI
.08* -.03 .09* .06* .17* .00
.00 .10 -.06 -.05
6. WITH
.08 -.18* .12 .11 .00 1.47* .41* .09
.09
.14
7. OPEN
.10 -.08 -.19 -.06 .00 1.32* 7.27* .06
.06
.05
8. EMPL
.02 -.13 .13 .19 .05
.14
.23 1.75* .51* .39*
9. SLS
-.00 -.10 .00 .14 -.05
.19
.26 1.09* 2.60* .19*
10. RIVAL
-.00 -.00 -.12 -.01 -.02
.22
.18 .65* .40* 1.58*
Model-to-Data Fit
Chi-Square/df/p-value
Comparative Fit Index c
RMSEA d
GFI/AGFI e

Average Variance Extracted:
Latent Variable Reliability:

.362/259/0
.976
.042
.889/849

SAT ALT INV SWC VOI
.770 .768 .739 .802 .760
.943 .929 .919 .941 .926

______________________________
a

Maximum likelihood.
Covariances on and below the diagonal, correlations above.
c
.90 or above suggests acceptable fit (McClelland and Judd 1993).
d
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation-- .05 or less suggests close fit, .051-.08
suggests acceptable fit (Brown and Cudeck 1993; Jöreskog 1993).
e
GFI and AGFI may be inappropriate for assessing fit in larger models (Anderson
and Gerbing 1984).
* t-value > 2.
b
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Table 4-- FIGURE 1 (BI-DIRECTIONAL) STRUCTURAL MODEL ESTIMATION RESULTS
Parameter
VOI,SATb
SAT,VOI
SAT,ALT
ALT,SAT
INV,SAT
VOI,INV
SWC,INV
ALT,SWC
VOI,SLS
VOI,EMPL
INV,WITH
INV,OPEN
INV,RIVAL
SWC,OPEN

Estimatea
-0.047
0.811
-0.268
-0.289
0.275
0.091
0.660
-0.282
-0.045
0.138
0.118
-0.050
-0.131
0.010

t-value
- 0.28
2.31
-2.47
-1.55
3.38
1.64
7.93
-4.51
-2.07
3.03
2.65
-2.52
-2.90
0.49

Fit
Chi-Square/df/p-value
RMSEA c
Comparative Fit Index d
GFI/AGFI e

.383/280/0
.040
.976
.878/.847

Squared Multiple Correlations:

SAT ALT INV SWC VOI
.43 .32 .20 .29 .03

_______________________________
a

Maximum likelihood.
VOI,INV is the effect of INV on VOI.
c
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation-- .05 or less suggests close fit, .051-.08 suggests
acceptable fit (Brown and Cudeck 1993; Jöreskog 1993).
e
.90 or higher suggests acceptable fit (McClelland and Judd 1993).
d
GFI and AGFI may be inappropriate for assessing fit in larger models (Anderson and Gerbing
1984).
b
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Table 5--TRIMMED FIGURE 1 STRUCTURAL MODEL ESTIMATION RESULTSa
Parameter Estimateb
VOI,INVc 0.164
SAT,VOI 0.229
SAT,ALT -0.516
ALT,SWC -0.342
INV,SAT 0.236
INV,WITH 0.186
SWC,INV 0.509
VOI,EMPL 0.236
VOI,SLS -0.156
INV,OPEN -0.174
INV,RIVAL -0.189
SWC,OPEN 0.028

t-value
2.28
3.76
-8.37
-4.89
3.28
2.67
7.74
3.28
-2.16
-2.50
-2.90
0.48

Fit
Chi-Square/df/p-value
RMSEA d
Comparative Fit Index e
GFI/AGFI f

Squared Multiple Correlations:

384/282/0
.040
.976
.881/.852
SAT VOI ALT INV SWC
.37 .09 .15 .18 .28

__________________________
a
Figure 1 model with the nonsignificant bi-directional paths deleted.
b
Maximum likelihood.
c
VOI,INV is the standardized effect of INV on VOI.
d
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation-- .05 or less suggests close fit, .051-.08 suggests
acceptable fit (Brown and Cudeck 1993; Jöreskog 1993).
e
.90 or higher suggests acceptable fit (McClelland and Judd 1993).
f
GFI and AGFI may be inappropriate for assessing fit in larger models (Anderson and Gerbing
1984).
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Table 6-- TRIMMED MODEL STANDARDIZED TOTAL EFFECTSa b c

VOI

VOI
.009

SAT
.040

ALT
-.020

INV
.169

SWC
.007

SLS EMPL WITH OPEN RIVAL
-.157 .239 .031
-.029 -.031

SAT

(2.02) (2.07) (-2.04) (2.27) (1.97) (-2.16) (3.27) (1.73) (-1.68) (-1.78)
.236 .031
-.532 .131 .182
-.036 .056 .024
-.017 -.024

ALT

(3.75) (3.25) (-8.28) (4.23) (4.33) (-1.88) (2.48) (2.26) (-1.20) (-2.39)
-.009 -.042
.022 -.180 -.350
.001 -.002 -.033
.021 .033

INV

(-2.44) (-3.02)
.056 .244

(3.02) (-4.29) (-4.83) (1.62) (-1.97) (-2.27)
-.126 .031 .043 -.008 .013 .192

(2.57) (3.21)
.028 .124
(2.51) (3.12)

(-3.14) (3.25)
-.064 .525
(-3.07) (7.66)

SWC

(0.86) (2.40)
-.178 -.190

(3.01) (-1.66) (2.03) (2.67) (-2.49) (-2.90)
.022 -.004 .006 .098
-.061
-.097
(3.02) (-1.64) (2.00) (2.54) (-0.88) (-2.72)

__________________________
a

From the Figure 1 model with the nonsignificant bi-directional paths deleted. The table is read from
column to row (e.g., the effect of SAT on VOI is .040, while the effect of VOI on SAT is .236).
b
Stability Index = .427
c
t-values are shown in parentheses.
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Figure 1-- HYPOTHESIZED BI-DIRECTIONAL STRUCTURAL MODEL (Simplified)a

EM PL

___________________________
VOI
SLS
SAT
WITH

IN V

RIVAL

OPEN
ALT

SWC

_____________________________
a

SAT = Satisfaction, ALT = Alternative Attractiveness, INV = Investment, SWC = Switching Cost, VOI
= Voice, WITH = years with Wholesaler, OPEN = Years in Business, EMPL = Number of Employees,
SLS = Annual Revenue, and RIVAL = Number of Competitors. The indicator errors ('s) and structural
disturbances ('s) were uncorrelated, and the exogenous variables (i.e., EMPL, SLS, WITH, RIVAL, and
OPEN) were correlated.

RELATIONSHIP COMMITMENT AND OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR
(presented at the 2002 Summer American Marketing Association Conference)

Abstract
Relationship commitment has received considerable attention in several literatures outside of Marketing.
There it is conceptualized as personal or affective commitment (wanting to stay in the relationship), and
structural commitment (having to remain in the relationship).
Opportunism (self-interest seeking with deception) was proposed in the markets-versus-hierarchies
literature by Williamson (1975) as a macro explanation for backward or forward integration. It has also
generated limited theoretical interest, and a modicum of empirical research, at the micro level because it should
disappear in relational exchange (it endangers interfirm exchange relationships by increasing economic and
social costs in these relationships). However, empirical research disconfirming this proposal has been mixed.
This paper expands the concept of relationship commitment in interfirm relationships, and explores the
apparently complex relationships between relationship commitment and opportunism.

Research involving channel relationships has turned from unilateral relationships (i.e., with unbalanced
power and dependence), to those that could be termed bilateral. Bilateral relationships have more nearly equal
distributions of power and dependence, and they are usually characterized by high relationship quality. Over
the course of this research, studies investigated variables characterizing unilateral relationships (e.g., the power
and dependency literature-- see Gaski 1984 for a summary), and variables characterizing bilateral relationships
(e.g., the relationship literature-- see Weitz and Jap 1995 for a summary). Studies that combine variables
characteristic of both aspects of channel relationships, however, have been comparatively rare.
Of interest in the present research because it is an important yet empirically under explored unilateral
relationship behavior (Anderson 1988), retailer opportunistic behavior (i.e., self interest maximizing) that is
guileful (i.e., deceives the exchange partner) was introduced in the economics literature. There it was termed
opportunism and it was used to explain the failure of markets (see Williamson 1975).1 It is characterized by
covert violations of relationship norms and expectations (see Williamson 1975). Despite arguments that it
should be comparatively rare (e.g., Hill 1990), it has been self reported in studies channel relationships (see
Dwyer and Oh 1987, John 1984, Joshi 1995, Phillips 1982, Ping 1993, and Provan and Skinner 1989).
Interfirm relationship commitment has been conceptualized as an implicit or explicit pledge of relationship
continuity (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987). Gundlach et al. (1995) argued that it is evidenced by the magnitude

of inputs to the relationship, affective attachment to the relationship, and the longevity of the relationship.
Relationship commitment has been extensively studied in several literatures. Mowday, Porter and Steers
(1982) argued that organizational commitment is characterized by an employee's acceptance of the organization's values, a willingness to exert effort on behalf of this organization, and a desire to remain in the organization. Meyer and Allen (1991) termed this the affective attachment aspect of organizational commitment. They
argued that organizational commitment is also evidenced by being aware of the costs of leaving the relationship, and having a moral belief supporting remaining in the relationship.
Johnson (1982) argued that interpersonal commitment was composed of personal commitment and
structural commitment. Personal commitment is characterized by satisfaction with the relationship, a moral
belief supporting remaining in the relationship, and a contribution to one's identity provided by the relationship. Structural commitment is characterized by many irretrievable investments in the relationship (i.e., those
that would be lost if the relationship ended), unattractive alternative relationships, social pressure to remain in
the relationship, and awareness of the costs and difficulty of ending the relationship.
Summarizing these arguments, relationship commitment in general should be characterized by wanting to
stay in a relationship. This should be characterized by satisfaction, affective attachment, a moral belief that one
ought to stay in the relationship, and a contribution to one's identity provided by the relationship. Further,
affective attachment should be shown by the acceptance of organizational values, a willingness to exert effort
on behalf of the organization, and the desire to remain in the organization.
The appearance of relationship commitment should also be characterized by having to stay in the relationship. This construct, which we will term relationship dependence,2 should be characterized by unattractive
alternatives, many relationship investments that would be lost if the relationship were ended, social pressures,
the longevity of the relationship, and awareness of the costs and difficulty of ending the relationship.
In channel relationships relationship dependence should be characterized by other variables, including
many inputs to the relationship, and an awareness of the costs and difficulty of establishing a replacement
relationship. Further; the perceived magnitude of the time, effort, money, incentives lost, and the risk that
would be faced in replacing the relationship should be mobility barriers between the existing and alternative
relationships, and thus indicate relationship dependence. These costs include incentives, provided by partner to
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continue the relationship, that would be lost. They include the perceived cost to establish a replacement
relationship, including the money, time, and effort involved in beginning the replacement relationship. These
costs also include the risk that the replacement relationship would turn out to be a poor company with which to
do business.
Combining Relationship Commitment and Opportunism
Opportunism has been characterized as a natural inclination (Williamson 1975; see John 1984) that was
argued to increase with partner firm's relationship dependence (Williamson 1975).3 Opportunism has been
extensively discussed in several literatures. However, most disciplines implicitly assume parties in long term
economic exchange relationships do as they promise. Perhaps as a result, opportunism has been the focus of
comparatively little empirical research (Anderson 1988). In particular, two empirical studies have investigated
opportunism as the focal variable in the interfirm literature.4 John's (1984) study could be characterized as
involving several affective commitment variables, and Provan and Skinner (1989) study could be characterized
as investigating several relationship dependence variables.
Authors have argued that opportunism should be attenuated by high relationship quality (e.g., Goldberg
1980) and thus it should be minimal in bilateral relationships. However, empirical studies have not consistently
supported these arguments. For example, in John's (1984) study, firms' opportunism was negatively associated
with their (positive) affective attitudinal orientation toward the relationship. However, in a study of several
responses to relationship dissatisfaction, including opportunism, Ping (1993) reported that firms' satisfaction
with their relationship was not associated with their opportunism.
The present research will propose that these inconsistent associations between opportunism and
satisfaction-related variables are the result of different levels of alternative relationship attractiveness across the
reported studies (i.e., alternative relationship attractiveness is moderating the opportunism-satisfaction
relationship). This research will also investigate the complex reality surrounding past proposals involving
interfirm opportunism: that personal or affective commitment reduces opportunism, and relationship dependence increases it.
Antecedents of Opportunism
Opportunism and Alternative Unattractiveness
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Authors have argued that firms with unattractive alternative replacement relationships should exhibit
reduced opportunism (e.g., Anderson and Weitz 1986, Provan and Skinner 1989, Ping 1993). This association
has been inconsistently observed. Firms' opportunism was negatively associated with their alternative unattractiveness in Ping (1993), but firms' opportunism was not associated with availability of alternatives in Provan
and Skinner (1989). It is plausible that this association depends on, or is moderated by, different levels of
relationship commitment across the two studies. In a committed interfirm relationship, future economic
exchanges with partner should be valued highly (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987). Conversely, any potential gains
from opportunism should be less attractive to the committed subject firm than the potential of losses that might
result if their opportunism were discovered and the relationship were ruined. Increases in alternative unattractiveness should amplify this effect because it makes the committed subject even more dependent on their
partner (Emerson 1962, see Anderson and Narus 1984). This should make potential gains from opportunism
even less attractive to the subject than the potential losses if their opportunism were discovered and negative
sanctions such as relationship termination resulted (Joshi 1995, see Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
Formally, when firms' relationship commitment is high, increased alternative unattractiveness should make
them likely to avoid behaviors such as opportunism that might damage or jeopardize the relationship (Provan
and Skinner 1989), and (H1a) Alternative unattractiveness is negatively associated with opportunism when
relationship commitment is high;
When firms' relationship commitment is low, however, increases in firms' alternative unattractiveness
should be viewed negatively by them. Alternative unattractiveness makes it difficult to exit the relationship,
which should in turn be interpreted as a threat to freedom (a cost) (see Brehm 1972). Firms with unattractive
alternative relationships should be more likely to engage in re-balancing operations to improve their relationship rewards and costs if the interfirm balance of these rewards and costs becomes tipped in partner's favor.
Frazier (1983), among others (see Brehm 1972, Walster, Berscheid and Walster 1976), argued that when
relationship rewards are tipped in partner's favor, firms may decrease their relationship inputs (a cost) to reduce
partner's relationship rewards.
Opportunism could be viewed as a means to improve the balance of rewards and costs in an interfirm
relationship in the subject firms' favor. For example, partner firms' relationship costs could be decreased by
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shirking relationship responsibilities, or firms' relationship rewards could be increased by overstating the extent
of their local difficulties so partner firms provide additional relationship inputs.
Thus, when relationship commitment is low, alternative unattractiveness should be positively associated
with firms' balancing operations such as opportunism. Formally, (H1b): Alternative unattractiveness is
positively associated with opportunism when relationship commitment is low.
Opportunism and Relationship Costs
The cost facets of relationship dependence can be categorized as past costs to establish and build the
relationship (i.e., relationship investments, relationship duration, and irretrievable investments), or future costs
to end the relationship and establish another (i.e., the costs of ending the relationship, new relationship startup,
incentives lost, and new relationship risk). These costs should have associations with firms' opportunism that
depend on how these costs are perceived by the firms.
Costs such time, energy, and effort voluntarily invested to establish, build and maintain a relationship,
should be negatively associated with opportunism. Costs and investments already voluntarily incurred, especially those that would be lost or obsoleted if the relationship were ended, should be safeguarded. Thus, these
costs and investments should decrease the likelihood of opportunism, which risks damaging or losing the
relationship. Specifically, past relationship inputs, especially investments of time, effort, and energy, should
make the relationship perceptually more valuable (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Frazier 1983). When they
increase their relationship investments, especially those that would be lost or obsoleted if the relationship were
ended, firms should magnify the risks associated with their opportunism in comparison to its rewards (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), and opportunism should be avoided. Thus, as firms' relationship investments, including the duration of the relationship, and irretrievable investments increase, the likelihood of opportunism
should decline, and (H2a): Relationship investments, relationship duration, and irretrievable investments are
negatively associated with opportunism.
The time, effort, money, incentives lost, and risk firms would incur to end a relationship and establish an
alternative replacement relationship, however, should be positively associated with opportunism. These costs
that loom in the future and are unavoidable when changing relationships should be viewed negatively because
they threaten freedom (Brehm 1972). They should increase the likelihood of opportunism as a way to balance
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or discount these unavoidable costs. Costs that would be incurred in the future to end the present relationship,
including i) money and time required to physically terminate the relationship; and ii) lost incentives provided
by partner to continue the relationship should be discounted by increased opportunism as a balancing operation. Costs that would be incurred in the future to establish an alternative relationship, including iii) money,
time, and effort required to start the alternative relationship, and iv) the risk of the alternative relationship
turning out to be a poor company with which to do business, should also be discounted by increased opportunism as a balancing operation. Thus, as relationship ending, new relationship startup, incentives lost, and new
relationship risk costs perceptually increase, firms should seek to discount these costs via opportunism.
Formally, (H2b): Relationship ending costs, new relationship startup costs, incentives lost, and new relationship risk are positively associated with opportunism.
Unexplored Antecedents of Opportunism
Opportunism may have several unexpected antecedents. Authors have proposed there are several possible
responses to relationship problems (actions or inactions by the partner firm that violate relational norms-- see
Kaufmann and Stern 1988) besides leaving the relationship or exiting (Hirschman 1970, Ping 1993). Hirschman (1970) argued that when relationship problems first occur in a (committed) relationship, individuals react
first with loyalty rather than simply exiting the relationship. He proposed this loyalty is characterized first by
loyal behavior (remaining silent when there were relationship problems, with confidence that things will get
better). If these problems persist, then they use voice (constructive attempts by the subject firm to change
objectionable relationship conditions) is used, or they exit the relationship.
Loyal Behavior

Loyal behaving subjects are silent when there are relationship problems because they are

confident that things will get better (Hirschman 1970). This loyal behavior is characterized by an absence of
complaint (Hirschman 1970), the belief that the relationship partner will remedy problems, and that there is no
need for the loyal behaving subject to take action when there are relationship problems. Thus when relationship
problems occur, loyal behaving firms should be disinclined to engage in actions designed to re-balance their
rewards and costs in the relationship because the relationship partner will soon remedy the situation. Thus, as
their loyal behavior increases, firms should be increasingly less likely to engage in opportunism, and (H3):
Loyal behavior is negatively associated with opportunism.
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Voice

Vocal subjects, however, make constructive attempts to change objectionable relationship conditions

(Hirschman 1970). This suggests that voice and opportunism behaviors should be unlikely to be emitted jointly
because they are dissonant (see Festinger 1954). Voice is aimed at relationship repair, while opportunism, if
discovered, risks ruining the relationship. Thus, vocal firms should be unlikely to engage in opportunism, and
(H4): Voice is negatively associated with opportunism.
These hypothesized relationships are summarized in Figure 1.
A Study
Conceptual and Operational Definitions
Relationship Commitment

Interfirm relationship commitment was conceptualized above as an implicit or

explicit pledge of relationship continuity arising from wanting to stay in a relationship. Recalling that commitment has been argued to be indicated by wanting to stay in a relationship because of satisfaction, affective
attachment, a moral belief that one ought to stay in the relationship, and a contribution to one's identity
provided by the relationship, interfirm relationship commitment was operationalized as overall satisfaction with
the relationship, and affective attachment to it. The facets of interfirm relationship commitment related to
relationship commitment arising from a moral belief that a firm should remain in the relationship or the
relationship's contribution to a firm's identity were not operationalized in the preset study because focus groups
with a convenient sample of firms from the study population strongly suggested that moral beliefs and contribution to identity were unlikely to be a basis for relationship commitment in many interfirm relationships.
Affective attachment was argued to be shown by the acceptance of organizational values a willingness to
exert effort on behalf of the organization, and the desire to remain in the organization. Because interfirm
relationships are more likely to develop norms and expectations (Macneil 1980) than to simply accept existing
organizational vales, observance of relationship norms and expectations should be more indicative of affective
attachment than acceptance of organizational values in interfirm relationships. However, because affective
attachment in part involves observing relationship norms and expectations, while opportunism involves
deceitful violation of these norms and expectations, their conceptual domains overlap in the area of norms and
expectations. As a result, interfirm affective attachment was operationalized in the present study as willingness
to exert effort on behalf of the relationship, and desire to remain in the relationship. Observance of relationship
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norms and expectations was not operationalized to avoid a domain overlap in the area of norms and
expectations, and any attendant distortions of their construct and discriminant validities. In addition, it avoided
overstating the association between opportunism and relationship commitment.
These facets of relationship commitment were operationalized using previously developed measures that
have shown acceptable psychometric properties. The conceptual domain of overall relationship satisfaction, the
global evaluation of relationship fulfillment (Dwyer and Oh 1987), includes the fairness of the supplier,
whether or not they are a good company to do business with, and overall satisfaction with the relationship. It
was operationalized using a scale developed by Ping (1993), the items of which are shown in Appendix B.
Willingness to exert effort on behalf of the relationship was measured with an existing scale that has
previously shown acceptable psychometric properties, minimal neglect of the relationship (whether or not the
subject firm will allow the relationship to deteriorate). Firms that are not willing to let their exchange relationship deteriorate should be willing to exert effort on behalf of the relationship to keep it from deteriorating. The
conceptual domain of willingness to exert effort on behalf of the relationship/minimal neglect of the relationship includes the degree of caring about the relationship, the willingness to expend effort to maintain or
improve the relationship, and whether or not the subject firm will let the relationship deteriorate (Rusbult,
Zembrodt and Gunn 1982). Minimal neglect was measured using a scale developed by Ping (1993). The items
for this and the other study measures are shown in Appendix B.
Similarly, the desire to remain in the relationship was measured using an existing measure that has
previously exhibited acceptable psychometric properties, minimal exiting propensity: whether or not subject
firm desires to continue the current relationship. Its conceptual domain includes not intending to engage in, or
not engaging in, the activities associated with ending a relationship: thinking of ending the relationship and
considering a replacement relationship, looking for a replacement relationship, and the intention to end the
relationship. Minimal exiting propensity was measured using a scale developed by Ping (1993).
Relationship Dependence

Relationship dependence as was conceptualized above as the magnitude of mobil-

ity barriers between the present relationship and a replacement relationship. It was argued to be characterized
by many irretrievable investments in the relationship (i.e., that would be lost if the relationship ended), unattractive alternative relationships, social pressures to remain in the relationship, awareness of the costs and diffi-
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culty of ending the relationship, many inputs to the relationship; and awareness of the costs and difficulty of
establishing a replacement relationship, incentives provided by partner to continue the relationship that would
be lost, the perceived cost to establish a replacement relationship, and the risk that the replacement relationship
would turn out to be a poor company with which to do business. We operationalized these facets of relationship dependence with the unattractiveness of the best alternative replacement relationship, the magnitude of
inputs to the relationship and the investments in the relationship that would be lost if it were ended, the longevity of the relationship, and the costs and the difficulty of ending the relationship and starting a replacement
relationship. The facet of interfirm relationship dependence involving social pressure was not operationalized
in the preset study because focus groups with a convenient sample of firms from the study population strongly
suggested that social pressure was not a basis for relationship dependency in many interfirm relationships.
Relationship ending cost, the firms costs to end the current relationship, was measured using a new scale
which is shown in Appendix B. Its conceptual domain includes the perceived magnitude of the anticipated
costs to cancel the relationship, including time, money, and customer goodwill. Its measure development was
guided by the switching cost literature (e.g., Porter 1980) and depth interviews with hardware retailers, and it
involved a jury of academic experts to judge the resulting items using the above conceptual definition.
The measure for new relationship startup cost, the time, money, and effort involved in preparing to use the
alternative supplier, was also guided by the switching cost literature and depth interviews, and it utilized item
judging by knowledgeable academic colleagues. The domain of new relationship startup cost includes the
perceived magnitude of the costs of negotiating with the alternative supplier, changing displays, and setting up
and getting ready to use the alternative supplier.
The measures for incentives lost, the current suppliers inducements to continue the relationship that
would be lost if the relationship were ended, and new relationship risk, the risk that the alternative supplier
would turn out to be a poor company with which to do business, were also new measures and were developed
as just described. The conceptual domain of incentives lost included the perceived magnitude of the incentives,
inducements, and rewards for continuing the relationship that would be lost or forfeited in switching to the
alternative supplier. The conceptual domain of new relationship risk included the perceived magnitude of the
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risk that the alternative supplier would not perform consistently with expectations, the perceived magnitude of
the risks of poor service and performance, and the perceived magnitude of the risk of being a poor company
with which to do business.
Relationship investments, the costs the firm has incurred to build and maintain the relationship (Lund
1985), was operationalized as the perceived time, effort and energy that have been invested to build and maintain the relationship. Irretrievable investments, the relationship investments that would be lost if the relationship were ended, was operationalized as the perceived uniqueness of the relationship investments, and the perception of how much of the investment in the relationship would be lost by changing primary suppliers. These
constructs were measured with modifications of scales developed by Ping (1993) that were item judged as
described earlier.
Alternative unattractiveness, the perceived overall satisfaction available in an alternative replacement
relationship, was operationalized as the overall fulfillment, or lack of it, available from the best alternative
supplier in comparison to the existing relationship (Rusbult 1980). Its domain includes the perception of
whether or not the alternative would be a good company to do business with; its fairness, products, services,
and policies; and the anticipated overall satisfaction with the alternative supplier.
Loyal behavior, abiding relationship problems in silence with confidence that things will get better
(Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982), was operationalized as intending not to say anything to the partner firm
about relationship problems; intending to overlook, ignore, or disregard relationship problems; and the belief
that relationship problems will fix themselves. Voice, constructive attempts by the subject firm to change
objectionable relationship conditions (Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982), was operationalized as intending to
discuss relationship problems with the partner firm, intending to suggest changes in the relationship when there
are problems, and intending to work with the partner firm to solve mutual problems. Both constructs were
measured using measures developed by Ping (1993).
Opportunism, self interest seeking with guile (Williamson 1975), was measured using the Dwyer and Oh
(1987) opportunism measure. It was operationalized as intending to distort information, intending to fail to
fulfill promises, and intending to shirking obligations (John 1984).
Relationship duration, the number of years the firm has done business with the supplier, was measured
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using a single open-ended question (see Appendix B).
As Figure 1 and the preceding discussion imply, relationship commitment was specified as a second order
construct in the present study. It's indicators were the first-order constructs overall relationship satisfaction,
minimal neglect, and minimal exiting propensity.
While interfirm relationship dependence could also be specified as a second order construct, as implied by
the hypotheses we elected instead to specify its first order constructs as directly associated with opportunism
for several reasons, including that it allows the estimation of the path coefficients between these variables and
opportunism (which is not possible using a second order construct).
Sampling

The study population was hardware retailers. They form long-term relationships with a single

primary wholesaler for most of their merchandise.5 The key informant was the store owner, manager, or executive. Depth interviews conducted prior to the study suggested they were quite knowledgeable of the primary
wholesaler relationship. These interviews also suggested their sentiments and perceptions were mirrored by
other informants in the firms.
Sampling involved systematic random (n-th name) selections of 600 pretest store names and 800 final-test
names (with one key informant per store).
Pretest The pretest responses (199) were used to evaluate the measures. They were unidimensional using
maximum likelihood exploratory factor analysis, except for opportunism which was multidimensional. Reliabilities for these measures, including the F1 factor for opportunism (items 3-8) were above .80. They were
judged to be valid (i.e., they were item judged to be content valid; they were correlated with the other study
variables in plausible directions, suggesting their construct validity; their average extracted variances (AVE's)
were above .50, which suggested convergent validity, and their AVE's were greater than the squared correlations with the other study variables, suggesting discriminant validity (see Fornell and Larker 1981)).
To utilize structural equation analysis, the model-to-data fit for each measure is investigated (see Anderson
and Gerbing 1988, Jöreskog 1993), and items are dropped in inconsistent scales until measurement model fit is
attained. However, authors have criticized dropping items from psychometrically acceptable (i.e., unidimensional, valid and reliable) measures to attain model fit on the grounds that it impairs content validity (e.g.,
Cattell 1973, 1978; see Gerbing, Hamilton and Freeman 1994). Cattell (1973) observed that the resulting
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measures are typically bloated specific (operationally narrow) instances of the target construct.
It is well known that fit improves by dropping items from a measure. Stated differently, fit declines as
items are added to a measure, and Bagozzi and Baumgartner (1994) observed that it is practically impossible to
obtain model-to-data fit in a measure with more than 6 items using survey data. Thus, itemizing a latent
variable with each of its individual indicators may be inappropriate for a unidimensional measure with more
than 6 items in structural equation analysis.
Kenny (1979) may have been aware of these difficulties. He suggested that instead of specifying a latent
variable with each of its individual indicators, a single indicator that was the sum of these indicators could be
used, as Likert (1932) suggested. Variations of this procedure have been used elsewhere in the social sciences
for established (long) multi-item measures (e.g., Heise and Smith-Lovin 1982; James, Mulaik and Brett 1982;
and Williams and Hazer 1986), but the procedure is generally unfamiliar to researchers in Marketing. This
suggestion has several merits (e.g., it permits the use of larger measures in structural equation analysis; it
reduces the size of the input covariance matrix (ICM), which results in more cases per ICM element, and thus
it reduces the asymptotic incorrectness of the ICM; and it produces more nearly continuous indicators that
better approximate the assumptions underlying structural equation analysis), and the present research uses this
summed specification for the latent variables in the Figure 1 model (see Appendix A for details).6
Except for irretrievable investments, single construct measurement models for the measures did not adequately fit the data (Dwyer and Oh 1987, John 1984, and Ping 1993 reported similar difficulties with these
measures). In the sad process of fitting successive measurement models to determine which items to drop from
measures that were nevertheless unidimensional using maximum likelihood exploratory (common) factor
analysis (ML EFA), we were unable to determine how much lack of fit was due to the number of items in a
measure and how much was due to actual inconsistency in the items. In addition, dropping items to attain
model-data fit produced submeasures that were judged to be less rich, to completely unacceptable, on a domain
sampling, and thus a content validity basis, when compared with the full measures. As a result, because the full
measures were unidimensional using ML EFA (except for opportunism), they were retained for the final test.
Final-Test Two hundred ninety-seven responses were usable from the final-test mailing after two postcard
follow-ups (a 37% usable response rate).
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As before, single construct measurement models for the scales did not adequately fit the data. In addition,
we continued to be unable to determine how much lack of fit was due to inconsistency and how much was due
to the number of items in each measure. As in the pretest, dropping items to improve fit produced conceptually
narrow to unacceptable submeasures based on the full measures' domain sampling. Since the full measures
were unidimensional (except for opportunism) using ML EFA, they were summed to estimate the Figure 1
structural equation model.
The eight-item opportunism measure was not unidimensional in the pre- and the final-test (Dwyer and Oh
1987 reported similar problems). Items 3-8 in Appendix B were unidimensional in the final test using ML EFA
but their single construct measurement model (see Jöreskog 1993) did not adequately fit the data. As before,
we were unable to determine how much lack of fit was due to inconsistency and how much was due to the
number of items. Because submeasures that did fit the data were judged to be less content valid than the items
3-8 measure, we also summed items 3-8 for opportunism in the final test.
Relationship commitment, specified as a second order construct with its first order constructs satisfaction,
minimal neglect, and minimal exiting, was judged to fit the data using ordered similarity coefficients7 (see
Anderson and Gerbing 1982) (also see Bagozzi 1981 for a discussion of second-order constructs). However,
there is no guidance for specifying a second-order construct when it is also involved in an interaction. Primarily
to simplify the specification of the interaction, the second-order construct relationship commitment was
specified with a single summed indicator that was the sum of the three summed indicators for satisfaction,
minimum neglect, and minimum exiting propensity to estimate the structural coefficients in the Figure 1 model
(see Bagozzi and Hetherton 1994 for a discussion of this approach).
The interaction between relationship commitment and alternative unattractiveness was specified using a
single product indicator as Ping (1995) suggested (see Figure 1).
Reliability and Validity The measures had reliabilities ranging from .81 to .97 (see Table 2). They were judged
to be content valid (see Appendix B). In addition, each construct was significantly correlated with other
constructs in plausible directions, which suggested the construct validity of the study measures (see Table 2).
The average variance extracted (AVE) for each measure were above .50 which suggested their convergent
validity (Fornell and Larker 1981) (see Table 2). Finally, the AVE's of each pair of constructs exceeded the
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square of the correlation between them, which suggested their discriminant validity (Fornell and Larker 1981).8
Measurement and Structural Models

The measurement and structural models for Figure 1 were estimated

using covariances, LISREL 8, and maximum likelihood, and the results are shown in Tables 1 and 2. Because
the measurement and structural models for Figure 1 had latent variables each with a single indicator and were
saturated, they each fit the data perfectly.
Results
More than half of the variance in opportunism was explained (see Table 1). The hypothesized relationship
commitment and alternative unattractiveness interaction was significant. However, opportunism's associations
with the relationship costs were checkered. Opportunism was positively associated with two of the future costs
(relationship ending cost and incentives lost), but it was not associated with relationship investments, irretrievable investments, new relationship startup cost, risks, or relationship duration. In addition, opportunism's
associations with loyal behavior and voice were positive instead of negative. These unanticipated results will
require considerable discussion and interpretation, which begin in the next section.
Estimating the interaction between relationship commitment and alternative unattractiveness required
specifying relationship commitment and alternative unattractiveness in the structural model. However, because
they were not hypothesized to be directly associated with opportunism, their opportunism path coefficients
were constrained to equal zero in estimating the Figure 1 model. This in turn assumed these associations were
zero in the population model of Figure 1. To probe this assumption, the Figure 1 model was re-estimated with
the opportunism path coefficients from RCOM and ALTU not constrained to equal zero. The alternative
unattractiveness-opportunism path was not significant, but the relationship commitment-opportunism path was,
and these two associations are also shown in Table 1.
Discussion
The Structure of Relationship Commitment and Relationship Dependency Commitment in an interfirm
relationship was argued to be characterized by relationship commitment and relationship dependency. Each of
these concepts was argued to have facets that are themselves concepts. This research specified relationship
commitment as a second-order construct, which was judged to be psychometrically adequate (i.e., unidimensional, reliable, and valid). This specification had the desirable property of allowing a straightforward specifi-
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cation of the RCxALTU interaction. However, RCOM's second-order specification fitting the data suggests
that one operationalization or structure of relationship commitment may be as a second order construct composed of satisfaction, willingness to exert effort on behalf of the relationship, and desire to remain in the
relationship. In different words, these concepts appear to work together (i.e., are consistent) to create relationship commitment in the present context.
The structure of relationship dependence was unspecified in the Figure 1 model so that associations with
opportunism could be observed. However, relationship dependence was multidimensional in the pre- and final
tests using maximum likelihood exploratory (common) factor analysis and the indicators (constructs) ALTU,
INV, IRINV, START, END, INCENT, RISK, YRS. Nevertheless, a second order construct composed of the
costs (INV, IRINV, START, END, INCENT and RISK) was unidimensional, had reliability of .85, and had an
average variance extracted of .51. This (second order) construct COST produced a positive association with
opportunism (βCOST = .14, t = 2.21) in a respecification of Figure 1 that combined INV, IRINV, START, END,
INCENT and RISK into the second order variable COST. This suggests that relationship dependency may be a
complex construct in this context that is characterized by alternative unattractiveness, COST, and relationship
duration. In different words, its facets did not vary together in the present study (i.e., they were inconsistent as
a second order construct).
Costs and Opportunism Opportunism was positively associated with two of the interfirm relationship mobility
barriers proposed by this research, the cost to end the relationship and the incentives that would be lost in
ending the relationship, and COST was positively associated with opportunism . These results suggest the
study firms may have compensated for these costs using the balancing mechanism of opportunism. Together
this suggests relationship costs increased opportunism in the present study, but not by much. The association
between opportunism and COST was weak when compared to relationship commitment (RCOM) and alternative unattractiveness (ALTU) (see Tables 1 and 3). In addition, because they were not significantly associated
with opportunism in the present study, the importance of irretrievable investments, new relationship startup
cost and risks, relationship investments, and relationship duration may not matter when it comes to opportunism (i.e., at best their effect on opportunism may depend upon the study context).
Holding Opportunism at Bay

Based on the signs of the significant study associations shown in Table 4,
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opportunism should be low when relationship commitment (RCOM) and alternative unattractiveness (ALTU)
are high, and relationship ending cost (END) and incentives lost (INCENT) are low. Indeed as shown in
Column 2 of Table 3, opportunism was lowest when relationship commitment, and alternative unattractiveness
were above their study averages, and relationship ending cost and incentives lost were below average. However, because of the interaction between relationship commitment and alternative unattractiveness, the opposite
was not true. Opportunism was highest when relationship commitment was below average, but alternative
unattractiveness were above average, and relationship ending cost and incentives lost were below average (see
Column 2 of Table 3).
Increased relationship commitment was linked with decreased opportunism for all levels of alternative
attractiveness in the study except when alternative attractiveness was at its minimum (see Columns 5 and 8 of
Table 4). Similarly, reduced alternative unattractiveness was likely to be accompanied by reduced opportunism
when relationship commitment was lower (see Columns 1 and 4 of Table 4). These results suggest that
opportunism in the study firms was likely to be increased by lack of relationship commitment (see Column 8 of
Table 4), and aggravated by high alternative unattractiveness (see the bottom of Columns 4 in Table 4).
Having said that, this research also suggests that relationship quality may not always hold opportunism at
bay. The relationship quality variable relationship commitment was negatively associated with opportunism
only when alternative unattractiveness was not extremely low (see Column 8 of Table 4). When alternative
unattractiveness was extremely low, the relationship quality variable relationship commitment had no association with opportunism (see Column 8 of Table 4)
The interaction between relationship commitment and alternative unattractiveness makes it difficult to say
with precision which had the greater effect on opportunism in the study, relationship commitment or variables
that characterize relationship dependence. Nevertheless, the Table 1 standardized coefficient of RCOM is
much larger than ALTU; but based on Column 8 of Table 4 ALTU should not be ignored. Together relationship commitment and alternative unattractiveness explained 34% of the variance in opportunism while the
other variables that characterize relationship dependency explained 7%. Thus, relationship commitment and
alternative unattractiveness may jointly matter when it comes to holding interfirm opportunism at bay, but
relationship commitment may matter relatively more.

17

Previous Inconsistent Results

The interaction between relationship commitment and alternative unattrac-

tiveness may explain the inconsistent reported opportunism associations between satisfaction and alternatives.
In the present study when alternative unattractiveness was higher, relationship commitment, and by implication, satisfaction, was negatively associated with opportunism as John (1984) observed (see Columns 5 and 8
of Table 4). However, when alternative unattractiveness was low this association was non significant as Ping
(1993) observed (see the bottom of Column 8 in Table 4). Thus, an explanation for the inconsistent associations between opportunism and variables related to satisfaction is that alternative unattractiveness may have
been high in John's (1984) study, while it may have been low in Ping's (1993) study.
Similarly, when relationship commitment was very high in the present study, alternative unattractiveness
may have been negatively associated with opportunism as Ping (1993) observed (see the top of Columns 1 and
4 of Table 4). When relationship commitment was near the study average, alternative unattractiveness was not
associated with opportunism as Provan and Skinner (1989) observed (see Columns 1 and 4 of Table 4). Thus,
an explanation for the inconsistent associations between alternative attractiveness and opportunism is satisfaction may have been very high in Ping's (1993) study but lower in Provan and Skinner's (1989) study.
Voice Loyal Behavior and Opportunism The above discussion of variable relationships across studies suggests
an interaction (or quadratic) might be responsible for an unanticipated association between two variables (also
see Ping 1998 for a summary of arguments for post hoc probing associations using interactions and quadratics).
Thus, to probe the unexpectedly positive voice and loyal behavior associations with opportunism, an interaction between relationship commitment and voice (RCxVOI in Table 1), and a quadratic in loyal behavior (LxL
in Table 1) were added to the Figure 1 model, to see if nonlinearity in these associations was responsible for
the unexpected results. The results were significant, and the coefficients are shown in Table 1.
The voice interaction with relationship commitment suggests the voice association with opportunism was
dependent on the level of relationship commitment in the study. The voice opportunism association was
positive for most levels of relationship commitment, except for very high relationship commitment, where the
opportunism-voice association was negative as hypothesized. This hints that voice may also have been a type
of balancing mechanism in the study context, when relationship commitment was very high, but that it is
associated with higher opportunism for lower levels of relationship commitment.
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The significant quadratic in loyal behavior suggested the opportunism-loyal behavior association was also
variable. This association was positive across most of the levels of existing loyal behavior, except when
existing loyal behavior was very high, where small changes in loyalty were negatively associated with opportunism. This suggests that most of the retailers in the study that were silent when there were problems in the
relationship were also likely to have been opportunistic. Together with the voice-opportunism association these
results suggest that for all but the most committed retailers in the study context increases in silence or voice
when there were relationship problems were likely to also be accompanied by opportunistic behavior. In turn
this suggests that neither voice not loyal behavior can be used to detect the possibility of opportunism in the
study context, and a prudent channel manager is left with maximizing relationship commitment and alternative
unattractiveness as the most likely strategy for dealing with opportunism in this context. In addition, because
on average, relationship commitment had the larger association with opportunism, and because alternative
unattractiveness and relationship commitment were positively correlated in the study (see Table 2), it may be
sufficient for the prudent channel manager in this context to maximize relationship commitment.
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Appendix A- Summed Indicators and Structural Equation Analysis
Kenny (1979) suggested an approach that uses reliabilities to determine the loading and measurement
error of an indicator that is the sum of items in structural equation analysis. Variations of this approach have
been used in the social sciences with established measures that have many items and larger models (e.g., Heise
and Smith-Lovin 1982; James, Mulaik and Brett 1982; and Williams and Hazer 1986), but the procedure is
generally unfamiliar to researchers in Marketing. This approach has several merits. When averaged, a summed
indicator produces more nearly continuous observed data which reduces the (unknown amount of) bias that
attends the much criticized use of structural equation analysis with ordinal data (such as that produced by
rating scales) (see Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996:239). Summed indicators substantially reduce the size of the
input covariance matrix, and thus its asymptotic incorrectness for a given sample size. In different words, this
enables the proper use of the smaller samples typical in marketing studies (e.g., 200-300) with larger structural
models by improving the ratio of the sample size to the size of the covariance matrix (at 5 items per latent
variable, the Figure 1 model would have required over 2500 completed questionnaires to produce at least one
case per input covariance matrix element). The use of summed indicators eliminates interpretational confounding by separating measurement issues from model structure in structural equation models (see Anderson and
Gerbing 1988 for a consistency-based approach to separating measurement from model structure).9 Thus, for
unsaturated structural models, lack of fit in a summed indicator model unambiguously suggests structural
model misspecification, rather than a combination of measurement model difficulties and structural model
misspecification. On the negative side, summed indicators are non traditional and not particularly elegant in
structural equation analysis. It is assumed that indicators must be tau equivalent to be summed (however,
Bagozzi and Heatherton's (1994) results suggest that structural equation analysis used with reliable measures
and survey data is robust to violations of the assumption that items be tau equivalent before summing them);
and it is believed that reliability underestimates the loading of the summed item when the factor analytic
loadings of the individual items vary widely in size (however, for unidimensional measures with reliabilities of
.70 or above and survey data, individual loadings typically vary only a few points).
The present research used summed (then averaged) indicators to specify the Figure 1 model in order to
avoid omitting items from unidimensional measures and thus to preserve their content or face validity; to
produce at least 2 cases per input covariance element and thus reduce the asymptotic incorrectness of the input
covariance matrix; and to provide more nearly continuous indicators that better approximate the assumptions
underlying structural equation analysis.
Authors have defined the reliability of an indicator as the square of the coefficient on the path between
the indicator and its latent variable (see Bollen 1989). Thus, the loading of an indicator is the square root of its
reliability. It is also well known that the measurement error variance, θX, of an indicator X is given by
θX = Var(X)(1 - ρX) ,
where Var(X) is the variance of X and ρX is the latent variable reliability of X.10
Anderson and Gerbing (1988) pointed out that for unidimensional measures there is little practical
difference between coefficient alpha (α) and latent variable reliability ρ.
Thus, for a single indicator specification of an unobserved construct, its loading is estimated by the
square root of its coefficient alpha reliability, and its measurement error variance is estimated by Var(X)(1 αX), where αX is the coefficient alpha reliability of X.
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Appendix B- Final Test Measures
ALTERNATIVE UNATTRACTIVENESS (ALTU) (All items were reverse coded)
1.
All in all, the alternative wholesaler would be ______ fair than/as the current wholesaler is.
a. Much more b. Slightly more c. As d. Slightly less e. Much less
2.
Overall, the alternative wholesaler's policies would benefit my company than/as the current wholesaler's policies.
a. Much more b. Slightly more c. As much d. Slightly less e. Much less
3.
I would be _____ satisfied with the product and service available from the alternative wholesaler than/as the
product and service provided by the current wholesaler.
a. Much more b. Slightly more c. As d. Slightly less e. Much less
4.
In general, I would be _____ satisfied with the alternative wholesaler than/as I am with the current wholesaler. a.
Much more b. Slightly more c. As d. Slightly less e. Much less
5.
Overall, the alternative wholesaler would be a/an _____ company to do business with than/as the current
wholesaler. a. Much better b. Slightly better c. As good a d. Slightly worse
e. Much worse
INCENTIVES LOST (INCENT)
1.
Switching to the alternative wholesaler would mean I would lose the current wholesalers rewards for continuing
the relationship.
2.
There are many current wholesaler provided incentives to continue the relationship that I would lose in switching
to the alternative wholesaler.
3.
The company would forfeit the current wholesalers inducements to continue a relationship if I changed to the
alternative wholesaler.
4.
Changing to the alternative wholesaler would mean that I would lose the incentives the current wholesaler
provides for continuing the relationship.
5.
If the company changed to be alternative there are many rewards that the current wholesaler
provides to continue the relationship that would be lost.
IRRETRIEVABLE INVESTMENTS (IRINV)
1.
The companys investment in the current wholesaler relationship is unique to the relationship.
2.
A lot of our investment in the current wholesaler relationship would be lost by changing primary wholesalers.
3.
All things considered, the company would lose a lot of our investment by changing primary wholesalers.
4.
Much of my investment with the current wholesaler is unique to the relationship.
5.
Overall, I would lose a lot of our investment if I changed primary wholesalers.
LOYAL BEHAVIOR (LOY)
1.
I will not say anything to my primary wholesaler about mutual problems because they seem to go away by
themselves.
2.
I disregard problems with my primary wholesaler because they just seem to work themselves out.
3.
Problems with my primary wholesaler will often fix themselves.
4.
Sometimes I ignore problems with my primary wholesaler.
5.
I often overlook problems with my primary wholesaler because they frequently fix themselves.
MINIMAL EXITING PROPENSITY (MINEXP) (All items were reverse coded)
1.
Occasionally I will think about ending the business relationship with my primary wholesaler.
2.
I am not likely to continue the business relationship with my primary wholesaler.
3.
I will probably consider a replacement primary wholesaler in the near future.
4.
I am looking at replacement wholesalers.
5.
I will consider a replacement wholesaler soon.
6.
I will probably stop doing business with my primary wholesaler in the near future.
MINIMAL NEGLECT (MINNEG) (All items were reverse coded)
1.
I won't plan to do anything to improve relations with my primary wholesaler and will expect things will become
worse.
2.
At times I care very little about what happens to my primary wholesaler as long as I get what I need from them.
3.
I have quit caring about my primary wholesaler and will let conditions get worse and worse.
4.
I will passively let the relationship with my primary wholesaler slowly deteriorate.
5.
If things are not right with my primary wholesaler I sometimes consider letting the
relationship die a slow death.
NEW RELATIONSHIP RISK (RISK)
1.
In switching to the alternative wholesaler there would be a risk of their poor service.
2.
There would be a lot of risk to the company to in switching to the alternative wholesaler.
3.
If I switched to the alternative wholesaler there is a chance they would perform poorly.
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Appendix B- Final Test Measures in Alphabetical Order (Continued)
4.
5.

There is a chance that the alternative wholesaler would turn out to be a poor company to do business with.
I am not certain that the alternative wholesaler would perform consistently with my
expectations.
NEW RELATIONSHIP STARTUP COST (START)
1.
If I changed primary wholesaler I would spend a lot of effort converting the store to use alternative wholesaler.
2.
Changing primary wholesalers would require changing many displays.
3.
The costs of getting ready to use the alternative wholesaler would probably be high.
4.
I would probably have to spend a lot of time and money to negotiate an agreement with the alternative wholesaler.
5.
If we changed primary wholesalers we would have to change a lot of our displays.
6.
The amount of time, money and effort required to set up for the alternative wholesaler may be considerable.
7.
If we changed primary wholesalers there would be many costs involved in getting ready to
use them.
OPPORTUNISM (OPP)
*1.
I will not volunteer much information regarding my business to my primary wholesaler.
*2.
There will be some things I will do only if my primary wholesaler checks up and insists on it.
3.
At times I may have to overstate my difficulties in order to get primary wholesaler assistances.
4.
Sometimes, I will have to alter the facts slightly in order to get what I need from my primary wholesaler.
5.
I may purposefully exaggerate the sales opportunities in my market in order to get additional allowances or
assistance from my primary wholesaler.
6.
Occasionally I may shrink certain contractual obligations to my primary wholesaler when I see profit
opportunities from doing so.
7.
I may neglect my program responsibilities when my primary wholesaler is not likely to notice
my noncompliance.
8.
I may slightly exaggerate the extent of my problems to get what I need from my primary wholesaler.
* Omitted for Figure 1 model estimation because items 1-8 were multidimensional (items 3-8 composed F1).
OVERALL RELATIONSHIP SATISFACTION (SAT)
1.
All in all, my primary wholesaler is very fair with me.
2.
Overall, my primary wholesaler is a good company to do business with.
3.
In general am pretty satisfied with my relationship with my primary wholesaler.
4.
Overall, my primary wholesaler treats me very fairly.
5.
All in all, my relationship with my primary wholesaler is very satisfactory.
RELATIONSHIP DURATION (YRS)
1.
How many years have you done business with your primary wholesaler? _________
RELATIONSHIP ENDING COST (END)
1.
Canceling the current wholesaler relationship would involve considerable expense.
2.
Terminating the current wholesaler relationship would probably cost the company time, money and customer
goodwill.
3.
My costs to stop doing business with the current wholesaler would probably be high.
4.
I would probably lose a lot of goodwill in terminating the current wholesaler relationship.
5.
The costs involved in exiting the current wholesaler relationship would probably be
considerable.
RELATIONSHIP INVESTMENTS (INV)
1.
Overall I have invested a lot in the relationship with the current wholesaler.
2.
A lot of energy, time and effort have gone into building and maintaining the relationship with the current
wholesaler.
3.
All things considered the company has put a lot into the relationship with the current wholesaler.
4.
I have put a considerable amount of time, effort and energy into building the relationship with the current
wholesaler.
5.
All things considered the company has invested a lot in the relationship with the current wholesaler.
VOICE (VOI)
1.
Occasionally I will suggest changes to my primary wholesaler if there is a mutual problem.
2.
If there are problems with my primary wholesaler I will work jointly with them to help improve the situation.
3.
I will work with my primary wholesaler to correct any mutual problems.
4.
I will try to discuss any primary wholesaler related problems with them.
5.
I will cooperatively discuss mutual problems with my primary wholesaler.
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Figure 1- Structural Modela
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a

The signs on the paths connecting the variables are both the hypothesized and observed associations, unless
otherwise indicated by parentheses. NS denotes Not Significant. V indicates the association was nonlinear and
thus it was variable. RCOM, ALTU, etc. (see Appendix B) were specified each with a single averaged
indicator except for INV, IRINV, and VOI which were specified with multiple indicators. All exogenous
variables were intercorrelated, and the measurement errors (εs) were uncorrelated.
b rc:au = [(SAT+MINNEG+MINEXP)/3][(a +a +a +a +a )/5], where a's are the indicators of ALTU (see
1
2
3
4
5
Appendix B). λrc:au = ρRCOM1/2ρALTU1/2 and θεrc:au = ρRCOMVar(RCOM) θεALTU + ρALTUVar(ALTU)θεRCOM +
θεRCOMθεALTU , where ρ denotes reliability, θ denotes variance of an error term, and Var() is the variance of .
c Including RCOM and ALTU (see Appendix B) in the model is required in order to estimate the loading and
error variance of RCxALTU. Because RCOM and ALTU were not hypothesized to be directly associated with
OPP, their paths to OPP were initially constrained to be zero.
d RCOM was specified as a second order construct (see p. 12).

Table 1 - Standardized Structural Model Resultsa
OPPb = -.98 RCOM -.32 RCxALTU + .16 ALTU - .04 INV -.20 IRINV + .03 START + .28 END
(-4.72)
(-2.51)
(1.22)
(-.33)
(-1.20)
(0.21)
(2.09)
(t-value)
+ .25 INCENT - .02 RISK + .39 LOY -.18 LxL + .22 VOI - .20 RCxVOI + .001 YRS + ζ (= .15)
(2.98)
(-.17)
(3.99)
(-2.18)
(2.10) (-2.39)
(0.02)
(5.07)

Squared Multiple Correlation:

a
b

Final Figure 1 model using maximum likelihood and LISREL 8.
OPP = Opportunism, etc. (see Appendix B).

OPP
.591
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Table 2 - Measurement Model Resultsa
Latent Variable Covariances and Correlations:b
LATENT

LATENT VARIABLE
C

1
2
3
4
5
.65 .25 .22 .28 .41
.19 .90 .75 .36 .37
.16 .64 .81 .38 .44
.19 .29 .29 .72 .27
.30 .32 .36 .21 .83
.35 .13 .10 .15 .13
-.25 -.02 .04 -.01 -.06
.20 .40 .38 .29 .24
.30 .70 .67 .40 .54
1.59 .27 .46 -.30 .14
-.01 -.02 -.03 -.05 .02
.05 .07 .06 .04 .05
-.03 .07 .07 -.01 -.03
.00 .02 .01 .00 .01
-.16 -.02 .01 .00 -.03
.31 .11 .09 .15 .12
.23 .11 .08 .11 .13
.44 .15 .12 .17 .13
.69 .65 .65 .68 .72

VARIABLE
1 ALTU
2 START
3 END
4 INCENT
5 RISK
6 RCOM
7 RCxAU
8 INV
9 IRINV
10 YRS
11 LOY
12 VOI
13 LXL
14 RCxVOI
15 OPP
16 SAT
17 MINNEG
18 MINEXP
AVE

a
b
c

6
.72
.23
.19
.30
.24
.36
-.25
.19
.17
1.05
-.02
.09
-.01
.01
-.21
.36
.34
.55
.62

7
8
9
10 11 12 13
-.44 .33 .39
.16 -.01 .16 -.04
-.03 .56 .76
.02 -.03 .19 .09
.07 .56 .77
.04 -.04 .18 .09
-.02 .46 .48
-.03 -.09 .14 -.01
-.10 .36 .61
.01 .04 .13 -.04
-.59 .42 .30
.14 -.04 .40 -.02
.51 .03 -.01
-.10 -.10 -.01 -.03
.01 .55 .62
.12 .02 .32 .20
-.01 .45 .94
.09 .10 .20 .11
-.85 1.12 1.02 148.24 .08 .01 .03
-.05 .01 .07
.68 .51 -.38 .44
.00 .09 .07
.04 -.10 .15 -.06
-.02 .12 .09
.34 .26 -.02 .69
.04 .01 .02
-.02 -.03 .04 .00
.05 -.10 -.04
-.53 .12 -.08 .00
-.23 .19 .18
.78 .00 .08 -.02
-.16 .15 .13
.90 -.06 .10 .03
-.33 .18 .18
1.30 .01 .08 -.04
.72 .65 .79
--- .57 .62 .74

14
-.01
.07
.07
-.02
.05
.10
.23
.09
.08
-.01
-.16
.46
.00
.05
-.05
.00
.01
.03
.61

15 16 17 18 Reliab. AVE
-.33 .60 .49 .62 .93
.69
-.03 .18 .20 .17 .93
.65
.03 .16 .15 .16 .90
.65
.00 .28 .22 .22 .92
.68
-.05 .20 .23 .17 .93
.72
-.56 .94 .95 .99 .81
.62
.12 -.50 -.38 -.52 .86
.72
-.23 .41 .34 .28 .92
.65
-.06 .28 .22 .21 .95
.79
-.07 .10 .12 .12
----.27 .00 -.14 .01 .86
.57
-.33 .32 .43 .23 .91
.62
-.01 -.04 .06 -.05 .87
.74
-.34 .00 .10 .12 .89
.61
.37 -.29 -.59 -.48 .88
.57
-.11 .41 .54 .68 .94
.70
-.22 .21 .36 .70 .92
.63
-.26 .38 .37 .78 .97
.76
.57 .70 .63 .76

Maximum likelihood using LISREL 8.
Covariances on and below the diagonal, correlations above.
INV = Relationship Investments, etc. (see Appendix B).

Table 3- Percentages of Study Firms Reporting They Intended to Be Opportunistic
END and INCENT
below the
study average:

END and INCENT
below the
study average:

ALTU
Lowa Higha
Lowa

50%b

63%

RCOM
40%
(1)

b

Lowa

54%

61%

RCOM
Higha

a

ALTU
Lowa Higha

20%
(2)

Higha 35%
(3)

(4)

25%
(Column Number)

Below or above the study average for the variable.
The table is read as follows: 50% of the firms with low (below average) ALTU and RCOM were
neutral, agreed, or strongly agreed they intended to be opportunistic, 63% of the firms with high
(above average) ALTU and low RCOM reported the same thing, etc.
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Table 4- Unstandardized Opportunism (OPP) Associations with Relationship Commitment (RCOM)
and Alternative Unattractiveness (ALTU)

ALTU-OPP Association
RCOM-OPP Association
Moderated by RCOMa
Moderated by ALTUe
SE of
SE of
ALTU ALTU
RCOM RCOM
RCOM Coef- CoeftALTU Coef- CoeftLevelb ficientc ficientd value Levelf ficient g ficienth value
5
-0.15
0.12
-1.23
5
-1.41
0.35
-4.02
i
4.01
0.12
0.10
1.22
4
-1.14
0.26
-4.46
4
0.12
0.10
1.25
3.49i -1.00
0.21
-4.73
3
0.40
0.17
2.37
3
-.86
0.18
-4.93
2
0.68
0.27
2.53
2
-.59
0.14
-4.13
1.29
0.87
0.34
2.56
1
-.31
0.18
-1.69
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

a

b
c

d

e

f
g

h

i

(Column Number)

The table displays the variable association of RCOM and ALTU with opportunism OPP. When the existing level of
RCOM was low in column 1, small changes in ALTU were positively associated with OPP (see column 2). At higher
levels of RCOM however, ALTU was less strongly associated with OPP, until for RCOM higher than 3, the association
was nonsignificant as Provan and Skinner (1989) reported (see column 4). When RCOM was very high, ALTU was
negatively associated with OPP as Ping (1993) reported (although in the present study this association was not
significant for very high RCOM).
The value of RCOM ranged from 1.29 (= low relationship commitment) to 5 in the study.
The coefficient of ALTU is determined by (.121-.276RCOM)ALTU with RCOM mean centered. E.g., when RCOM =
1.29 the coefficient of ALTU is .121-.276*(1.29 - 4.01) = .87.
The Standard Error of the ALTU coefficient is given by
______________________
_____________________________________________________
 Var(bALTU+bRCxALTURCOM) =  Var(bALTU) + RCOM2Var(bRCxALTU) + 2RCOMCov(bALTU,bRCxALTU).
The table displays the observed joint association of RCOM and ALTU with OPP. When ALTU was low in column 5,
the RCOM association with OPP was not significant as Ping's (1993) satisfaction-opportunism association would imply
(see column 8). However as ALTU increased, RCOM's association with OPP strengthened, until it was negatively
associated with OPP as John's (1984) results suggested.
The value of ALTU ranged from 1 (= low alternative unattractiveness) to 5 in the study.
The unstandardized coefficient of RCOM is determined by (-.996-.276ALTU)RCOM with ALTU
mean centered. E.g., when ALTU = 1 the coefficient of RCOM is -.996-.276*(1-3.49) = -.31.
The Standard Error of the RCOM coefficient is given by
______________________
____________________________________________________
 Var(bRCOM+bRCxALTUALTU) =  Var(bRCOM) + ALTU2Var(bRCxALTU) + 2ALTUCov(bRCOM,bRCxALTU),
where Var and Cov denote variance and covariance, and b denotes unstandardized structural
coefficient.
Mean value in the study.
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Endnotes

1. The term opportunism has multiple meanings, even in the economic literature. In the present paper opportunism is
used to signify covert self interest seeking at the expense of the relationship. Examples include distorting or
withholding important information from the relationship partner firm, reinterpreting implicit or explicit contract
provisions in the opportunistic firm's favor, or shirking important interfirm relationship obligations (Anderson and
Weitz 1986). Other examples include misrepresenting information and intentions to the relationship partner firm, and
over-stating unfavorable market conditions to the partner firm (see Anderson 1988). Thus it is important at the micro
or individual relationship level because it raises economic and social costs in the interfirm exchange relationship.
2. Johnson (1982) argued the appearance of commitment is shown by having to stay in a relationship because of what
he termed structural commitment. In the present research we will use the term structural commitment for Johnson's
relationship dependence because use of the term commitment in this context seems inappropriate.
3. Specifically, a firm's opportunism is argued to be likely to increase with partner firm's declining alternative
relationships and increasing transaction- or relationship-specific investments.
4. Other interfirm studies have involved opportunism peripherally. Ping (1993) investigated opportunism as one of
five responses to relationship dissatisfaction. Other such interfirm studies include Dwyer and Oh (1987), and
Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer (1995).
5. The average duration of the relationship between retailers and their primary wholesalers in the sample was 13.4
years, with a standard deviation of 12.3 years. Nearly twenty percent of these firms had done business with their
primary wholesaler for twenty years or more.
6. Curiously, a Figure 1 model estimated using (unsummed) consistent submeasures identified by dropping items
from the Appendix B measures produced results that were interpretationally equivalent to those shown in the tables.
7. Because satisfaction minimum neglect and minimum exiting were specified with a single summed indicator each,
the second order measurement model was exactly identified and thus fit the data perfectly.
8. The squared correlations for the indicators of RCOM (i.e., SAT, MINNEG and MINEXP) exceeded the Average
Variance Extracted for RCOM (see Table 2). While this suggests these variables were indistinct from RCOM, this is
actually desirable for indicators (i.e., SAT, MINNEG and MINEXP) of a construct (i.e., RCOM).
9. Intrepretational confounding in structural equation models was defined as the effect of model structure upon the
measurement of model constructs, and thus its effect on the empirical meaning of the constructs in a model (see Burt
1976 and Bagozzi 1980). It can also be viewed as an effect of measurement on the coefficient estimates in a
structural model-- changes in itemization can produce changes in coefficient estimates (see Anderson and Gerbing
1988).
10. Latent variable reliability ρX of the latent variable X with n indicators xi is given by
X =

2 X Var(X)
-------------------2 X Var(X) + X

where ΛX = λx1 + λx2 + ... + λxn, θX = Var(εx1) + Var(εx2) + ... + Var(εxn), and Var(X) is the dissattenuated or
measurement model variance of X (Werts, Linn and Jöreskog 1974) .
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Abstract
This research suggests there is more to learn about salesperson organizational commitment. It
proposes novel antecedents and consequences of organizational commitment. The empirical results shed
additional light on the nature of organizational commitment in salespersons. The paper concludes with
implications that may of interest to sales managers.

Organizational commitment has been studied extensively both in the personal selling literature
and in the employee relations literature (see Brown and Peterson 1993, and Ko, Price and Mueller 1997).
It has recently been the subject of renewed interest. One result has been its reconceptualization as an
aspect of relationship commitment which is composed of affective commitment or attachment to the
employment relationship (i.e., liking the relationship and wanting to remain in it), normative commitment
to the relationship (i.e., remaining in it because one ought to), and structural commitment (e.g., remaining
in the relationship because there is no alternative, etc.) (see Allen and Mayer 1990). This research focuses
on affective commitment, termed affective organizational commitment or simply organizational
commitment in this research to be consistent with its historic label (e.g., Porter, Steers, Mowday and
Boulian 1974), but the research will return to relationship commitment (i.e., organizational or affective
commitment, plus structural commitment, etc.) in the Results and Discussion section.
Affective organizational commitment is believed to have the relationship quality antecedent
"overall satisfaction with the relationship." This empirical results of this research reveal the linkage
between these two variables is more complex than previous research has suggested. The present research
proposes that organizational commitment also has the uninvestigated relationship quality antecedents
procedural justice (fair treatment regarding policies and procedures) and goal congruency (shared goals
and objectives).
Organizational commitment has been strongly associated with the consequent employee behavior
exiting. This research suggests that it also has the uninvestigated consequents employee perceptions of the
attractiveness of alternative relationships, and employee voice (constructive attempts to change
objectionable relationship conditions). The balance of the paper describes a test of these proposed
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relationships using a nationwide survey of salespersons and Kenny’s (1979) procedure for structural
equation analysis, and it concludes with a discussion of the implications of this research.
Hypotheses
Satisfaction, Organizational Commitment and Exiting

Consistent with previous conceptual and

empirical research, overall relationship satisfaction should be positively associated with organizational
commitment for salespersons, and organizational commitment should be negatively associated with
exiting (see Brown and Peterson 1993 for a summary).
Although salesperson satisfaction has been observed to be negatively associated with exiting
when organizational commitment is not measured (e.g., Netemeyer, Johnson and Burton 1990), based on
Williams and Hazer’s 1986 and other’s studies (e.g., Davy, Kinicki and Scheck 1991) the satisfactionexiting association should be mediated by organizational commitment, and thus satisfaction should not be
directly associated with exiting when organizational commitment is measured (however see Sager 1994).
This is consistent with Rosse and Miller’s (1984) arguments that dissatisfied employees first withdraw
emotionally before they withdraw physically.
Goal Congruence

Salespersons’ perceptions that they and their firm have similar goals and

objectives, or congruent goals, should be positively associated with organizational commitment. Agency
theory predicts that principals (e.g., firms) and agents (e.g., salespersons) should have divergent goals
(e.g., the firm maximizes profit while the salesperson maximizes personal income) (see Eisenhardt 1985).
To the extent the organization’s goals and objectives approximate those of the individual (e.g., via profit
sharing), the individual should be attracted to the organization (Byrne 1969). Over time, sharing similar
goals and objectives should be rewarding to the individual. These rewards should strengthen the
individual’s identification with the organization, and they should increase an individual’s efforts to
maintain and build the relationship, which captures Mowday, Steers and Porter’s (1979) definition of
organizational commitment (p. 226).
Satisfaction should be positively associated with goal congruence. As overall satisfaction with
the relationship increases, the relationship should become more attractive and an individual should be
more likely to conform to the goals and objectives of the group (Festinger 1954).
Procedural Justice

Procedural justice, the overall evaluation of company policy and procedure

fairness, their enactment, and treatment of employees, should be positively associated with organizational
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commitment for the same reasons as goal congruence: Procedural justice is rewarding and these rewards
should strengthen identification with the organization, including its goals and objectives.
Procedural justice should also be positively associated with goal congruence for the same
reasons as satisfaction: procedural justice should make the relationship more attractive and an individual
should be more likely to conform to the goals and objectives of the group.
Alternative Attractiveness

Alternative attractiveness should be negatively associated with

organizational commitment. While it seems plausible that unattractive alternative employment
relationships would increase affective organizational commitment, Rusbult and Buunk (1993) argue that
the linkage between these two variables works in reverse: They argue affective relationship commitment
actually decreases the attractiveness of alternative relationships, through a process they term discounting,
which reduces cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957).
Consistent with previous conceptual and empirical research, alternative attractiveness should be
negatively associated with exiting (e.g., Ko, Price and Mueller 1997). Further, switching cost should be
negatively associated with alternative attractiveness because increased switching cost makes the
alternative relationship more costly to attain, and thus makes it is less attractive.
Voice Organizational commitment should be positively associated with voice, constructive attempts to
change objectionable relationship conditions. As organizational commitment increases, the relationship
becomes more valuable, and when the inevitable relationship problems occur, the individual should be
more likely to take positive action to remedy the situation (see Hirschman 1970).
Previous conceptual and empirical research suggests that switching cost should be negatively
associated with exiting (see Ping 1993).
These hypothesized relationships are summarized in Figure 1.
Method
Measures versus Model Fit

When using structural equation analysis, it is customary to delete items

from measures specified as unidimensional to attain or improve measurement model-to-data fit. This
separates measurement from structure in the structural model and thereby minimizes interpretational
confounding (Burt 1976) (see Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Further, many substantive researchers appear
to believe that multi-item measures that are unidimensional in exploratory factor analysis are
psychometrically unacceptable if they do not fit the data in a confirmatory factor model. There are even
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suggested procedures that increase the efficiency and effectiveness of this activity (e.g., Anderson and
Gerbing 1982:454, Jöreskog 1993, Kano and Ihara 1994, and Ping 1998; see Dwyer and Oh 1987,
Gerbing and Anderson 1988, and Kumar and Dillon 1987).
Nevertheless, authors have warned against deleting items to attain model-to-data fit in a
unidimensionally specified measurement model (e.g., Cattell 1973, 1978). The resulting measure may no
longer adequately sample the domain of the target construct (e.g., Cattell 1973 noted the items in such
scales are often trivial restatements of each other, and termed the narrow content of these items “bloated
specific.”
It is well known that lack of fit in measurement and structural models may be an artifact of the
comparatively large sample sizes required in structural equation analysis (see Hoelter 1983). Lack of fit in
structural equation analysis also may be an artifact of many constructs in a structural models (see
Anderson and Gerbing 1984). Lack of fit in measurement models may be an artifact of having more than
6 items in a measure (rather than an indication of lack of unidimensionality in the Anderson and Gerbing
1988 sense-- see Bagozzi and Heatherton 1994:43; also see Anderson and Gerbing 1984). Thus for
measures that are unidimensional in an exploratory (common) factor analysis, deleting items to attain
confirmatory model-to-data fit may not be more desirable than using the full measure, especially an older
well-established measure developed before structural equation analysis became popular.
Fortunately, there is an alternative to deleting items to be able to use structural equation analysis.
Kenny (1979) suggested a structural equation analysis procedure that rigidly separates measurement from
structure without the potential for measurement model fit limiting the number of items in a measure. His
procedure uses reliability to specify the loading,  (i.e.,  = , where  denotes reliability), and the
measurement error variance, , (i.e.,  = Variance(X)(1 - ) of a single summed indicator of a
unidimensional construct X. Variations of this procedure have been used elsewhere in the social sciences
(see for example Heise and Smith-Lovin 1982; James, Mulaik and Brett 1982; and Williams and Hazer
1986), but the procedure is unfamiliar to marketers. Thus, this research breaks with convention by arguing
that unidimensional scales should not always have items deleted at the expense of content validity simply
to improve model-data fit when Kenny (1979) has provided a reasonable alternative.
Measures

Satisfaction, the global evaluation of relationship fulfillment, was initially measured

using several scales (one due to Bagozzi 1980a, and one adapted from a measure developed by Ping
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1993). Based on results from pretests using scenario analysis the Ping 1993 measure was selected for the
final test (see Table 4 for an example item).i ii While this measure was unidimensional using exploratory
(common) factor analysis and the final test data, its single construct measurement model did not fit the
data acceptably because the measure had 8 items (2/df/p-value = 104/20/0, GFI = .82, AGFI = .69, CFI
= .92, and RMSEA = .17). The customary approach of deleting items to obtain acceptable model-to-data
fit required removing three items. However, the resulting 5-item measure was judged to be substantially
less content valid than the full eight item measure. As a result, the full 8 item Satisfaction measure and the
above Kenny procedure were used to estimate the Figure 1 model.
Procedural justice, the overall evaluation of company policy and procedure fairness, their
enactment, and treatment of employees, was measured using a scale developed for this research. Measure
development was guided by the procedural justice literature (e.g., Tyler and Bies 1990). It was developed
using focus groups of salespersons and a jury of academic experts to judge the resulting items using the
conceptual definition, and resulted in thirty-eight items. Subsequently, scenario analyses suggested that
the 38-item measure was multidimensional, and items were omitted using exploratory maximum
likelihood common factor analysis (EML-CFA) to produce a unidimensional final-test measure
containing eighteen items. With the final-test data the procedural justice measure was unidimensional
using EML-CFA, but because the measure contained eighteen items confirmatory model fit was
impossible. The largest subset of items that did fit the data omitted 13 items and produced a measure that
was judged to no longer content valid. Thus, the full eighteen item Procedural Justice measure was used
with the Kenny (1979) procedure to estimate the Figure 1 model.
Other study measures required item deletion to attain model fit, but the submeasures that fit the
data were judged less content valid than the original full measures. As a result, other study measures
utilized the Kenny procedure to estimate Figure 1.
For example, goal congruency, the perception that the company and salespeople have the same
goals and objectives, was measured using a scale developed by Anderson (1988). While unidimensional
using EML-CFA, it did not fit the data in a single construct measurement model, and the full measure was
used.
Organizational commitment, an individual’s organizational identification and involvement, was
measured using a scale developed by Mowday, Steers and Porter (1979). It was multidimensional using
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EML-CFA in the final test.iii However, because it is an established measure and we wished to preserve its
content validity, it was specified as a second-order construct in Figure 1 as Gerbing, Hamilton and
Freeman (1994:574) suggested.
Measures for alternative attractiveness, the global evaluation of the relationship fulfillment available in the best available alternative relationship, switching cost, the cost to change employers, and voice,
constructive attempts to change objectionable relationship conditions, were adapted from measures
developed by Ping (1993). These measures were unidimensional using EML-CFA and the final test data.
Exiting was measured as exit propensity, the disinclination to continue the current relationship,
and was initially measured using two scales, one due to Bluedorn (1982), and another adapted from a
measure developed by Ping (1993). Based on pretest results only the second measure was unidimensional
using EML-CFA and it was included in the final test were it was also unidimensional using EML-CFA.iv
Example items for these measures are shown in Table 4.
Sampling
The study population was U.S. salespersons who represent a single firm which employs them
(i.e., excluding independent agents and brokers). The sampling frame was the circulation list of a major
sales publication, and sampling involved n-th name selections of 100 pretest salesperson names and
addresses, then 900 final test names and addresses. The pre- and final test mailings included a cover letter
assuring respondent anonymity, and a $2 bill as a response incentive, and the final test mailing was
followed by two follow-up postcard mailings, a remailing of the questionnaire, and two more postcard
follow-ups.
Pretesting
As discussed earlier, the final test mailing was preceded by several scenario analyses that were
used to preliminarily validate the measures (see Footnote 1). These were followed by a pretest mailing
that was used primarily to gauge the response rate, and secondarily to further assess the psychometric
properties of the measures. Minor changes were made to the letter, and questionnaire instructions and
format, between the pre- and final test mailings.
Final Test
Two hundred eighty-four responses were usable from the final-test mailing (32% usable response
rate). These responses were used to determine the representativeness of the responses, and to reexamine
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the psychometric properties of the measures. Based on a comparison of the demographics of the responses
and published salespersons’ demographics, the set of responses were judged to be representative of the
study population.
Reliability and Validity
As discussed earlier, the measures were unidimensional in the final test except for organizational
commitment, which produced three dimensions. The items in each factor were averaged to produce three
indicators of the second order construct organizational commitment. To conserve degrees of freedom
these three indicators were then averaged to produce a single indicator of organizational commitment to
estimate the Figure 1 model.
The reliabilities of the study variables were above .88 which suggests the study measures were
reliable (see Table 3).
Each measure was judged to be content valid, and each latent variable was correlated with the
other latent variables in theoretically plausible directions (see Table 3), which suggests the construct
validity of these measures. In addition, they each had an Average Variance Extracted (AVE) (Fornell and
Larker 1981) above .5 which suggests their discriminant validity (see Table 3).vwhere i is the loading

of the indicator xi on its Latent Variable X, Var is variance, ei is the measurement error of xi, and
 indicates a sum. For unidimensional X, i2 is approximated by the sum of squares of the
loadings in a Maximum Likelihood exploratory common factor analysis (i.e., the sum of the
communalities or the eigenvalue of the items). Var(X) can be set to one, and Var(ei) is
approximated by n - i2. Substituting these estimates into the above equation, AVE is
approximately the explained variance of the items in a Maximum Likelihood exploratory
common factor analysis. Further, with two exceptions, each measure’s squared correlation with the
other study variables was less than the AVE’s of both variables involved in the correlation, which
suggests their discriminant validity (see Fornell and Larker 1981 and Table 3). However, Satisfaction
(SAT) and Procedural Justice (PJUST) had AVE’s that were less than the squared correlation between
them (see Table 3). This suggests that they each had more variance in common (i.e., their squared
correlation) than either had in error-free variance (i.e., their AVE). This in turn suggests a lack of
discriminant validity between SAT and PJUST. Stated differently, SAT was empirically indistinct from
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PJUST in the study. Similarly, SAT was indistinct from Organizational Commitment in the study.vi
Nevertheless, this did not prevent estimation of the Figure 1 measurement and structural models.
Measurement and Structural Models
The measurement and structural models corresponding to Figure 1, were estimated using
covariances, LISREL 8, and maximum likelihood; and the results are shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3.vii
The fixed values for loadings and measurement errors of the single summed indicators suggested
by Kenny (1979) in the measurement and structural models were specified using reliabilities. Because a
single indicator construct is under determined, estimates of its loading and measurement error variance
are required. Authors have defined the reliability of an indicator as the square of the correlation between
the indicator and its construct (i.e., its loading) (see Bollen 1989). Thus the loading of a construct
specified with a single indicator is , where  is the latent variable reliability of the measure. However,
for unidimensional constructs there is little practical difference between coefficient alpha () and the
latent variable reliability  (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). It is well known that the measurement error
variance of an indicator x is Var(x)(1-), where Var(x) is the variance of x. Thus the loading and
measurement error of a unidimensional measure X specified with a single indicator, are  and Var(X)(1) respectively.
The structural model for Figure 1 was judged to fit the data using several popular fit criteria, such
as Comparative Fit Index (CFI) (Bentler 1990) and Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation
(RMSEA) (Steiger 1990, see Jöreskog 1993).viii ix
Results and Discussion
The study hypotheses were supported, except Procedural Justice (PJUST) was not directly
associated with affective organizational commitment (ORGCOM) (see Table 1). Based on the Table 2
total effects (i.e., direct- plus indirect effects) implied by the paths in Figure 1, the hypothesized
relationships were also supported except PJUST was not associated with ORGCOM.
In probing the Figure 1 model, the direct path between Satisfaction (SAT) and Exiting
(EXITING) was non significant when it was freed (ORGCOM, PJUST = .15, t = .75). This is consistent with
other satisfaction-organizational commitment-exiting studies, and together such results add to the growing
evidence that there may be no direct relationship between satisfaction and exiting.x

9

The significant negative direct and total effects of ORGCOM on Alternative Attractiveness
(ALT) in the study, and the non significant direct and total effects in the other direction, suggest that
salesperson alternative attractiveness was likely to be increased by declining affective organizational
commitment as Rusbult and Buunk (1993) predicted, but that increased alternative attractiveness was not
likely to have an effect on affective organizational commitment.xi While generalizing from a single study
is risky, this suggests that salespersons are likely to devalue alternatives as their affective organizational
commitment increases. Unfortunately however, this also means that as affective organizational
commitment declines for salespersons the attractiveness of their alternatives is likely to increase.
ORGCOM and Voice (VOICE) were positively associated in the study. Further, modification
indices and first derivatives (not reported) suggest that the direction of the effect was from ORGCOM to
VOICE and not from VOICE to ORGCOM in the study.xii This suggests that as salespersons became
more affectively committed to their organizations, they were more likely to be vocal when the inevitable
relationship problems occurred. In different words, salespersons who were not vocal were likely to be less
affectively committed to their organizations. While the association was only moderate, this is consistent
with Napoleon’s statement that his only fear was the silence of his army.
ORGCOM was negatively associated with EXITING in the study. Based on modification indices
and first derivatives (not reported), it is likely that the direction of this effect was from ORGCOM to
EXITING and not from EXITING to ORGCOM.xiii However in this case it is not necessarily true that not
exiting implies affective commitment. Based on the significant positive association between ALT and
EXITING, unattractive alternatives may also hold exiting at bay. In fact, this is the central argument that
Allen and Meyer 1990, among others (see Levinger 1979), appear to make regarding relationship
commitment: individuals stay in (i.e., appear to be committed to) a relationship either because they want
to (i.e., relationship quality is high) or because they have to (e.g., the alternatives are not attractive, etc.).
The relationship between PJUST and ORGCOM has not been tested to our knowledge. Possible
explanations for the observed lack of association between the two variables in salespersons include too
small a sample (the indirect PJUST-GOALCON-ORGCOM effect approached significance-Indirect

ORGCOM,PJUST-GOALCON = .08, t = 1.85), invalidity in procedural justice (or organizational

commitment) (which the final test psychometrics seemed to rule out), and lack of variance (however,
Var(PJUST) = .73, VAR(ORGCOM) = 1.21, which compare favorably to the variances of the other
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variables that ranged from .34 to 1.41). Other possibilities include that salespersons in the sample simply
were not likely to be sensitive to procedural justice when forming or modifying their organizational
commitment, or that SAT accounted for most the PJUST-ORGCOM variance because PJUST was
empirically indistinct from SAT.
To test this last possibility, items were omitted from SAT to increase its AVE and thereby make it
distinct from PJUST and ORGCOM. While the correlations of SAT with PJUST and ORGCOM
remained high (rSAT,PJUST = .83, rSAT,ORGCOM = .84) and the content validity of SAT was degraded, the
resulting PJUST-ORGCOM indirect and total effects were significant (IndirectORGCOM,PJUST-GOALCON = .22, t
= 3.33; TotalORGCOM,PJUST-GOALCON = .27, t = 2.61), but the direct effect was not (ORGCOM,PJUST = .04, t =
.45). Thus SAT may have accounted for most the PJUST-ORGCOM variance.
These results have several implications. First, the significant PJUST-GOALCON-ORGCOM
association and the nonsignificant PJUST-ORGCOM association suggest the procedural justice
relationship with affective organizational commitment is mediated by goal congruence for salespersons:
procedural justice is likely to increase affective commitment by first increasing goal congruence, rather
than directly.
The historically high observed correlations between satisfaction and affective organizational
commitment when coupled with the difficulty measuring satisfaction so that it was empirically distinct
from affective organizational commitment in the present study (and possibly other studies-- AVE’s and
discriminant validity are not routinely reported) suggest they may be quite similar as mental constructs,
and there may be little practical difference between the two. Thus, it may be pointless to continue to try to
distinguish between satisfaction and affective commitment.
Similarly, procedural justice and goal congruency were quite empirically similar to each other,
and they were quite similar to satisfaction and affective commitment in the present study (see Table 3).
These strong empirical similarities suggest these variables may be facets of a higher order construct,
Relationship Quality (RQ), as Allen and Meyer (1990) seem to imply. For example, SAT, PJUST,
GOALCON, and ORGCOM were respecified in the present study as a second order construct that fit the
data (2/df/p-value = 2.6/2/.27, GFI = .99, AGFI = .95, CFI = .99, and RMSEA = .04). In addition, they
were all about equally correlated with RQ (rRQ,ORGCOM [= StandardizedRQ,ORGCOM2] = .57, rRQ,SAT = .58,

rRQ,GOALCON = .52, rRQ,PJUST = .63). Thus an alternative Figure 1 model would specify satisfaction,
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procedural justice, goal congruency, and affective organizational commitment as first-order “indicators”
of the second-order construct RQ.
However, Allen and Meyer’s (1990) arguments that relationship commitment is composed of
affective commitment, normative commitment, and structural commitment suggest there may be another
Figure 1 model that involves a higher order construct Relationship Commitment (RC) and is composed of
Relationship Quality and Structural Commitment variables such as alternative attractiveness and
switching cost. Indeed respecifying Figure 1 by combining SAT, PJUST, GOALCON, ORGCOM, ALT
and SWITCH into a second order construct, RC, nearly fit the data (2/df/p-value = 20/9/.01, GFI = .95,
AGFI = .89, CFI = .97, and RMSEA = .09). Specifying RC without PJUST fit the data almost perfectly
(2/df/p-value = 4.1/5/.52, GFI = .98, AGFI = .96, CFI = 1.00, and RMSEA = .00). The correlations of
RC with these “indicators” were rRC,ORGCOM = .76, rRC,ALT = .39, rRC,SAT = .61, rRC,GOALCON = .42, and

rRC,SWITCH = .13.
This result has several implications. In this study Relationship Commitment could be specified
with Relationship Quality variables such as affective commitment, satisfaction, and goal congruency, plus
Structural Commitment variables such as alternative attractiveness and switching cost, which supports
Allen and Meyer (1990) arguments concerning the facets of person-organization commitment. Further,
because Relationship Quality variables such as ORGCOM and SAT were the most highly correlated with
RC, and Structural Commitment variables such as ALT and SWITCH were less so, relationship
commitment was driven primarily by relationship quality in this context. The EXITING associations with
ORGCOM and ALT in the original Figure 1 model suggest the same thing: the opposite of relationship
commitment, exiting, is driven primarily by relationship quality variables in this context.
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Table 1- Standardized Direct Effect Estimates for the Figure 1 Modela
Model Fit: 2/df/p=20/13/.05, GFI=.96, AGFI=.89, CFI=.98, RMSEA=.07b

SAT
PJUST
GOALCON
ALT

SAT
PJUST
--------------- - - - 0.435
0.404
(3.404)c
(3.175)
- - -

GOALCON
-------- - - - -

- - -

VOICE

- -

- -

- -

EXITING

- -

- -

- -

ORGCOM

0.763
(6.593)

-0.123
(-1.255)

ALT
-------- - - -

0.210
(2.593)

0.232
(2.223)
-0.157
(-1.946)

SWITCH
-------- - - -0.174
(-2.694)
- -0.176
(-2.871)
- -

ORGCOM
-------- - - -

R2
--- - .65

-0.691
(-10.366)
0.377
(4.499)
-0.553
(-5.496)
- -

.66
.14
.68
.91
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__________
a

The table is read from column to row. For example the direct effect of SAT on GOALCON is
.435.
b
CFI = Comparative Fit Index (.90 or higher indicates acceptable fit), and RMSEA = Root Mean
Squared Error of Approximation (0-.05 suggests close model-to-data fit, .051-.08 suggests
acceptable model-to-data fit) (Steiger 1990).
c
T-value.
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Table 2- Standardized Total Effect Estimates for the Figure 1 Modela
SAT

PJUST

GOALCON

ALT

SWITCH

--------

--------

--------

--------

ORGCOM
--------

----

---SAT
PJUST
GOALCON
ALT

- - 0.435
(3.404)b
-0.663

- - 0.404
(3.175)
0.029

- - - -

- - - -

- - - -

-0.163

0.122

-0.195

(0.390)

(-2.557)

(1.771)

(-2.698)

-0.776
(-6.677)
(-8.812)
SWITCH
VOICE
0.423
(4.309)
EXITING
.801
(-9.185)
ORGCOM
0.122

- 0.361

- -0.016

- 0.089

- -0.066

- 0.011

(4.066)

(-0.392)

(2.224)

(-1.614)

(1.404)

-0.685

0.030

-0.169

0.358

-0.239

(-7.231)

(0.390)

(-2.581)

(3.199)

(-3.750)

0.959

-0.042

0.236

-0.176

0.030

(8.625)

(-0.390)

(2.625)

(-1.174)

(1.488)

(1.771)

__________
a
b

The table is read from column to row. For example the total effect of SAT on ALT is -.643.
T-value.

-
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Table 3- Psychometrics of the Study Measures
Disattenuated) Correlations:a
SAT
PJUST
GOALCON
ALT
SWITCH
VOICE
EXITING
ORGCOM

SAT
PJUST
GOALCON ALT
SWITCH VOICE
EXITING
1
0.868
1
0.786
0.782
1
-0.696 -0.589 -0.597
1
0.295
0.216
0.216 -0.385
1
0.351
0.300
0.305 -0.303
0.115
1
-0.729 -0.616 -0.624
0.745 -0.435 -0.299
1
0.931
0.797
0.808 -0.804
0.304
0.377 -0.794

ORGCOM

Reliability
.956
.979
.912
.951
.895
.967
.978
.886

1

(Disattenuated) Squared Correlations:b
AVEc -->
0.731
ORGCOM
0.733
0.726
0.677
0.723
0.740
0.618
0.769
0.731

SAT
PJUST
GOALCON
ALT
SWITCH
VOICE
EXITING
ORGCOM

0.733

0.726

0.677

0.723

SAT

PJUST

GOALCON ALT

SWITCH VOICE

EXITING

1
0.753
0.618
0.484
0.087
0.123
0.531
0.867

1
0.612
0.347
0.047
0.090
0.379
0.635

1
0.356
0.047
0.093
0.389
0.653

1
0.013
0.189
0.092

1
0.630

1
0.148
0.092
0.555
0.646

0.740

0.618

1
0.089
0.142

0.769

1

__________
a

From the measurement model corresponding to Figure 1.
An italic indicates a squared correlation that is greater than the AVE of one or both variables involved in
the correlation. This suggests lack of discriminant validity between the two variables involved in the
correlation (see Fornell and Larker 1981).
c
Average Variance Extracted.
b
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Table 4- Example Items in the Study Measures
Measurea

Example Item

SAT (8 items)
All in all, my relationship with my company is very satisfactory (5 point Likert scale).
PJUST (18)
The company's policies are very fair (5 point Likert scale).
GOALCON (5) Our salespeople strongly feel that they and the company work for common goals and
objectives (7 point rating scale- agree to disagree).
ALT (7)
In general, I would be _____ satisfied with the alternative company than/as I am with my
company.
a. Much more
b. More
c. As
d. Less
e. Much less (5 point rating scale)
SWITCH (6)
Generally speaking, the costs in time, money, effort and grief to switch employers would
be high (5 point Likert scale).
VOICE (9)
I will cooperatively try to change things in my company to correct problems I may have
with them (5 point Likert scale).
EXITING (8)
I will probably stop working for my company in the near future (5 point Likert scale).
ORGCOM (15) I am extremely glad I chose this organization to work for over others I was considering at
the time I joined (7 point Likert scale).

__________
a

The parentheses contain the number of items in each measure.
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Figure 1- Abbreviated Structural Model with Hypothesized and Observed Associationsa

SAT

+
+

GOALCON

+

+

PJUST
+ (NS)

ORGCOM
+

- (NS)

ALT

-

VOICE

+

-

SWITCH

-

EXITING

__________
a

Each construct was specified with a single indicator using the Kenny (1979) procedure
described on p. 8. The nonrecursive relationship between ALT and ORGCOM was
specified to test the hypothesized direction of that association and the model is identified
using a procedure suggested by Berry (1984). The signs indicate the hypothesized
associations, and, unless otherwise indicated by parentheses, they also indicate the
observed associations.

21

Endnotes
i

Scenario analysis can be used for measure evaluation (see Ping 1996). It involves an
experiment in which subjects, typically students, read written scenarios that ask them to
imagine they are the subjects of an experiment, then they complete a questionnaire
containing the study measures. The results, when compared with other research designs
such as surveys, are reported to be similar enough (e.g., Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and
Mainous 1988) to suggest that scenario analysis may be useful in new measure
development and the verification of existing measures.
ii

The Bagozzi (1980a) measure exhibited low convergent validity in the pretests
(Average Variance Extracted = .37-- see Footnote 5). It was actually included in the final
test to compare the results with the scenario analyses, and it performed similarly (e.g.,
Average Variance Extracted = .45).
iii

While organizational commitment was unidimensional when it was proposed (i.e., in
Mowday, Steers and Porter 1979), it has been multidimensional when used with
salespersons (e.g., Sager 1994).
iv

In addition to being multidimensional in the pretests, the Bluedorn (1982) measure
exhibited implausible correlations with other study measures (e.g., it was either not
correlated or positively correlated with the satisfaction measures-- Michaels and Spector
1982 reported similar results).
v

AVE can be estimated using estimates available in SPSS, SAS, etc. AVE is given by,
(i2)Var(X)
AVEX = ---------------------------- ,
(i2)Var(X)+Var(ei)

vi

The Bagozzi (1980a) measure fared even worse. Because its AVE was so low, it was
indistinct from JUST, GOALCON, ORGCOM, and EXITING.
vii

The Figure 1 model was identified using a procedure suggested by Berry (1984).

viii

The measurement model for Figure 1 had zero degrees of freedom and fit the data
perfectly.
ix

Model fit using chi square, GFI and AGFI, were slightly low for the Figure 1 structural
model (see Table 1). However, chi square, GFI and AGFI may not be adequate for fit
assessment in larger samples or models-- see Anderson and Gerbing 1984.
x

Sager (1994) observed a direct SAT-EXITING association in the presence of
organizational commitment. However, the study associations did not account for
measurement error which can bias coefficient estimates in unknown directions.
xi

Such evidence should be considered as merely suggestive. Directionality can only be
disproved by a longitudinal research design.
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xii

See Footnote 11.

xiii

See Footnote 11.
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EXITING IN A MARKETING CHANNEL

Abstract
Despite its importance in interfirm relationship maintenance, relatively little is known of exiting in
marketing channels. In relationship marketing exiting is assumed to be the result of relationship failure, and
research there has focused on the formation of economic exchange relationships. While authors have argued
there are forces that attenuate exiting in these relationships, there have been surprisingly few empirical studies
of exiting in Marketing. Moreover, channel studies investigating exiting and its predictors have produced
mixed and counter-intuitive results. This research proposes exiting can be predicted by other relationship
behaviors including voice, and relationship constraints, specifically satisfaction and structural constraint (the
mobility barrier between the present and alternative relationships). The study results support these proposals,
and shed additional light on exiting in channel relationships.
Introduction
Much research involving firms in long-term buyer-seller relationships such as strategic alliances, just-intime/quick response relationships, inter-firm partnerships, joint ventures, and marketing channels, has
concentrated on their formation (see Wilson 1995; also see Anderson and Narus 1984, 1990; Anderson and
Weitz 1989, 1992; Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Ford 1980; Frazier 1983; Frazier and Rody 1991; Frazier,
Spekman, ONeil 1988; Gadde and Mattsson 1987; Håkansson 1982; Hallén, Johanson and Seyed-Mohamed
1991; Heide and John 1988, 1990, 1992; Skinner, Gassenheimer and Kelly 1992; Stern and Scheer 1991;
Webster 1979; Weitz and Jap 1995). Less is known of the maintenance of these relationships, and relatively
little is known of their dissolution. Perhaps as a result authors have called for research on these matters (Dwyer,
Schurr and Oh 1987; Ping and Dwyer 1991; Ping 1993; Weitz and Jap 1995; Wilson 1995). Additional
knowledge of the dissolution of economic exchange relationships, in particular predictors of exiting, should be
useful to relationship managers in the maintenance of these relationships.
Relationship Dissolution
Relationship dissolution has received attention in several literatures. These include some that appear
unrelated to inter-firm relationships, such as employee adaptation-to-work and romantic relationships. In the
marketing literature for example, Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) proposed long-term buyer-seller relationships
develop in five phases: awareness of a potential economic exchange partner, then relationship exploration,
expansion, commitment, and dissolution. Paralleling Ducks (1982) proposal for romantic relationships, they
also proposed the dissolution of these relationships is comprised four stages: intrapsychic (relationship
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evaluation), interactive (relationship discussion with the partner firm), social (public announcement), and grave
dressing (social and psychological recovery) stages (also see Ping and Dwyer 1991).
In the employee adaptation-to-work literature, employment relationship dissolution or employee exiting is
argued to consist of several stages: thoughts of quitting, cost-benefit analysis of quitting, identification and
evaluation of alternatives, intention to quit, and quitting (see Mobley 1977). While useful, this and the Dwyer,
Schurr and Oh (1987) frameworks seem incomplete. They do not include alternatives to exiting for dissatisfied
subjects that cannot exit the relationship (because there is no alternative relationship), or will not exit (because
the cost is unacceptable).
However in the economics literature, Hirschman (1970) proposed alternatives to exiting a dissatisfactory
relationship: loyalty and voice (loyalty is remaining silent, confident things will get better, and voice is
constructive attempts by the subject to change objectionable relationship conditions). In the romantic
relationships literature Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn (1982) proposed neglect as an additional alternative to
exiting (neglect is allowing the relationship to deteriorate). Alternatives to exiting a dissatisfactory employment
relationship that are similar to loyalty; voice and neglect have also been proposed. They include attempts to
change undesired aspects of work, aggressive/retaliatory responses, psychological withdrawal and avoidance
(e.g., lateness and absenteeism), and cognitive readjustment (Rosse and Miller 1984).
Hirschman (1970:86) proposed loyalty, voice, and exit are linked. Loyalty should be followed by voice
then exiting, with exiting also a possibility after loyalty. Similarly Rosse (1988) argued employee exiting
should be preceded by relationship neglectful activities that include lateness and absenteeism. These proposals
suggest relationship dissolution may have predictors that include loyalty, voice, and neglect.
Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn (1982) proposed that loyalty, voice, neglect, and exiting had the predictors
relationship satisfaction, the attractiveness of the alternative relationship, and relationship investments. In the
marketing literature Ping (1993) argued that loyalty, voice, neglect and exiting were responses to problems in
channel relationships. He also proposed these responses to relationship problems should have as predictors the
Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn variables, and the cost to switch to the alternative relationship. These
associations have been tested (see for example Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers
and Mainous 1988; Ping 1993). However, the results have been mixed and counter-intuitive (e.g., the
associations have been inconsistently observed, and alternative attractiveness typically was positively
associated with voice contrary to Hirschmans 1970 predictions).
The Present Research
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The present research investigates predictors of exiting in long-tem buyer-seller relationships between firms.
Specifically it tests linkages among exiting operationalized as exit-propensity, and the other responses to
relationship problems, loyalty, voice, neglect (exit-propensity is the disinclination to continue the current
relationship).1 The proposed model (see Figure 2) also includes the Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn/Ping
predictors of relationship problems: satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, investment, and switching cost.
However alternative attractiveness, relationship investment, and switching cost are argued to be instances or
indicators of a second-order construct, the cost to exit a relationship, which is linked to exiting.
The paper begins by discussing the Hirschman/Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn responses to relationship
problems.2 Using theory from several literatures, including some that seem unrelated to inter-firm relationships
such as employee adaptation-to-work, the paper then proposes associations between exit-propensity and
loyalty, voice, neglect, satisfaction, and cost-of-exit in committed buyer-seller relationships between firms. The
results of a test of these proposals involving survey data and structural equation analysis in a marketing channel
context is then presented.
At first glance this topic may seem less important than other aspects of buyer-seller relationships between
firms, such as knowledge of how and why these relationships develop. However, knowledge of responses to
the inevitable problems in buyer-seller relationships, and their connection to relationship dissolution, should
help firms maintain these relationships once they develop so they are likely to become long-term relationships.
The study contributes to several literatures, including inter-firm relationship marketing. It fills a gap in the
responses-to-dissatisfaction literature; it proposes the Hirschman/Rusbult responses to relationship problems
may be coping strategies, and investigates the associations among these responses in an inter-firm context.
Authors have observed that knowledge of relationship dissolution provides closure in the relationship
development process (Ping and Dwyer 1988). The study also contributes a first test in any context of

1

We will distinguish between exit-propensity, the disinclination to continue the relationship, and exit, leaving the
relationship. Exit-propensity involves planning to leave. It is comprised of activities that precede physically leaving such as
thinking of exiting, intending to search for alternatives, evaluation of alternatives, and intention to exit (see Mobley 1977). Exit
involves physically leaving. It includes activities such as breaking contract with the partner firm, contracting with an alternative
partner firm, disposing of relationship specific assets, acquiring assets specific to the alternative relationship, etc.
Exit-propensity and exit have been strongly and positively linked (see the literature summary in Bluedorn 1982). In
this paper exit is operationalized as exit-propensity because exit is a dichotomous variable, and such variables can produce
estimation problems with structural equation analysis. Specifically, dichotomous variables require Asymptotic Distribution Free
(ADF) estimation (see Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996), but ADF estimates may not be appropriate for methodologically small
samples (i.e., 200-300 cases) (see Hu, Bentler and Kano 1992).
2

Relationship problems are viewed from the subject firms perspective. They are actions or inactions by their partner
firm that violate relational norms-- see Kaufmann and Stern (1988).
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Hirschmans (1970) proposed associations among loyalty, voice and exit. In addition, it contributes new theory
to inter-firm relationships regarding the relationship of neglect with voice and exit-propensity. The study
contributes to the emerging relationship marketing literature (see the Fall 1995 issue of the Journal of the
Academy of Marketing Science); it proposes alternative attractiveness, investment and switching cost are facets
of a higher-order predictor of exiting, cost-of-exit. Further, it illuminates the likely role of cost-of-exit, as well
as satisfaction, in relationship maintenance. Finally, the study provides a first empirical test in an inter-firm
context of Hirschmans (1970) and others arguments that voice may be negatively associated with exit (see for
example Spencer 1986, Fornell and Wernerfelt 1987).
Responses to Relationship Problems
Hirschman (1970) noted economic progress is negatively correlated with societys tolerance for
performance deterioration in firms and organizations. However he believed slack, as he defined it, the gap
between potential and actual firm or organization performance, is generated all the time. He conceived the
performance of firms and organizations to be permanently subject to this slack; to decline and decay, and a
gradual loss of rationality, efficiency, and surplus producing energy, no matter how well the institutional
framework within which the firm or organization functioned was designed. Yet he maintained declined firms
and organizations do recover from their performance lapses; and concerned himself with these recoveries.
In particular, Hirschman (1970) proposed dissatisfied members or clients of declined firms or
organizations have three behavioral options available to them: remain loyal, use voice, or leave the relationship
(exit).
Voice
Hirschman (1970) characterized Voice as, ...any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an
objectionable state of affairs" (p. 30). He pointed out customer voice alerts a firm or organization to its failings.
Hirschman (1970) observed that firm losses from customer exiting will be small for a firm with demand
that is highly inelastic with respect to performance lapses in their product or service. As a result, a firm may not
be made aware something is wrong with its products or services, and repair of performance lapses may not take
place. But if this demand is highly elastic, repair of performance lapses may not take place then either, this time
because the firm will cease to exist because of customer exiting.
For repair to be possible, a firm's product or service elasticity of demand with respect to performance
lapses should be neither very large nor very small. In order for a firm to be able to repair its performance
lapses, a firm should have a mixture of alert" and inert" customers. Alert customers make a firm aware of
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its failings (via exit and voice). Inert (i.e., loyal) and vocal customers give it the time and dollar cushion needed
for repair efforts to come to fruition.
In the romantic relationships literature Rusbult, Johnson and Morrow (1986a,b) operationalized voice as
Hirschmans (1970) original notion of alerting the relationship partner, but added the notion of compromise
and working out relationship problems. This focused notion of voice includes constructive actions aimed at
relationship improvement beyond alerting the partner, such as working with them to improve objectionable
relationship conditions; and it more fully accounts for attempts to change an objectionable state of affairs" in
committed relationships. The Rusbult, Johnson and Morrow (1986a,b) notion of voice is consistent with
Hirschmans (1970) characterization of voice. However, it excludes other more negative operationalizations of
voice (i.e., less relationship-maintenance oriented) such as simply complaining or negative word-of-mouth
(Diener and Grayser 1978). Voice in this paper involves constructive (i.e., relationship maintenance oriented)
behavior aimed at the partner firm and intended to change an objectionable state of affairs; including but not
limited to alerting the partner firm to relationship problems.
Loyalty
Hirschman (1970) proposed inert customers included those who expected the efforts of others, combined
with their own faithfulness, to be successful in improving relationship conditions. He characterized this group
as loyal and described them as those who remain silent with confidence things will get better. He argued the
decision to be loyal was based on: i) an evaluation of the chances of getting the firm back on track, through the
actions of others or something that will improve matters; and ii) a judgement that it is worthwhile to trade the
certainty or uncertainty of the alternative relationship against those chances.
There has been some confusion in the conceptualization and operationalization of Hirschmans (1970)
notion of loyalty. Early in his monograph he characterized loyalty as remaining silent, confident things will get
better. However he subsequently described loyalty as simply refusing to exit, and stated his earlier depiction of
loyalty described non-exiters who do not wish to be influential. Perhaps as a result, studies have conceptualized
loyalty as Hirschman (1970) did, but have operationalized it variously. Some studies have operationalized
loyalty as remaining silent, confident things will get better (e.g., Farrell 1983, Ping 1993). Other studies have
operationalized loyalty by including items that appear to tap relationship commitment (see for example
Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous 1988). In this paper loyalty is conceptualized as Hirschmans (1970)
original notion of loyalty (i.e., remaining silent, confident things will get better), and it is operationalized
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consistent with that conceptualization.
Neglect
Paralleling Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn (1982), Ping (1993) argued a firm could react to relationship
problems by neglecting the relationship (i.e., allowing the relationship to deteriorate) as an alternative to
exiting. He stated neglect involved not caring about the relationship, expending no effort to maintain it, and a
willingness to let the relationship deteriorate. Ping (1993) suggested it was emotional, as opposed to physical,
exiting. He maintained neglect was marked by impersonal, possibly reluctant, even grudging, exchanges with
the partner firm. Ping (1993) observed neglect involved reduced contact with the partner firm (but not
necessarily reduced economic exchanges with them); ordering in writing not over the phone, and delegating
contacts with the partner firm to low-level staff. Rusbult and Zembrodt (1983) characterized neglect in
romantic relationships as inattentive behavior, such as lack of caring and staying away. Farrell (1983)
characterized employee neglect as lax and disregardful behavior, and suggested it included lateness and
absenteeism (also see Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous 1988).
Predictors of Responses to Relationship Problems
Ping (1993) also proposed overall satisfaction with the relationship, alternative attractiveness, investment
in the relationship, and the cost to switch relationships were predictors of exit-propensity and the other
responses in marketing channels (also see Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982). He proposed the existence of
two types of satisfaction in inter-firm relationships, event and overall satisfaction. He maintained that, while
dissatisfaction with some relationship event triggers a response (e.g., loyalty, voice, neglect, or exit-propensity),
the level of overall relationship satisfaction, along with alternative attractiveness, investment, and switching
cost, helps determine which response will be triggered.
Authors have noted individuals remain in a relationship because they want to, or they have to (see for
example Hirschman 1970; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous 1988). Several authors have used the term
structural commitment with having to remain in a relationship. They argue the dimensions of structural
commitment or the cost to exit a relationship include available alternatives, irretrievable investments,
termination procedures, and social pressures (see Johnson 1982, Levinger 1979). This and Pings (1993)
proposal that alternative attractiveness, investment, and switching cost were predictors of loyalty, voice and
neglect, suggest the cost to exit a relationship also should be a predictor of the responses to relationship
problems, in particular exiting.
The Proposed Model
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We will propose that exit propensity has the other responses to relationship problems as predictors, along
with satisfaction and cost-of-exit. We will also propose that the other responses are associated with each other
(see Figure 2).
Theoretical Foundations
Hirschman (1970) did not provide theoretical justification for his arguments. Nevertheless, that subjects
exhibit various responses to relationship problems has been proposed in several literatures. These include
marketing channels (see Ping 1993), consumer behavior (see Andreasen 1985), adaptation-to-work (see
Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous 1988), and romantic relationships (see Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn
1982). For example, Staw (1980) proposed employees initially attempt to exert control over their work
environment. If that is impossible they attempt to make it more predictable, and if that fails, they engage in
various psychological or physical withdrawal behaviors.
That individuals respond to stimuli such as relationship problems is also well established in the
psychological literature (for a summary see Berkowitz 1962). That cognitive intervention occurs between
stimulus and response is widely held or implied in psychology and organizational behavior (for individuals),
and micro economics (for firms) (see Machlup 1967; however, see Nagel 1963 for a dissenting view). For
example, Rosse and Miller (1984) proposed a stimulus that produces relative dissatisfaction (i.e.,
dissatisfaction with an event or outcome as opposed to dissatisfaction with the relationship) produces an
evaluation of alternative responses; then it produces behavior (also see French, Rogers and Cogg 1974; Ping
and Dwyer 1991). The evaluation of response alternatives is also consistent with a cognitive orientation,
specifically theories of choice. For example, Steiner (1980) proposed options are more desirable or less so
depending on their (cognitively determined) expected payoffs versus their expected costs (also see Homans
1974, Vroom 1964).
Thus relationship problems should produce relative dissatisfaction that in turn produces a cognitive
evaluation of alternative responses (i.e., loyalty, voice, neglect and exit), and a behavioral response (i.e.,
loyalty, voice, neglect or exit) (Rosse and Miller 1984; also see Frazier 1983). Evaluation of alternative
responses should be influenced by the expected payoffs and costs associated with each alternative, and
experience (Steiner 1980). Costs should include activity costs (e.g., effort), and economic, psychic and
opportunity costs; and payoffs should include the perceived likelihood of remedying the problem.
It is plausible Hirschmans (1970) assertions for individuals are also true for firms. It is plausible firms
would behave as if they were rational. Inter-firm relationship problems should produce relative dissatisfaction
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and evaluation (Frazier 1983), and a response would be observed. Specifically, it is plausible firms would
behave as if they assess the payoffs and costs associated with the responses to relationship problems. Then they
should either exit the inter-firm relationship, or stay and optimistically remain silent (i.e., be loyal) or attempt
to be influential and work to change things (i.e., use voice). In the balance of the paper we will use the rational
firm or as if assumption (see Machlup 1967 for a discussion of the as if assumption for firms), and will
implicitly justify firm-level theory by citing individual-level theory from psychology and social psychology
(including employees adapting to work).
Loyalty and Voice
Hirschman (1970:88) proposed subjects respond to relationship problems first with loyalty, then voice, and
finally exit; with exit also a possibility after a (possibly brief) period of loyalty. Hirschmans (1970) arguments
are plausible for firms based on firm rationality and the expected payoffs and costs of each response. However,
while some subjects might exit when relationship problems first occur, in committed buyer-seller relationships
between firms it is likely when relationship problems first occur, firms would remain loyal or use voice.
Specifically, the activity (i.e., effort), economic, psychic and opportunity costs of exiting a committed and
satisfactory relationship should initially appear higher than the cost of a loyalty or voice response. For example,
being in a committed and satisfactory buyer-seller relationship should reduce the attractiveness of alternative
relationships (see Johnson and Rusbult 1989). There also may be relationship-specific investments (i.e.,
economic, activity, and opportunity costs that helped ensure future exchanges-- see Macneil 1980) which
would be lost by exiting. Further, switching costs (i.e., economic, opportunity, activity and psychic costs to
terminate the current relationship, and startup a new one) also may be high (see Ping 1993).
Loyalty involves optimistically doing nothing about a relationship problem; voice involves activity and
opportunity cost to remedy a relationship problem. Both involve the performance risk of others and/or the
partner (i.e., the risk loyalty or voice will not remedy the problem). However in buyer-seller relationships
between firms neither involves the costs of dismantling the current relationship and putting another in its place
(i.e., exiting). Nor do they involve the performance risk of the alternative relationship (i.e., the risk the
alternative relationship would be the same or worse than the incumbent relationship). Thus, when problems
first occur in these relationships, they should produce a loyalty or a voice response, because they are less costly
than exiting.
However when problems first occur in these relationships, loyalty should be perceived as less costly than
voice. Loyalty requires less effort than voice because it is passive and involves doing nothing about a
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relationship problem. Voice, on the other hand, requires taking action to remedy a relationship problem
(Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982). It involves activity and opportunity cost, and possibly economic cost. In
addition, when problems first occur, there may be little to suggest the actions of others, including partners
own unprompted actions, would not remedy a relationship problem. Voice may also appear costly if the subject
is concerned that it might be ignored or resisted by partner, or partner might retaliate instead of solving the
problem. Finally, authors have commented on firms penchant for inaction (e.g., loyalty), even when there are
powerful incentives to take action (e.g., voice) (see Yasai-Ardekani 1986).
If loyalty is not an effective response to problems in these relationships (i.e., problems remain
unremedied), and the subject grows suspicious that more relationship problems will occur and loyalty will
continue to be ineffective (i.e., it will have no payoff), the next more costly response, voice, should become
more likely. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed the certain outcome (i.e., the efficacy of loyalty) should
be undervalued when compared with a probabilistic outcome (i.e., the efficacy of voice). Although the cost of
voice is higher, its probabilistic outcome or payoff (i.e., problem remedy) should appear more attractive than
the increasingly certain outcome of loyalty (i.e., problems remain unremedied). Thus a loyalty response should
become less likely, and a voice response should be more likely, and
H1: Loyalty is negatively associated with voice.
Voice and Exit-Propensity
Hirschman (1970:87) predicted if voice were unsuccessful, the subject would become unhappy about
continuing the relationship, and the subject would have thoughts of exiting. It is possible that voice,
unhappiness about continuing the relationship, and thoughts of exiting it could briefly coexist. However, it is
more likely that constructive attempts to change objectionable relationship conditions so the subject can remain
in the relationship (i.e., voice), and unhappiness about continuing the relationship and thoughts of exiting it are
dissonant (Festinger 1954). Thus thoughts of exiting should extinguish constructive attempts to change
objectionable relationship conditions (i.e., voice); or, thoughts of exiting should cease and the subject should
continue to constructively attempt to change objectionable relationship conditions (i.e., be vocal).
As a result, if the subjects attempts to change relationship conditions (i.e., voice) are not effective (i.e.,
problems remain un-remedied), and the subject grows suspicious that voice will continue to be ineffective (i.e.,
it will have no payoff), exit-propensity should become more likely. Although exit-propensity would be more
costly, its payoff (i.e., problem remedy) should now appear more attractive than the certain outcome of voice
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(i.e., problems remain unremedied) (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). A voice response should now become less
likely, and exit-propensity should be more likely. Consequently,
H2: Voice is negatively associated with exit-propensity.
Neglect
Staws (1980) and others arguments regarding withdrawal behaviors (see page 7) suggest neglect also
precedes exiting. Rosse and Miller (1984), for example, argued dissatisfied employees attempt to cope with
chronic problems (i.e., remedy their dissatisfaction) by using the least costly form of relationship withdrawal. If
this proves unsatisfactory, progressively more costly forms of withdrawal are attempted until one is found that
provides sufficient coping (also see Rosse and Hulin 1985). Subsequently Rosse (1988) found employee
exiting was preceded by relationship withdrawal (i.e., coping) activities that included lateness and absenteeism
(also see Farrell 1983).
Operationalizing exit as exit-propensity however, it might be argued that exit-propensity should precede
neglect, because neglect is the result of inability or unwillingness to exit a relationship. Nevertheless, it is more
likely in committed buyer-seller relationships between firms, neglect precedes exit-propensity because it is less
costly than exit-propensity.3 Neglect involves not maintaining the relationship, and letting it deteriorate (i.e.,
inaction). However, exit-propensity involves actions that precede leaving the relationship. This includes
searching for and evaluating alternatives (Mobley 1977), which involves activity, opportunity, and possibly
economic costs. In addition, firms are again likely to prefer inaction (e.g., neglect) over action (e.g., exitpropensity) (see Yasai-Ardekani 1986).
Thus, in committed buyer-seller relationships between firms the subject should attempt to cope with
chronic relationship problems by neglecting the relationship before exiting it. If neglect fails to produce
sufficient coping, the subject should also have thoughts of exiting and the other activities associated with exitpropensity should follow. However, relationship neglect should not cease when exiting activities begin. It is
likely that not caring about the relationship, not maintaining it, and allowing it to deteriorate (i.e., neglect) is
not dissonant with activities that precede physically leaving the relationship (i.e., exit-propensity).
Therefore neglect should precede exit-propensity in these relationships because it is less costly. However,

3

However, exit-propensity could subsequently (i.e., non-recursively or bi-directionally) affect neglect as proximity to
physically exiting the relationship increases, or if the subject is unable to exit. These matters were investigated using a
nonrecursive specification of the neglect-exit-propensity association in Figure 2 (see page 19) but the results were inconclusive
(both neglect-exit-propensity paths were non significant).
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neglect should continue during activities that precede physically exiting the relationship (i.e., exit-propensity)
because neglect and exit-propensity are consonant. As a result,
H3: Neglect is positively associated with exit-propensity.
In committed buyer-seller relationships between firms, neglect should intervene between voice and exitpropensity as a stronger form of coping with chronic relationship problems than voice, that is less costly than
exit-propensity. Neglect is a stronger form of coping with chronic relationship problems than voice because it
involves no longer caring about the relationship, and thus is a form of (emotional) exiting. But, it is less costly
than exit-propensity because it involves inaction.
Farrell (1983) characterized voice as constructive and positive in its potential effects on the relationship,
and neglect as destructive and negative. For example, voice involves constructively attempting to change
objectionable relationship conditions, while neglect involves doing nothing to improve objectionable
relationship conditions. Further, Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn (1982) characterized voice as active, because it
involves attempts to change objectionable relationship conditions. They also characterized neglect as passive
because it involves doing nothing to improve objectionable relationship conditions. Thus, voice is likely to be
dissonant with neglect. Attempts to change relationship conditions should extinguish not caring about the
relationship. Or, attempts to change relationship conditions should cease; the subject should stop caring about
the relationship, expend no more effort to maintain it, and allow it to deteriorate.
Therefore if the subjects attempts to change relationship conditions (i.e., voice) are not effective in
committed buyer-seller relationships between firms (i.e., problems remain unremedied), and the subject
becomes suspicious relationship problems will continue to occur and voice will continue to be ineffective (i.e.,
it will have no payoff), the next more costly response, neglect, should become more likely. Thus as voice
becomes less likely, neglect should become more likely, and
H4: Voice is negatively associated with neglect.
Satisfaction
Ping (1993) proposed that satisfaction was related to the responses to relationship problems, and we will
do likewise to avoid model misspecification.4 Increased satisfaction with the relationship makes economic
exchanges with the partner firm more valuable (Thibaut and Kelley 1959). As their satisfaction increases, firms
4Omitting important antecedents that may be correlated with other model antecedents creates the missing variables
problem (see James 1980). This can bias structural coefficients, because model antecedents could then be correlated with
structural errors, a violation of assumptions (structural errors then contain the variance of omitted variables).
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should be likely to respond positively to relationship problems, help maintain the relationship, and safeguard
future satisfaction. Thus they should also likely to avoid negative responses that might jeopardize the
relationship. Because they are unlikely to damage the relationship, positive responses include voice and loyalty
(Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982). Because they jeopardize the relationship, negative responses include
neglect and exit-propensity. Therefore as relationship satisfaction increases, loyalty and voice become more
likely, and neglect and exit-propensity become less likely. Thus,
H5: Overall relationship satisfaction is positively associated with loyalty and voice, and negatively
associated with neglect and exit-propensity.
Cost-of-Exit
Authors have argued the facets or dimensions of structural commitment, or the cost to exit a relationship,
include available alternatives, irretrievable investments, termination procedures, and social pressures (see
Johnson 1982, Levinger 1979). This suggests the existence of a second-order construct, which we will term
cost-of-exit.5 This construct should have first-order latent variable indicators" that include a) the
attractiveness of alternative exchange relationships; b) economic, activity, and opportunity costs that might be
lost or obsoleted by exiting the current relationship (i.e., relationship investments); and c) economic,
opportunity, activity and psychic termination costs, and startup costs for the new relationship (e.g., switching
cost) (see Figure 1).
Cost-of-exit should affect the responses to relationship problems. As their cost-of-exit increases, firms
should become more dependent on their partner firms (Emerson 1962). The perceived risk accompanying their
responses that are relationship negative (i.e., jeopardize the relationship) also should increase because there
may be much to lose (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Thus, as their cost-of-exit increases they should be more
likely to respond positively to relationship problems (i.e., with loyalty or voice), and less likely to respond
negatively (i.e., with neglect or exit-propensity). Thus
H6: Cost-of-exit is positively associated with loyalty and voice, and negatively associated with neglect
and exit-propensity.
Moderation

5

Jöreskog (1970) introduced a second-order construct as a latent variable with no observed variables as indicators.
Instead, it has other latent variables for indicators," hence the term second-order." Each of the indicator latent variables
has observed variables for indicators as usual, and these latent variables are termed first-order constructs (see Gerbing and
Anderson 1984a).
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Johnson (1982) argued that when one is no longer satisfied with a relationship, the consequences of
structural commitment (i.e., cost-of-exit) must be faced (see Hom and Griffeth and Sellaro 1984 for a summary
of similar arguments and supportive evidence). On the other hand, Johnson and Rusbult (1989) argued
satisfied subjects in committed relationships devalue alternatives, a facet of cost-of-exit. Thus when
relationship satisfaction is high in these relationships, the subject may be less aware of alternatives. In
committed buyer-seller relationships between firms they may also be less aware of the investment that may be
lost in switching to an alternative relationship, and the other costs involved in switching relationships. Thus
satisfied subjects in committed relationships may devalue or be less aware of cost-of-exit. But, when
satisfaction is lower in these relationships they may become more aware of these costs to exit the relationship.
In addition, being loyal because of relationship satisfaction may be dissonant with being loyal because of
high exiting costs. When satisfaction is high, cost-of-exit may be devalued (i.e., the subject is loyal because
they want to be, not because they have to be). However when satisfaction is lower in committed buyer-seller
relationships between firms, continued loyalty may be attributed to the cost to exit the relationship (i.e., the
subject is loyal because they have to be). Thus, satisfaction should moderate the relationship between cost-ofexit and loyalty in committed buyer-seller relationships between firms. Specifically, high satisfaction should
attenuate this relationship, and it should be weaker at higher levels of satisfaction. Hence,
H7: Satisfaction attenuates the association between cost-of-exit and loyalty.
These relationships are summarized in Figure 2.
Method
Measurement
Cost-of-exit To assess its psychometric properties as a second-order construct, cost-of-exit was specified using
the indicator" latent variables alternative attractiveness (reverse coded), investment, and switching cost (see
Figure 1). Cost-of-exit was then respecified in the full measurement and structural models corresponding to
Figure 2 by averaging the observed indicators of each indicator" latent variable (i.e., alternative attractiveness
(reverse coded), investment and switching cost-- see Figure 2), and using the resulting three (observed)
indicators to itemize cost-of-exit. This approach has been used before (see for example Dwyer and Oh 1987). It
avoids difficulties in specifying the moderation of cost-of-exit by satisfaction, which will be explained next.
Moderation The moderation of the loyalty-cost-of-exit association by satisfaction was operationalized as the
product of the latent variables satisfaction and cost-of-exit (i.e., the interaction, SATxCOE). This allowed the
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strength of the moderation (i.e., its coefficient size) to be assessed.6 The respecification of cost-of-exit with
averaged indicators produced a first-order cost-of-exit latent variable. This enabled the specification of a firstorder-by-first-order interaction variable (SATxCOE).7 The SATxCOE latent variable was itemized using a
technique provided by Ping (1995) that uses a single composite indicator. This has desirable properties in this
application. They include reducing the nonnormality introduced in the full measurement and structural models
corresponding to Figure 2 by the indicators of an interaction, so maximum likelihood estimation can be used
(see Appendix A and Ping 1995 for details).
Study Measures Satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, investment, switching cost, loyalty, voice, neglect, and
exit-propensity were measured based on scales developed by Ping (1993). Alternative attractiveness was
measured with five-point rating scaled items, and the other study concepts were measured with balanced fivepoint Likert-scaled items.

The study concepts, a description of their conceptual domains, their

operationalizations, and a sample item are summarized in Table 1.
Sampling

6 The customary latent variable interaction approach of dividing cases into high and low satisfaction groups, and then
comparing covariance matrices or coefficients does not enable the assessment of the strength of any moderation.
7

There is no available guidance for the specification of an interaction between a first-order latent variable and a
second-order latent variable such as cost-of-exit as it was specified in Figure 1.
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These measures were placed on a questionnaire and mailed to a sample of U.S. hardware retailers
(Note: hardware retailers have been studied previously in Dwyer and Oh 1988, and Ping 1993-- the data sets
used in these studies were not used in the present study). Hardware retailing was selected because hardware
retailers buyer-seller relationship with their primary wholesaler is typically long-term (Ping 1993), which
suggests these are committed relationships where the full range of responses to relationship problems should be
more likely.8
The sampling frame was the subscription list of a widely read industry publication. It contained names and
addresses of senior key informants such as storeowners and managers, or senior executives. Interviews with
multiple informants in a small and convenient sample from the study population revealed that hardware
retailers buy from a limited set of wholesalers (typically one primary wholesaler). Although Phillips (1981) has
cautioned against using single informants in general, the senior key informants in this nonrepresentative sample
were judged quite knowledgeable of their primary wholesaler relationship. In addition their sentiments and
perceptions were judged to be mirrored by the other informants in the firm.
Sampling involved systematic random (n-th name) selections of 100 pretest store names, and 600 final test
names (with one key informant per store). The pre- and final test included a cover letter assuring informant
anonymity, a $2 bill as a response incentive, and a business reply envelope, and were followed up by three
postcard mailings. Minor changes to the letter, and questionnaire instructions and format (but not to the
measures), were made between the pre- and final test mailings.
Pretest
The pretest responses (32) were used to assess the response rate of the survey protocol and the
psychometric properties of the measures. Internal consistency of the study measures was gauged using these
responses and ordered similarity coefficients (Hunter 1973) (see Gerbing and Anderson 1984b), item-to-total
correlations, and coefficient alphas. The measures had coefficient alphas of .70 or above in the pretest.

8 In the present research 44% of the final test sample had done business with their primary wholesaler for 10 or more
years. Eighteen percent of the sample had done business with their primary wholesaler for 21 years or more, 25% had done
business with them for 11-20 years, 24% for 6-10 years, and 33% had done business with their primary wholesaler for 1-5 years.
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Final Test
Two hundred twenty responses were usable from the final test mailing (a 36% usable response rate). The
pretest responses were not combined with those from the final test because the number of pretest responses was
too small to allow reliable statistical testing for equivalent samples. The psychometric properties of the
measures were re-examined using the final-test responses and ordered similarity coefficients, single and
multiple factor measurement models (Jöreskog 1993), and latent variable reliabilities.
Reliability and Validity
The latent variable reliabilities for satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, investment, switching cost,
loyalty, voice, neglect and exit-propensity were above .82 (see Table 2). The latent variable reliabilities of costof-exit and the interaction were lower (.700 and .707 respectively), but within acceptable limits for our
tentative inference purposes. Each latent variable was plausibly correlated with one or more other latent
variables (see Table 2), which suggests construct validity, and the measures were judged to be content valid.
Most of the correlations in Table 2 were less than |.6|, which suggests discriminant validity for the latent
variables involved. For latent variables with correlations above |.6|, single degree of freedom tests were
performed (see Bagozzi and Phillips 1982). The results (not shown) suggested the discriminant validity of
these latent variables (e.g., the largest p-value of the χ2 differences with df=1 for H0: |Correlation| = 1 was
1.2E-09).
Measurement and Structural Model Results
The second-order measurement model for cost-of-exit (see Figure 1), and the full measurement and
structural models corresponding to Figure 2, were estimated using covariances, LISREL, maximum likelihood,
and an interaction estimation technique suggested by Ping (1995) (see Appendix A for details).9 The results are
shown in Tables 2 and 3.
The Figure 1 specification of cost-of-exit as a second-order construct fit the data (not shown) (χ2 = 110/df =
51/p = .000, GFI = .935, AGFI = .902, CFI = .975, RMSEA = .072 ). In addition, alternative attractiveness,

investment and switching cost were judged sufficiently unidimensional based on their single construct
measurement models (not shown) (e.g., χ2ALT = 2.73/df = 2/p = .25, χ2INV = 2.47/df = 2/p = .29, χ2SWC = 0.72/df = 2/p
= .69) and a full measurement model of these variables plus satisfaction, loyalty, voice, neglect and exit

9

Maximum likelihood estimates are robust to departures from normality, and their model fit and significance statistics
may be robust to the use of a single nonnormal interaction indicator (Ping 1995, see Appendix A).
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propensity (not shown) (e.g., CFI = .949, RMSEA = .055). As a result the indicators for each of the variables
alternative attractiveness, investment and switching cost were averaged. Cost-of-exit was then respecified in
the full measurement and structural models corresponding to Figure 2 as a first-order construct using these
averaged alternative attractiveness(reverse coded), investment, and switching cost indicators. The psychometric
equivalence of the Figures 1 and 2 specifications for cost-of-exit was investigated by respecifying cost-of-exit
in the Figure 1 measurement model with these averaged indicators. The Figure 1 measurement model with this
averaged specification of cost-of-exit suggested this and the original Figure 1 specification were
psychometrically equivalent (not shown) (i.e., the measurement parameters were similar-- λaltr = 0.449, γALTR,COE
= 0.498, λinv = 0.562, γINV,COE = 0.559, λswc = 1.000, γSWC,COE = 1.000, εaltr = 0.587, ζALT = 0.667, εinv = 0.371, ζINV =
0.371, εswc = 0.208 ζSCT = 0.233, φFig 1 COE = 0.735, φFig 2 COE = 0.748).

Although the GFI and AGFI values were low for the full measurement and structural models
corresponding to Figure 2, GFI and AGFI may not be adequate for fit assessment in larger models (see
Anderson and Gerbing 1984). The full measurement and structural models were judged to fit the data
acceptably using other popular fit criteria (see Tables 2 and 3). For example, the Figure 2 structural model
exhibited a Comparative Fit Index (Bentler 1990) of .933 (.90 or better suggests acceptable model-to-data fit-see McClelland and Judd 1993) (see Table 3). It also exhibited a Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation
(Steiger 1990) of .068 (values up to .08 suggest acceptable fit-- Brown and Cudeck 1993, Jöreskog 1993).
Using the same criteria, the full measurement model corresponding to Figure 2 was also judged to fit the data
(see Table 2).
Results
Hypotheses
In summary, exit-propensity was directly or indirectly associated with the other responses to relationship
problems (see Tables 3 and 4), and satisfaction and cost-of-exit were associated with all the responses to
relationship problems, although not always unconditionally (see Tables 3 and 5). Of the direct paths in Figure 2
involving the associations among loyalty, voice, neglect, and exit-propensity, all but the direct voice-exitpropensity association were significant. Similarly, of the paths involving satisfaction and cost-of-exit, all but
the loyalty associations between satisfaction and cost-of-exit, and the cost-of-exit association with voice were
significant. In addition, satisfaction moderated the cost-of-exit-loyalty association (see Table 3 and 5), and
there were several indirect associations (see Table 4). As a result, all of the hypothesized associations were
significant although not always direct or unconditional.
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Cost-of-Exit
Cost-of-exit was a second-order construct in the study context (i.e., it fit the data). However, the loadings
for cost-of-exit were different between the Figure 2 full measurement and structural models (see Tables 2 and
3), as can be expected with an exactly determined latent variable (see Anderson and Gerbing 1988, Burt 1976).
Nevertheless, a Figure 2 structural model with cost-of-exit specified with indicators fixed at the Table 2
measurement model values (not shown) fit the data (e.g., CFI = .933, RMSEA = .068) and suggested the Tables 2
and 3 cost-of-exit parameterizations were interpretationally equivalent (i.e., the constrained structural model
produced structural parameter estimates that were similar in direction and significance to the Table 3 results-βVOI,LOY = -0.173/t = -4.54, βNEGL,VOI = -0.377/t = -3.65, βEX_P,VOI = 0.132/t = 1.31, βEX_P,NEG = 0.551/t = 6.84, βLOY,SAT = 0.108/t = -0.83, βLOY,COE = 0.118/t = 0.74, βLOY,SATxCOE = -0.371/t = -2.61, βVOI,SAT = 0.156/t = 2.64, βVOI,COE = 0.077/t =
0.99, βNEG,SAT = -0.284/t = -3.18, βNEG,COE = -0.368/t = -3.12, βEXI_PSAT = -0.411/t = -4.82, βEXI_PCOE = -0.238/t = -2.01 for

the constrained model).
Unmodeled Paths
To further investigate the significant indirect paths not specified as direct paths in Figure 2 (see Table 4),
direct paths from loyalty to neglect, loyalty to exit-propensity, and the interaction to voice, were specified in the
Figure 2 structural model. The results (not shown) suggested there were no significant direct paths from loyalty
to neglect, loyalty to exit-propensity, or the interaction to voice.
Alternative Models
To evaluate the direction of the direct paths between loyalty, voice, neglect, and exit-propensity in Figure 2
further, several nonrecursive or bi-directional models were estimated. The Figure 2 model with bi-directional
paths between loyalty and voice, voice and neglect, and neglect and exit-propensity specified all in one model
was not identified. However, models estimating one bidirectional path at a time (not shown) suggested the
Figure 2 model path directions were as shown except for the NEG-EX_P path which could not be verified
because that model was not identified.
Discussion
Holding Exit at Bay
These results are consistent with Hirschmans (1970) and others predictions that increased voice is
associated with reduced exiting (see Spencer 1986, Fornell and Wernerfelt 1987). However the lack of
significance in the direct voice-exit-propensity association (see Table 3) and the significant indirect association
between voice and exit-propensity via neglect (see Table 4) suggest increased voice was associated with
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reduced exit-propensity only via reduced neglect. Thus voice may have held exit at bay in the study only when
it was less costly to use voice than to neglect the relationship. Had wholesalers made voice more costly (e.g., by
ignoring complaints), and/or neglect less costly (e.g., by decreasing cost-of-exit), retailers may have been more
likely to skip voice on their way to exiting..
Associations Among the Responses
These results are also consistent with Hirschmans (1970) predictions concerning the associations among
the responses to relationship problems. The negative signs on these relationships suggest as loyalty declined,
voice was likely to increase, and as voice declined neglect and exit-propensity were likely to increase. The lack
of significance in the direct loyalty-to-neglect, loyalty-to-exit-propensity, and voice-to-exit-propensity
associations suggest as subject firms loyalty declined, their use of voice was more likely to increase than their
neglect or exit-propensity. It also suggests as their use of voice declined, their neglect was more likely to
increase than their exit-propensity.10
Inter-firm Relationship Development
Firms remain in a relationship either because they want to, or because they have to (Johnson 1982, Thibaut
and Kelly 1959). The sample contained dissatisfied firms in committed relationships that were willing to
neglect their relationships (i.e., not care about the relationship, expend no effort to maintain the relationship,
and let the relationship deteriorate). They also suggest others were planning to exit their relationships, rather
than maintain and build them in anticipation of future exchanges (see Footnote 10). Such relationships may not
belong in the committed phase of Dwyer, Schurr and Ohs (1987) framework. These relationships are in
decline because the subject firms do not care about their relationships and are unwilling to maintain them (i.e.,
neglect), and/or they are planning to leave their relationships (i.e., exit-propensity). As a result, these
relationships should be classified as in either the dissolution phase of Dwyer, Schurr and Ohs (1987)
framework, or a phase between relationship commitment and dissolution.
It could be argued these relationships should be in the intrapsychic stage of relationship dissolution (see p.
2). However, dissatisfied firms that cannot leave their relationships will not go on to the other stages in
relationship dissolution, and these relationships will not dissolve. For dissatisfied firms that will not leave their

10

45% of the firms in the study agreed or strongly agreed they were loyal, 98% agreed or strongly agreed they use
voice, 7% were neutral or agreed to strongly agreed they neglect the relationship, and 19% were neutral or agreed to strongly
agreed they were planning to exit their relationship. The percentages add to more than 100% because many firms appeared to be
in transition from loyalty to voice, or voice to neglect and exit-propensity.
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relationships, the other stages of dissolution may take some time, or these relationships may not dissolve at all.
Thus to emphasize the possibility these declined relationships do not belong in the committed stage, yet some
may not dissolve, and for others dissolution may take considerable time, we propose there may be an additional
phase between Dwyer, Schurr and Ohs (1987) relationship commitment and relationship dissolution phases in
the study context, relationship decline.
Relationship Decline

Johnson (1982), among others (see Levinger 1976), proposed relationship

commitment consisted of satisfaction and structural commitment (i.e., cost-of-exit). He also argued that
understanding the implications of both components of relationship commitment was essential to understanding
why individuals stay in relationships (also see Rusbult and Buunk 1993). However Johnsons (1982) view of
relationship commitment is different from the prevailing view of commitment in buyer-seller relationships (see
for example Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer 1995). Commitment in buyer-seller relationships has been defined
as a stated or implied pledge of relationship continuity between partners (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987). It has
been conceptualized as the desire to continue a relationship and work to ensure its continuance (Wilson 1995).
Further, its conceptual domain is invariably described implicitly or explicitly assuming a positive evaluation of
the relationship (i.e., satisfaction). However Johnson (1982) argued the benefits derived from a relationship
produce satisfaction, and thus one form of relationship commitment, but exit barriers produce structural
commitment (as in we cannot back out now, the cost would be too great), another form of relationship
commitment. As a result, a firms commitment to a relationship may be the result of satisfaction or structural
commitment.
Because firms that were no longer satisfied, and hence no longer committed to their buyer-seller
relationships in the sense Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) and others intend (see Weitz and Jap 1995, Wilson
1995), may also have been unable or unwilling to exit these relationships, buyer-seller relationship
development in the study context may have consisted of six phases: awareness, exploration, expansion,
commitment, then relationship decline, and finally dissolution. Firms with relationships in the commitment
phase were satisfied, and may have been loyal or vocal when there were relationship problems. Firms in
relationship decline were no longer satisfied with their relationships. These firms should have been aware of
their structural commitment (i.e., cost-of-exit) (Johnson 1982); they were unwilling or as yet unable to exit
their relationships, and may have responded to relationship problems with neglect and exit-propensity. Firms in
the relationship dissolution phase were also dissatisfied with their relationships, but they no longer should have
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viewed structural commitment as a barrier to exiting.
Interactions
Several observed associations were contingent or dependent on the levels of interacting variables. For
example satisfaction attenuated the cost-of-exit association with loyalty (see Table 5). At low levels of
satisfaction the cost-of-exit association with loyalty was positive (see the COE-LOY associations in Table 5).
However, as satisfaction increased to the study average, this association was weaker, and it became non
significant at higher levels of satisfaction.
Satisfaction also indirectly attenuated the cost-of-exit association with voice. At low levels of satisfaction
the indirect association of cost-of-exit with voice was negative rather than positive as hypothesized (see the
COE-VOI associations in Table 5). As satisfaction increased to the study average and higher this association
was non significant. Since increased cost-of-exit should increase dependence and decrease power (Emerson
1962), it is possible increased cost-of-exit could have reduced the likelihood of voice because it was viewed as
risky (i.e., the costs outweighed the benefits). Specifically, attempts to change objectionable relationship
conditions (voice) under these circumstances (i.e., lower satisfaction) might have been ignored or resisted by
partner, or partner might have retaliated.
Cost-of-exit moderated the association between satisfaction and loyalty (see the SAT-LOY associations in
Table 5).11 At low levels of cost-of-exit the satisfaction association with loyalty was positive, and as it
approached the study average it became nonsignificant. However, when cost-of-exit was high this association
was negative. It is possible when cost-of-exit was high, increased satisfaction decreased loyalty because the
subject firms were likely to become more vocal at that point (when cost-of-exit was high increased satisfaction
also increased voice-- see the SAT-VOI associations in Table 5).
Future Research
Relationship Exiting
The study results were equivocal on the likelihood of the responses to relationship problems forming a
sequence or process of relationship exiting as Hirschman (1970:86) proposed (see p. 18). Additional surveys
with more predictors of the responses to relationship problems, longitudinal research, experiments, and case
studies should be conducted to investigate the plausibility of relationship exiting beginning with loyalty, and

11

In the equation Y = b1X + b2Z + b3XZ + ζ (with X, Z and Y mean centered), the association of Z with Y is
determined by b2 + b3X. Similarly, the association of X with Y is determined by b 1 + b3Z.
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progress through voice to neglect and exiting. For example, additional surveys with more predictors of the
responses (see the suggestions below) should be aimed at providing an identified jointly bi-directional or
nonrecursive Figure 2 model of these responses. This in turn would suggest or disconfirm the possibility of an
exiting process involving the responses to relationship problems.
Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer (1995) provide an example of a longitudinal experiment involving interfirm simulations and knowledgeable students. Similarly Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous (1988) reported
several studies that included an experiment involving scenario analysis. Students were instructed to read
written scenarios in which they were to imagine they were the subjects of the experiment. The results from this
scenario analysis and the other reported designs (with much more internal and external validity) were generally
similar. While they used single subjects, it is likely meetings of groups of subjects could also be used.
Additional Predictors
Investigating additional predictors of the responses may be useful in several ways. Approaches to
identifying exiting and neglectful firms by name should be helpful to inter-firm relationship managers. At first
glance surveys might appear to be effective. However, identifying firms that may be neglectful or exiting by
measuring their neglect or exit-propensity (or, any other study variable) may be difficult because of their desire
for confidentiality when sensitive constructs such as these are measured. Thus predictors of neglect and exiting
are needed that are publicly available and/or not sensitive so that confidentiality is not an issue, and the
responding firm can be identified.
For example, firm and relationship contingency variables may be associated with neglect and exiting (or
other responses). Structural contingency theory has enjoyed a central position in the organizational behavior
literature (see Pfeffer 1982). There, firm behavior, and in particular its structure, is argued to be a result of
contextual factors such as firm size, technology and the environment. Thus contingencies such as the number
of employees in a firm and the number of competitors it faces should cause variations in that firms behavior
(e.g., exiting, neglect, loyalty, or voice). These variables may also include the number of employees a firm has,
their revenue, the number of years they have been in business, the number of years they have done business
with their partner firm, and productivity measures (see Ingene 1982).
Variables such as those used in organizational demography could also be efficacious (e.g., average
employee age, education, length of service, etc.) (see Pfeffer 1983). If it turned out, for example, that number
of employees was positively associated with neglect, relationship managers could determine their suppliers
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and customers number of employees and target the comparatively smaller firms for neglect reduction.
Little is known about loyalty in inter-firm relationships, and its predictors are largely unknown. Hirschman
(1970) mentioned there were differences in sensitivity to relationship problems. As a result, loyalty may also
have predictors that include the magnitude, frequency and relevance of relationship problems, and the partner
firms history of solving problems without the subject firms involvement.
Similarly, much work remains to be done in understanding voice in these relationships. Hirschman (1970)
argued voice was affected by the expectation of its success. He proposed this involved the subject's evaluation
of the prospects of the declined firm getting back on track through that firm's actions, the subjects actions, or
the actions of others. Hirschman (1970) also argued voice was affected by the advantage to be gained by using
voice. Singh (1990) conceptualized this advantage in a consumer context as the worthwhileness of complaint,
the costs versus the benefits to the subject. Hirschman (1970) also argued industry structure should affect
voice. Specifically he proposed that in what he termed loose monopolies there should be little voice. Andreasen
(1985) characterized loose monopolies as industries in which a near-monopoly exists, and he proposed
physicians, for example, are a loose monopoly. Finally, Hirschman (1970) proposed the importance of the
purchase would also increase voice. This suggests the importance of the relationship to the subject firm may
also increase their voice.
Exit-Propensity
It is plausible exit-propensity is itself a process in inter-firm relationships, as Mobley (1977) argued for
employees, and there may be one or more feedback loops within an exit-propensity process that nonrecursively
(i.e., bi-directionally) affect neglect. For example, it is plausible that after planning to exit begins, neglect could
increase as the subject firm draws nearer to physically exiting a relationship. It is also plausible neglect may be
affected by the subjects discontinuing the exiting process (e.g., for lack of an acceptable alternative). This
level of detail was beyond the scope of the present research, but there may be more to learn about exitpropensity as a series of interrelated stages with plausible feedback loops to neglect.
Exit was operationalized as exit-propensity in the study because exit is a dichotomous variable, and such
variables can produce estimation problems in covariant structure analysis (see Footnote 1). Thus the
relationships between the study variables and exit may be smaller than those observed with exit-propensity.
Longitudinal studies linking the Figure 2 model with exit it would therefore be useful to observe the study
variables linkages with the physical termination of inter-firm relationships.
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Interactions
As it turned out, the present study missed the full extent of the role of cost-of-exit (COE) in the study
context. The results of investigating additional interactions suggested there were other cost-of-exit interactions
in the Figure 2 model.12 For example we found while COE did not affect the association between satisfaction
and voice (t= -.06) or exit (t= 1.39), it attenuated the satisfaction-neglect association (t= 2.04). Specifically as
COE increased, the satisfaction-neglect association became weaker until at high cost-of-exit satisfaction was
not associated with neglect.
COE also attenuated the voice-exit-propensity relationship (t= -2.34) (it did not significantly affect the
other relationships among the responses). As COE increased the association between voice and exit-propensity
became weaker. At low cost-of-exit the voice-exit association was positive and significant. As cost-of-exit
increased this association weakened until it became nonsignificant at the study average. Then it became
negative and significant at high cost-of-exit. Thus as voice declined, neglect was more likely at all levels of
cost-of-exit. Exit was less likely at low cost-of-exit (because the effort of exit-propensity was not necessary). It
was no more or less likely near the study average (when it was nonsignificant), and more likely at high cost-ofexit (when the effort of exit-propensity was quite necessary). Consequently, there may also be more to learn
about the role of cost-of-exit in holding exit at bay.
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Table 1
MEASURES SUMMARY
Construct
Satisfaction
(SAT)

Alternative
Attractiveness
(reverse
coded as
ALTR)

Investment
(INV)

Switching
Cost
(SWC)

Cost-of-Exit
(COE)

Conceptual Definition
Conceptual Domain
A global evaluation
Overall rating of the relationship; an
of relationship
appraisal of the attributes of the
fulfillment.
relationship that are rewarding,
profitable, or instrumental.
A global evaluation
An overall evaluation of the most
of the relationship
salient and available alternative
fulfillment available
relationship, and generalized percepin the best available
tions of the rewards available in that
alternative
relationship.
relationship.
The cost to build and
maintain the current
relationship in
anticipation of future
exchanges.
The cost to change to
an alternative
relationship.

Economic (e.g., money), activity
(e.g., effort), and opportunity costs
(e.g., time).

The perceived
magnitude of the
mobility barrier
between the
incumbent and the
alternative
relationships.

The attractiveness of the alternative
relationship, the relationshipspecific investments (i.e., economic,
activity, and opportunity costs that
helped ensure future exchanges)
which might be lost or obsoleted by
exiting, and switching costs (i.e.,
economic, opportunity, activity and
psychic costs to terminate the
current relationship, and startup a
new one).
Viewing problems as transitory
phenomena that fix themselves; from
the subjects perspective, problems
work themselves out or are fixed by
others, so the subject ignores them.
Actively seeking problem removal
by contacting the partner firm in a
positive (i.e., relationship
preserving) manner, and
cooperatively discussing and
working with the partner firm to
improve the situation.
Not caring about the relationship,
expending no effort to maintain the
relationship, and willingness to let
the relationship deteriorate.
Thinking of exiting, intention to
search for alternatives, evaluating
alternatives, and the intention to
exit.
Changes in Satisfaction increase or
decrease the size of the Cost-of-Exit
structural coefficients.

Loyalty
(LOY)

Abiding relationship
problems in silence
with confidence that
things will get better.

Voice
(VOI)

Constructive attempts by the subject
firm to change
objectionable
relationship
conditions.

Neglect
(NEGL)

Allowing the
relationship to
deteriorate.

Exit-Propensity
(EX_P)

The disinclination to
continue the current
relationship,

SatisfactionCost-of-Exit
Interaction
(SATxCOE)

The moderation of
the Cost-of-Exit
effect on other
variables by
Satisfaction.

Economic, activity, and opportunity
cost to end the current relationship
and secure an alternative
relationship, and the psychic cost to
achieve this end.

Operational Definition
Belief that the
relationship is
satisfactory.

Sample Item
All in all, my relationship with
my primary wholesaler is very
satisfactory (s1).

The satisfaction
believed to be available in the best alternative relationship, above that available in
the current relationship.
The magnitude of the
cost that went into
building and
maintaining the
current relationship.
The cost and loss that
would be required to
terminate the current
relationship and
secure an alternative
relationship.
The satisfaction
believed to be available in the best alternative relationship, above that available in
the current relationship, plus the cost and
loss involved in
switching
relationships.

In general, I would be __
satisfied with the alternative
wholesaler than/as I am with the
current wholesaler. a. Much
more b. Slightly more c. As
d. Slightly less e. Much less
(a1)
Overall I have invested a lot in
the relationship with the current
wholesaler (i1).

The predisposition to
overlook problems
because they fix themselves.

I often overlook problems with
my primary wholesaler because
they frequently fix themselves
(l1).

The intention to notify
constructively and
work with the primary
wholesaler to solve
relationship problems.

Occasionally I will suggest
changes to my primary
wholesaler if there is a mutual
problem (v1)

Planning to do
nothing to improve
conditions in the
relationship.
Planning to leave the
relationship.

If things are not right with my
primary wholesaler I sometimes
consider letting the relationship
die a slow death (n1).
Occasionally I will think about
ending the business relationship
with my primary wholesaler
(e1).
s:c = [(s1+s2+s3 +s4 +
s5)/5][(altn + inv + sct)/3],
where altr = (1 + 2 + 3 +
4)/4 (i are reverse coded
indicator of ALT so altr would
load positively on COE), inv =
(i1+i2+i3 +i4)/4, swc =
(sc1+sc2+sc3+sc4)/4.

Satisfaction times
Cost-of-Exit.

Considering everything, the
costs to stop doing business
with the current wholesaler and
start up with the alternative
wholesaler would be high (sc1).
Alternative unattractiveness (the
construct ALTR), Investment
(INV), and Switching Cost
(SWC).

Table 2
FIGURE 2 MEASUREMENT MODEL RESULTS
Latent Variable Covariances and Correlations:a
Latent
Latent Variable
Standard
Variable
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Reliability Meanb Deviationb
1. LOY
.645 -.296* .057 -.038 .051 .080 -.227* .826
2.41
.74
2. VOI
-.104 .191 -.396* -.263* .312* .253* -.053
.928
4.09
.42
3. NEGL
.033 -.125 .523 .712* -.554* -.561* .310* .922
1.85
.62
4. EX_P
-.027 -.101 .451 .766 -.678* -.622* .357* .946
2.13
.84
5. SAT
.030 .098 -.290 -.429 .523 .634* -.365* .945
4.16
.67
6. COE
.040 .068 -.252 -.338 .285 .385 -.139
.700
3.50
.68
7. SATxCOE
-.097 -.012 .119 .166 -.140 -.045 .283
.707
14.78
4.37
Parameter Estimates:
Parameterc Estimated Parameterc
λl1
1.000
λe3
λl2
0.832
λe4
λl3
0.810
λe5
λl4
0.695
λe6
λv1
0.974
λs1
λv2
0.864
λs2
λv3
1.000
λs3
λv4
0.877
λs4
λn1
1.000
λs5
λn2
0.735
λaltr
λn3
0.699
λinv
λn4
0.876
λswc
λe1
0.866
λs:c
λe2
0.842
θεl1

Estimated Parameterc
1.000
θεl2
0.994
θεl3
0.960
θεl4
0.915
θεv1
0.939
θεv2
0.884
θεv3
1.000
θεv4
0.798
θεn1
0.896
θεn2
0.971
θεn3
0.725
θεn4
1.000
θεe1
0.812
θεe2
0.165

Estimated
0.436
0.261
0.648
0.032
0.061
0.042
0.067
0.125
0.103
0.189
0.062
0.522
0.188

Fit Statistics:
Chi-Square Statistic Value
Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom
p-Value of Chi-Square Value
Steiger (1990) RMS Error of Approximation (RMSEA) e
Bentler (1990) Comparative Fit Index
GFIf
AGFIf
RMS Residual

Parameterc
θεe3
θεe4
θεe5
θεe6
θεs1
θεs2
θεs3
θεs4
θεs5
θεaltr
θεinv
θεswc
θεs:c

Estimated
0.109
0.289
0.104
0.130
0.104
0.120
0.098
0.167
0.126
0.381
0.409
0.590
0.077

625
305
.000
.069
.933
.835
.795
.048

COE Indicator" Latent Variable Covariances and Correlations:g
Latent
Latent Variable
Standard
Variable
1
2
3
Reliability Meanb Deviationb
1. ALT
.849 .286* .404* .929
2.54
.86
2. INV
.204 .601 .538* .922
3.80
.78
3. SWC
.366 .410 .968
.941
3.25
.98
───────────────────────
a

Covariances on and below the diagonal, correlations above.
Attenuated values (estimating latent variable means with an interaction creates severe estimation problems- see Jöreskog and Yang 1996)
(attenuated standard deviations are presented for completeness- disattenuated values can be computed from the disattenuated variances shown to
the left).
c
λli = indicators of LOY (Loyalty), etc. (see Table 1 and Figure 2).
d
Maximum likelihood.
e
.05 suggests close fit, .051-.08 suggests acceptable fit (Brown and Cudeck 1993, Jöreskog 1993).
f
Shown for completeness only-- GFI and AGFI may be inadequate for fit assessment in larger models (see Anderson and Gerbing 1984).
g
From Figure 1 Measurement Model.
* t-value > 2.
b

Table 3
FIGURE 2 STRUCTURAL MODEL ESTIMATION RESULTS
Parametera Estimateb Parametera Estimateb Parametera Estimateb
λl1
λl2
λl3
λl4
λv1
λv2
λv3
λv4
λn1
λn2
λn3
λn4
λe1
λe2
λe3
λe4
λe5
λe6
λs1

1.000
0.831
0.808
0.693
0.974
0.864
1.000
0.877
1.000
0.736
0.698
0.877
0.867
0.843
1.000
0.993
0.960
0.916
0.936

λs2
λs3
λs4
λs5
λaltr
λinv
λswc
λs:c
θεl1
θεl2
θεl3
θεl4
θεv1
θεv2
θεv3
θεv4
θεn1
θεn2
θεn3

0.881
1.000
0.795
0.893
1.000
0.711
0.805
0.668
0.164
0.436
0.262
0.649
0.032
0.061
0.042
0.067
0.125
0.103
0.190

θεn4
θεe1
θεe2
θεe3
θεe4
θεe5
θεe6
θεs1
θεs2
θεs3
θεs4
θεs5
θεaltr
θεinv
θεswc
θεs:c
φSAT
φCOE
φSATxCOE

Fit Statistics:
Chi-Squared Statistic Value
Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom
p-Value of Chi-Squared Value
Bentler (1990) Comparative Fit Index
Steiger (1990) RMS Error of Approximation (RMSEA) d
GFIe
AGFIe
RMS Residual

0.061
0.521
0.187
0.109
0.291
0.104
0.129
0.103
0.120
0.098
0.167
0.126
0.260
0.482
0.592
0.081
0.540*
0.510*
0.400*

Parametera

Estimateb t-value

φSAT,COE
φSAT,SATxCOE
φCOE,SATxCOE
ζLOY
ζVOI
ζNEG
ζEX_P
βVOI,LOYc
βNEGL,VOI
βEX_P,VOI
βEX_P,NEG
βLOY,SAT
βLOY,COE
βLOY,SATxCOE
βVOI,SAT
βVOI,COE
βNEG,SAT
βNEG,COE
βEX_P,SAT
βEX_P,COE

0.352*
-0.175*
-0.128*
0.610*
0.153*
0.293*
0.255*
-0.170
-0.413
0.089
0.505
-0.067
0.036
-0.309
0.197
0.001
-0.235
-0.373
-0.334
-0.345

-4.48
-4.02
0.87
6.19
-0.52
0.25
-2.53
3.22
0.01
-2.44
-3.31
-3.72
-2.98

633
310
.000
.933
.068
.833
.797
.045

LOY VOI NEGL EX_P
Squared Multiple Correlation:

.054 .197 .445

.672

───────────────────────
λli = indicators of LOY (Loyalty), etc. (see Table 1 and Figure 2).
Maximum likelihood.
c
βVOI,LOY is the effect of LOY on VOI.
d
.05 suggests close fit, .051-.08 suggests acceptable fit (Brown and Cudeck 1993, Jöreskog 1993).
e
Shown for completeness only-- GFI and AGFI may be inadequate for fit assessment in larger models (see Anderson and Gerbing 1984).
* t-value > 2.
a

b

Table 4
TRIMMEDa FIGURE 2 MODEL STANDARDIZED INDIRECT AND TOTAL EFFECTS (ASSOCIATIONS b c

STANDARDIZED INDIRECT EFFECTS (ASSOCIATIONS)d e:
LOY

VOI

NEGL EX_P

VOI

SAT

COE SATxCOE

.019 -.010
(0.52) (-0.26)

.076
(2.22)

NEGL

.078
(3.05)

-.091
.007 -.019
(-2.49) (0.25) (-1.96)

EX_P

.031 -.099
(2.75) (-3.43)

-.129 -.143 -.007
(-2.79) (-3.15) (-1.88)

STANDARDIZED TOTAL EFFECTS (ASSOCIATIONS)e:
LOY

VOI

NEGL EX_P

LOY

SAT

COE

-.061 .033
(-0.52) (0.26)

SATxCOE
-.243
(-2.52)

VOI

-.312
(-4.47)

. 363 -.030 .076
(3.39) (-0.25) (2.22)

NEGL

.078 -.251
(3.05) (-4.07)

-.327 -.362 -.019
(-3.34) (-3.19) (-1.96)

EX_P

.031 -.099 .396
(2.75) (-3.43) (6.26)

-.394 -.439 -.007
(-4.46) (-4.16) (-1.88)

───────────────────────
a

The Figure 2 structural model was re-estimated with the nonsignificant (NS) VOI-EX_P path fixed at zero. With this path free
the indirect EX_P association with LOY was NS, and the total EX_P associations with LOY and VOI were NS.
b
LOY = Loyalty, COE = Cost-of-Exit, etc. (see Table 1 and Figure 2).
c
The table is read from column to row (e.g., the indirect effect of VOI on EX_P is -.103).
d
Stability Index = .625
e
t-values are shown in parentheses.

Table 5
SATISFACTION (SAT)-COST-OF-EXIT (COE) INTERACTION STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
COE-LOY (Loyalty) Assoc.
SAT-LOY (Loyalty) Assoc.
COE
SE of
SAT
SE of
SAT Coef- COE Coef- tCOE Coef- SAT Coef- tValuea ficient b ficientc
value Valued ficiente ficientf value
1.20
0.95
0.38
2.49 1.83
0.44
0.20
2.16
2
0.70
0.29
2.40
2
0.39
0.19
2.07
3
0.39
0.19
2.03
3
0.08
0.12
0.69
4
0.08
0.14
0.61
3.5 g -0.06
0.12
-0.52
4.16g 0.03
0.13
0.26
4
-0.22
0.15
-1.40
5
-0.22
0.17
-1.26
5
-0.53
0.25
-2.10
SAT-VOI (Voice) (Indirect) Assoc. COE-VOI (Voice) (Indirect) Assoc.
SAT
SE of
COE
SE of
COE Coef- SAT Coef- tSAT Coef- COE Coef- tValued ficienth ficientj
valuej
Valuea ficienti ficientj valuej
1.83
0.12
0.05
2.19
1.20 -0.16
0.06
-2.47
2
0.12
0.05
2.36
2
-0.11
0.05
-1.99
3
0.18
0.05
3.09
3
-0.06
0.06
-1.08
3.5g
0.20
0.06
3.24
4
-0.01
0.07
-0.19
4
0.23
0.07
3.29
4.16 g -0.00
0.07
-0.07
5
0.28
0.08
3.25
5
0.03
0.08
0.45
───────────────────────
a

The values ranged from 1.2 (=low) to 5 in the study.
The coefficient of COE is given by (.036-.309SAT)COE with SAT mean centered.
c
The Standard Error (SE) of the COE coefficient is given by
___________________
_____________________________________________
√Var(bCOE+bSAT*COESAT) = √ (Var(bCOE)+SAT2Var(bSAT*COE)+2SATCov(bCOE,bSAT*COE)
d
The values ranged from 1.83 (=low) to 5 in the study.
e
The coefficient of SAT is given by (-.067-.309COE)SAT with COE mean centered.
f
The Standard Error (SE) of the SAT coefficient is given by
___________________
_____________________________________________
√Var(bSAT+bSAT*COECOE) = √Var(bSAT)+COE2Var(bSAT*COE)+2COECov(bSAT,bSAT*COE)
g
Mean value.
h
The coefficient of SAT is given by (.208+.052COE)SAT with COE mean centered (Table 4shows standardized coefficients).
i
The coefficient of COE is given by (-.005+.052SAT)COE with SAT mean centered (Table 4shows standardized coefficients).
j
Approximate.
b

Figure 1
COST-OF-EXIT (COE) MEASUREMENT MODEL*

COE
γs

ALTR

INV

SWC

λs
1

2

3

4

i1

ε1

ε2

ε3

ε4

εi1

i2

i3

εi2

i4
εi3

sc1
εi4

εsc1

sc2

sc3

sc4

εsc2

εsc3

εsc4

───────────────────────
* ALTR = ALT with i reverse coded to produce positive loadings on ALTR, INV = Investment, etc. (see Table 1).

Figure 2
PROPOSED STRUCTURAL MODEL (Simplified)a

ζ

SATxCOEb
LOY
λs:c
s:c
εs:c

ζ
VOI

SAT
ζ
COEc

NEGL

λs
altr inv swc
εalt

EX_P

ζ

εinv εswc

───────────────────────
a

SAT, LOY, VOI, NEG, EX_P were specified with their respective indicators. SAT, COE (Cost-of-Exit) and SATxCOE were correlated, and the
measurement errors (εs) and structural disturbances (ζ) were uncorrelated.
b
s:c = [(s1+s2+s3+s4+s5)/5][(altr + inv + swc)/3].
c
altr = (1+1+1+1)/4, inv = (i1+i2+i3+i4)/4, swc = (sc1+sc2+sc3+sc4)/4 (i were reverse coded to produce a positive altr loading on COE).

Appendix A Latent Variable Interaction Specification Using a Single Indicator
The following summarizes the seminal paper on these matters, Kenny and Judd (1984), then it summarizes an
alternative technique proposed by Ping (1995) that was used in the present research.
Kenny and Judd (1984) proposed for latent variables X and Z with multiple indicators xi and zj, the interaction XZ
could be specified using all possible product indicators xizj. However, this technique has proven difficult for researchers
to implement (Aiken and West 1991). While LISREL 8 reduces the effort involved using constraint equations, interaction
specification still requires considerable effort (Jöreskog and Yang 1996). In addition, many indicator and dummy
variables result producing large matrices that may create model estimation problems (Ping 1995).
The resulting measurement and structural models for an interaction are per se nonnormal because products of
indicators (i.e., xizj) are nonnormal (Kenny and Judd 1984). While maximum likelihood parameter estimates are robust to
departures from normality (see the citations in Ping 1995), their model fit and significance statistics may not be (Bollen
1989). However model fit and significance statistics may be robust to the addition of a few (nonnormal) product
indicators (i.e., four or fewer) (Jaccard and Wan 1995; Ping 1995).
The Ping (1995) technique is attractive because it requires a single (nonnormal) product indicator for an interaction.
Under the Kenny and Judd (1984) normality assumptions, (i.e., the latent variables X and Z with indicators xi and zj are
independent of the error terms for their indicators εxi and εzj, the error terms are independent of each other, and xi, zj, εxi
and εzj are normally distributed) an interaction can be specified with one indicator that is the product of sums of the
indicators of the linear latent variables. For example the indicator for XZ, comprised of X and Z with indicators x1, x2, z1,
and z2 respectively, would be x:z = (x1+x2)(z1+z2), or, if equivalently sized elements in the resulting covariance matrix are
desired, x:z = [(x1+x2)/2][(z1+z2)/2]. The loading and error variance of x:z are given by
λx:z = ΓXΓZ
(A1
and
θεx:z = ΓX2Var(X)θZ + ΓZ2Var(Z)θX + θXθZ ,
(A2
where λx:z is the loading of x:z on XZ, θεx:z is the variance of the error term (εx:z) for x:z, Var(a) is the variance of a, and
for equivalently sized elements, ΓX = (λx1 + λx2)/2, θX = (Var(εx1) + Var(εx2))/22, ΓZ = (λz1 + λz2)/2, and θZ = (Var(εz1) +
Var(εz2))/22 (see Ping 1995). The loading and error variance of x:z could then be specified subject to the constraint
equations A1 and A2 using LISREL 8.
For example, the loading and error of s:c (= [(s1+s2+s3+s4+s5)/5][(altr + inv + swc)/3], see Figure 2), the single
indicator of SATxCOE are given by
λs:c = ΓSATΓCOE
(A3
and θεs:c = ΓSAT2Var(SAT)θCOE + ΓCOE2Var(COE)θSAT + θSATθCOE ,
(A4
where λs:c is the loading of s:c on SATxCOE, θεs:c is the variance of the error term (εs:c) for s:c, Var(a) is the variance of a,
ΓSAT = (λs1 +...+ λs5)/5, θSAT = (Var(εs1) +...+ Var(εs5))/52, ΓCOE = (alt + inv + swc)/3], and θCOE = (Var(εalt) + Var(εinv) +
Var(εswc))/32.
Each indicator of the independent and dependent variables in the study was centered by subtracting the indicators
average from its value in each case (centering independent variables is important to reduce collinearity, and centering
dependent variables is important to compensate for not estimating intercepts-- see Jöreskog and Yang 1996). The value
for the interactions single-indicator s:c was added to each case. Next the structural model was specified using PAR
variables (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993b:14) and constraint equations (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993b:11) for ΓSAT, ΓCOE
θSAT, and θCOE. Constraint equations (CO statements) were written for equations A3 and A4 using PAR variables,
Var(SAT), and Var(COE)), and the variance of the interaction (= Var(SAT)*Var(COE) + Cov(SAT,COE) 2), then the
structural model was estimated using maximum likelihood. The use of PAR variables in this manner is sensitive to the
sequence and location of the PAR and CO statements in the LISREL program. In general PARs should not be used
recursively (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993b:13). In this application they are used recursively, and appeared at the end of the
program. In addition, the PAR variables and the variables constrained in the CO statements were defined in their natural
numerical order (e.g., PAR(1), PAR(2), etc.), and a PAR variable was used in a CO statement as soon after it was defined
as possible. Starting values for the loading, error and variance terms of the interaction were estimated using a
measurement model involving all the variables except the interaction. The resulting measurement parameters estimates
were substituted into equations A3 and A4 to produce a starting value for λs:c and θεs:c (see Ping 1995). The starting values
for the structural coefficients were estimated using regression.
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VOICE IN BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS:
COST-OF-EXIT AND DEMOGRAPHIC ANTECEDENTS

ABSTRACT
Because voice may play an important role in the maintenance of business-to-business relationships, the
paper investigates its antecedents. After summarizing what is known about voice in an inter-firm context, the
paper proposes that a firm's voice is affected by their cost to exit the relationship, their overall relationship
satisfaction, and demographic variables. These proposals are tested in a field survey, and while satisfaction and
the cost to exit the relationship were stronger predictors of voice than the demographic variables, the results
suggest that several partner firm demographic variables could be useful to relationship managers interested in
the maintenance of business-to-business relationships via partner firm voice cultivation. Because these
demographic variables are less sensitive (i.e., partner firms are likely to provide this information without
insisting on their anonymity), they could be used to identify partner firms by name that are likely to be nonvocal when they are experiencing relationship problems.
INTRODUCTION
Ping (1993) proposed that alternatives to exiting committed business-to-business relationships when there
are relationship problems included loyalty (remaining silent, confident that things will get better), voice
(constructive attempts by the subject to change objectionable relationship conditions), and neglect (allowing
the relationship to deteriorate) (also see Hirschman 1970; Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn 1982). This suggests
that partner firms may or may not use voice when they are experiencing relationship problems. Thus in the
management of important buyer-seller relationships (e.g., JIT relationships, strategic alliances, and other
relationships in which high levels of partner cooperation is desired), voice cultivation and maintenance, and the
identification of nonvocal partner firms (by name) that are experiencing relationship problems, should be
important relationship maintenance tasks. It bears emphasizing that exchange relationship problems are known
to the offended firm but not necessarily to the offending firm (Hirschman 1970). In the absence of their voice
or some other means of identifying them, offended customers remain unidentified, remediation of their
problem(s) is therefore less likely, and the likelihood of their exiting the relationship is increased (Fornell and
Wernerfelt 1987; Hirschman 1970).
Hirschman (1970) proposed that when there are relationship problems, the subject should become more
vocal when overall relationship satisfaction or the cost to exit the relationship is high (e.g., the alternative
relationship is unattractive, or investment in the relationship or switching cost is high). In the single empirical
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article addressing voice in a business-to-business context, Ping (1993) reported that firm voice was increased
by their overall relationship satisfaction and their investment in the relationship. However, the voice
relationship with the attractiveness of the alternative relationship approached positive significance (i.e., as
alternative attractiveness increased voice increased, rather than decreased), and the voice relationship with
switching cost was not significant (also see Rusbult et al. 1982 and Rusbult et al.1988 for similar results).
While loyal firms are believed likely to eventually respond to relationship problems with voice (Hirschman
1970), they should be identified for remediation of any relationship problems because some may simply exit
the relationship when they experience chronic relationship problems (i.e., they may never respond to
relationship problems with voice) (Hirschman 1970). Firms that are neglecting their relationship should also be
identified for problem remediation because they may be taking from their relationship, rather than investing in
it and giving to the relationship in anticipation of future exchanges (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987).
However, the problem of identifying nonvocal partner firms with relationship problems (by name) is not
solved efficiently by assuming all nonvocal firms have problems (the number of nonvocal relationships could
be large-- see page 14). Neither is it solved by conducting partner firm surveys that measure sensitive variables
such as their satisfaction, their cost to exit the relationship, relationship problems, loyalty, neglect, etc. (partner
firms are likely either to not respond to surveys involving variables they deem sensitive unless their anonymity
is assured, or they are likely to provide inaccurate information). As a result, relationship managers cannot
easily separate partner firms without relationship problems from those that are likely to be experiencing
relationship problems because of the sensitivity of the information required to do so.
Objectives and Contribution
Thus the empirical picture of voice as a response to satisfaction and the dimensions of the cost to exit in
business-to-business relationships is murky at best. In addition, business-to-business relationship managers
cannot easily separate nonvocal relationships without relationship problems from those that may have
relationship problems. As a result, an objective of the present research is to help clarify the extant interfirm
voice research. We will argue that the cost to exit an interfirm is appropriately captured in a second-order
concept, cost-of-exit, that has as its indicators" the first order concepts alternative attractiveness, relationship

2

++
investment, and switching cost. We will then show that firm voice is increased by their cost-of-exit, as
Hirschman (1970) maintained.
A second objective of this research is to investigate less sensitive antecedents of voice (i.e., more likely to
be reported by partner firms without insisting on their anonymity) such as partner firm demographic variables
(e.g., partner firm revenue and number of employees). Assuming firms experience relationship problems that
are unknown to their partners, and that it is possible for partners to remediate these problems, these variables
should be useful in relationship maintenance because they have the potential of identifying firms by name that
are likely to be persistently nonvocal when there are relationship problems.
The study contributes to several literatures, including interfirm relationship marketing and marketing
practice. For example, the study fills a gap in the reactions-to-dissatisfaction literature by providing a clearer
understanding of several voice antecedents. The study also contributes to the emerging relationship marketing
literature by identifying demographic antecedents of voice that should be useful in determining individual
partner firms likely to be nonvocal when there are relationship problems. Finally, authors have called for
research such as this on reactions to problems in buyer-seller relationships (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Ping
and Dwyer 1988).
VOICE
Hirschman (1970) pointed out that customer voice and exit alert a firm to its failings. In business-tobusiness relationships voice may also signal the importance the vocal firm attaches to the relationship
(Hirschman 1970). Partner firm voice may also signal that they want remediation of their relationship
problems, they believe this is possible (Hirschman 1970), and they are willing to work to effect this end (Ping
1993). Hirschman (1970) argued that voice should be likely for customers that view the current relationship as
superior to the alternative relationship, and this likelihood should increase as the gap between the alternative
and the current relationship as it was widens.
Not surprisingly authors have recommended that firms should provide mechanisms to increase customer
voice. Hirschman (1970) argued this can be done by reducing the cost and increasing the rewards of voice, and
by raising the cost and reducing opportunities for exit (p. 123) (see also Hirschman 1974, p. 8). Others have
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argued deterministicly that complaints should be encouraged; they can be used to increase market share and
lower the cost of obtaining new customers (see Fornell and Wernerfelt 1987, p. 345).
Voice Research
Voice has been investigated in the interpersonal relationships literature (Rusbult, Johnson and Morrow
1986; Rusbult et al. 1982), and the employment relations literature (Farrell 1983; Rosse and Hulin 1985;
Rusbult et al. 1988; Rusbult and Lowery 1985; Spencer 1986).
Voice has also been investigated in the Marketing literature (Andreasen 1985; Fornell and Didow 1980;
Fornell and Wernerfelt 1987; Fornell and Westbrook 1984; Ping 1993; Singh 1990a, 1990b). For example,
Ping (1993) reported that in channel relationships, firm voice was positively associated with their overall
satisfaction with the relationship and their investment in that relationship. In that study the attractiveness of
their alternative relationship approached positive significance in its association with voice (t=1.92), and their
switching cost was not associated with their voice (t=.59).
The Present Research
Given its potential for relationship maintenance, the voice research streams in other literatures, and the
single study of voice in a business-to-business context, with its unexpected results in light of Hirschman's
(1970) predictions, our empirical knowledge of interfirm voice seems limited. In the balance of the paper we
will argue that the cost to exit an interfirm relationship is a second-order concept that has as its indicators" the
latent variables alternative attractiveness, relationship investment, and switching cost. We will also propose
that this cost-of-exit should be positively associated with voice, as Hirschman (1970) argued. In addition, we
will replicate the positive voice association with satisfaction reported by Ping (1993) and others (see Rusbult et
al. 1982; Rusbult 1988). Further, because relationship managers interested in relationship maintenance have no
predictors of voice that can be used to identify individual partner firms likely to be nonvocal when there are
relationship problems, we will propose several firm demographic variables that should be associated with their
voice, such as partner firm revenue, years with partner, years in business, number of employees, revenue per
employee, competition, and return on investment. Finally we will describe and interpret a field survey of these
antecedents of voice in a retailer-supplier context.
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HYPOTHESES
Cost-of-Exit
Authors have noted that parties remain in an exchange relationship because they either want to, or have to
(see Hirschman 1970; Johnson 1982; Levinger 1979; Ping 1993; Rusbult 1980; Rusbult et al. 1982; Rusbult et
al. 1988). Authors have used the term structural commitment in connection with having to remain in a
relationship, and argued that the dimensions of structural commitment included alternative attractiveness,
investment, and switching cost (see Ping 1993; Johnson 1982; Levinger 1979). This suggests the existence of a
second-order structural commitment construct which we will term cost-of-exit, with indicators" alternative
attractiveness, investment and switching cost.
Jöreskog (1970) introduced the notion of a (confirmatory) second-order construct, which can be
conceptualized as a latent or unobserved variable with no observed variables as indicators (see COST-OFEXIT in Figure 1). Instead, a second-order construct has other latent variables for indicators," hence the term
second-order." Each of these indicator" latent variables has observed variables for indicators, and as a result
these latent variables are termed first-order constructs in this situation (see Gerbing and Anderson 1984a;
Rindskopf and Rose 1988). In particular cost-of-exit should have the indicators" alternative attractiveness,
investment and switching cost, which in turn have their respective observed indicators.
Hirschman (1970) argued that voice should substitute for exiting when the cost of exiting a relationship is
high. He and others (see Rosse 1988) have proposed that subjects should choose the least costly option in
response to relationship problems. When the cost of exiting is high (i.e., the subject firm lacks an attractive
alternative, and there are high relationship investment and switching cost), a less costly reaction to relationship
problems such as voice should appear more attractive than exit. High levels of cost-of-exit should make
economic exchanges with the partner firm more valuable (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Frazier 1983; Thibaut
and Kelley 1959). As a result, cost-of-exit should make the firm less likely to be passive when there are
relationship problems, and it should increase voice because there is much to lose if the unresolved problems
lead to relationship dissolution.
In summary,
H1a: Cost-of-exit is a second order construct with indicators" alternative attractiveness, investment and
switching cost,
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and
H1b: Increasing cost-of-exit fosters an increased likelihood of voice.
Satisfaction
In business-to-business relationships, overall relationship satisfaction should also make an exchange
relationship more valuable, and thereby increase the likelihood of voice when there are relationship problems.
To explain, Ping (1993) proposed the existence of two types of satisfaction in interfirm relationships, event and
overall satisfaction. He maintained that, while it is dissatisfaction with a relationship event that triggers a
reaction, it is the level of overall relationship satisfaction that determines which reaction will be emitted (e.g.,
exit, voice, etc.). He proposed that increases in the level of overall satisfaction with the exchange relationship
should also make economic exchanges with the partner firm more valuable (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987;
Frazier 1983; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). As overall relationship satisfaction increases, the firm should respond
positively to relationship problems by preferring to work with the partner firms to resolve problems (voice)
(Hirschman 1970, Rosse and Hulin 1985, Rusbult et al. 1982, Rusbult et al. 1988), to help preserve the
relationship. Thus, we hypothesize that,
H2: As satisfaction increases voice is more likely.
Revenue
Besides variables such as overall satisfaction and cost-of-exit, firm and relationship demographic variables
should also be associated with voice. In particular the revenue a firm derives from economic exchanges with its
partner firm should make economic exchanges with this partner firm more valuable (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh
1987; Frazier 1983; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). As their revenue increases, the firm should respond positively
to relationship problems by preferring to work with the partner firms to resolve problems (voice) and thereby
help ensure their future revenue because there is much to lose if unresolved relationship problems lead to
relationship termination. Hence we hypothesize that,
H3: Increasing revenue makes voice more likely.
Competition
The number of competitors in a firm's market is plausibly related to that firm's revenues and return on
investment. Economic theory predicts that in maturing markets, as the number of competitors increases, each
competitor's revenue and return on investment should decrease (Chamberlin 1933).
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In addition, because we have also proposed that revenue and return on investment are likely to increase
voice, the effect of competitors should indirectly affect voice. In particular, the number of competitors should
negatively affect voice via revenue and return on investment. Thus, we hypothesize that,
H4a: An increase in the number of competitors promotes lower revenue and return on investment,
and
H4b: An increase in the number of competitors indirectly produces a decreased likelihood of voice.
ROI and Revenue per Employee
In interviews conducted with a convenient sample of distributors and retailers regarding their business-tobusiness relationships we noticed that several firms were quick to bring relationship problems to the attention
of their exchange partner. Many of these firms also focused on efficiency in their business, and were very
aware of productivity measures such as revenue per employee and return on investment (see Ingene 1982). For
these reasons, we expected that more productive firms would be more inclined to use voice when there were
problems in the exchange relationship. As a result,
H5: With increasing return on investment and revenue per employee voice becomes more likely.
Number of Employees
In the interviews we also noticed that firms with many employees were more involved with their primary
business-to-business partner firm, and were more likely to be vocal when there were relationship problems.
This result is predicted by perspective theory (Ostrom and Upshaw 1968), which proposes that subjects should
be influenced to be more extreme in their opinions when the range or perspective (Upshaw 1969) of opinions
to which they are exposed is wide (see Ostrom 1970). With many employees, higher cost responses to
relationship problems (than doing nothing) such as voice and exit should be more likely to be discussed, and
the likelihood of a voice or exit response to relationship problems should therefore be increased. However
because voice is less costly than exit and has a probabilistic reward (Kahneman and Teversky 1979), it should
be more likely than exit. For this reason, we anticipated that the number of employees should positively affect
voice, and firms with many employees would be more inclined to exercise the voice option when there were
problems in the exchange relationship. Formally,
H6: An increase in the number of retailer employees makes voice more likely.
Years in Business
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Voice should also be affected by how long the firm has been in business. Firms that have been in business
for many years should be more knowledgeable of alternative exchange partners, and more experienced in
dealing with the category of firms represented by their exchange partner (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987).
Because this knowledge may be a source of countervailing power (Dwyer 1980), these firms should be less
dependent on their exchange partner (Emerson 1962). This in turn should make them more willing to change
exchange partners, and therefore less willing to expend the effort involved in using voice (Hirschman 1970).
As a result,
H7: As the number of years the firm has been in business increases voice is less likely.
Years with Partner
On the other hand, the length of time the firm has done business with an exchange partner should make
future business together likely. In long-lived economic exchange relationships, relationship specific
investments should have increased, commitment should have grown, and there should be a pressure to adjust
rather than dissolve the exchange relationship (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Macneil 1980), which should
increase the likelihood of voice. Formally,
H8: As the number of years the firm has done business with their exchange partner increases voice
becomes more likely.
These associations are summarized in Figure 1. The balance of this article presents the results of a test of
these associations involving hardware retailers and their primary wholesalers.
MEASURES
Voice, satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, investment, and switching cost were measured using the
balanced five-point Likert measures developed by Ping (1993). The conceptual and operational definitions plus
sample items from the scales for these variables are shown in Table 1.
The firm and relationship demographic variables in the study were measured primarily with open-ended
questions. For example retailer revenue was measured with an item asking for the retailer's prior year revenue
(see Table 1). Revenue per employee for each retailer was computed by dividing their revenue by the number
of their employees, and return on investment was measured using a forced choice scale. Table 1 also shows
these measures.
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SAMPLE
The study population was U. S. hardware retailers. The sampling frame chosen for this population was the
subscription list of a popular hardware retailing trade publication that was representative of the study
population. The key informant within the hardware retailer sampling unit was the store owner, manager or
executive. Although Phillips (1981) has cautioned against using single informants in general, the interviews
indicated hardware retailers typically buy from one primary wholesaler, and senior key informants were very
knowledgeable of that relationship. In addition, their sentiments and perceptions were strongly mirrored by the
other informants in the firm.
The pre-test and final test samples were selected using systematic random (n-th name) sampling and
resulted in one hundred pretest retailer addresses, and six hundred final test addresses. The survey
questionnaire was mailed to these pretest and final test samples, and three post card follow-ups in the final test
produced two hundred four usable questionnaires (34%).
RESULTS
Reliability and Validity
The psychometric properties of the latent variable measures were examined using the final test responses
and coefficient alpha calculations, ordered similarity coefficients (Hunter 1973), multiple group analysis
(Anderson, Gerbing and Hunter 1987), and single factor analysis (Jöreskog 1993). The final test measures were
judged to be unidimensional, and internally and externally consistent. For example, they displayed latent
variable reliabilities greater than .80, and average extracted variances of .58 or above (Fornell and Larker
1981) (see Tables 2 and 3).
The measures for the latent variables were judged to be content valid. In addition, the Average Variance
Extracted for the latent variables suggested convergent and discriminant validity for these measures (Fornell
and Larker 1981) (see Tables 2 and 3). The latent variables also were judged to be construct valid; they were
significantly and plausibly correlated with at least one other study variable (see Table 3).
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Measurement and Structural Model Results
The measurement and structural models corresponding to Figure 1 were estimated using LISREL 8 and
maximum likelihood estimation. These measurement and structural models appeared to fit the data, based on
the Comparative Fit Index (Bentler 1990) and the Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (Steiger 1990)
(see Tables 3 and 4). In addition, the second-order measurement model for cost-of-exit appeared to fit the data
based on the same criteria (see Table 2).
Hypotheses Tests
The study hypotheses received mixed support (see Table 4). The cost-of-exit hypotheses, the hypothesized
voice relationships with satisfaction and number of employees, and the indirect revenue-voice effect were as
hypothesized. However, the revenue-voice effect, the number of competitors-revenue effect, and the number of
competitors-voice effect were significant but opposite in sign from that which was hypothesized; and the
balance of the hypothesized effects were not significant.
In particular, the number of competitors positively affected revenue, instead of negatively. As a result
revenue negatively affected voice rather than positively.
DISCUSSION
Cost-of-Exit
Retailers with a high perceived cost to exit the incumbent wholesaler relationship were also likely to use
voice when there were relationship problems. The direct cost-of-exit effect on voice was almost the same as the
satisfaction-voice effect in this context (see Table 4). This suggests that satisfaction and cost-of-exit may play
equal roles in encouraging voice in the study context (however see the total effect of cost-of-exit in the next
paragraph).
Alternative Attractiveness, Investment and Switching Cost
In previous research alternative attractiveness, investment and switching cost have been specified as
directly affecting voice (see Ping 1993; Rusbult et al. 1982; Rusbult et al. 1988). Unfortunately a
respecification of the Figure 1 model that included the Figure 1 paths plus paths to voice from alternative
attractiveness, investment, and switching cost was not identified. However, the results from a respecification of
Figure 1 that added a single path to voice from alternative attractiveness (not reported) suggested that
alternative attractiveness positively affected voice (t = 2.37), which is consistent with prior research (see Ping
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1993; Rusbult et al. 1982; Rusbult et al. 1988). Nevertheless, Hirschman (1970) argued that those with
diminished alternatives were likely to use voice (p. 52 and 53), as previously mentioned. To explain these
apparently inconsistent results, decreased alternative attractiveness may have increased the subject firms'
perception of dependence on their partner firm (Emerson 1962), and increased their perception that there
would be more to lose by complaining than there would be to gain. However reduced alternative attractiveness
was also likely to have been the result of increased cost-of-exit, and increased cost-of-exit was likely to
increase voice. The resulting total effect of cost-of-exit (i.e., the positive direct effect of cost-of-exit on voice
plus the negative indirect cost-of-exit effect via alternative attractiveness) was positive and significant (see the
next paragraph), which suggests that although alternative attractiveness and cost-of-exit appear to affect voice
in opposite directions, decreased alternative attractiveness because of increased cost-of-exit was likely to
increase voice.
Parenthetically, the standardized total effect of cost-of-exit on voice was smaller than the standardized
satisfaction-voice effect (γVOI,SAT = .28, TotalγVOI,COE = .18). While the direct effects of satisfaction and cost-ofexit were similar (see Table 4), this suggests that satisfaction may have a larger overall effect on voice than
cost-of-exit. In addition, using the single path specification approach just described, voice was not directly
associated with investment or switching cost (not reported).
Number of Retailer Employees
Retailers with more employees were also more likely to use voice. As discussed previously this result could
be explained by perspective theory, which predicts that when the range of opinions to which they are exposed
is wide, subjects should be more extreme in their opinions. For firms with many employees, higher cost
responses to relationship problems (than doing nothing) such as voice and exit may have been discussed, and,
because voice is less costly than exit and has a probabilistic reward, voice responses may have been the result.
Retailer Revenue
Retailers with higher revenue were also more likely to use voice. It is plausible that higher revenue retailers
were more valuable to wholesalers in the study. As a result, these retailers may have received more unsolicited
consideration and attention, and experienced better problem resolution efforts, and they may not have needed
to resort to voice often.
Number of Competitive Stores
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The number of competitive stores positively affected revenue. One explanation for this result might be that
increased competition may have increased the level of promotion in the study retailers' service areas. This in
turn may have increased primary demand for hardware in these service areas. This could have lead to increased
revenue for all the retailers in these areas, and in particular the study retailers. However, it is also plausible that
in competitive markets, only the larger hardware retailers may have survived.
Combining the paths between the number of competitive stores and voice (the competitive stores-revenuevoice path) produced the hypothesized indirect negative effect on voice. This indirect effect of the number of
competitive stores on voice was significant, and suggests that as the number of competitive stores increased,
voice declined. As we have already speculated, an explanation for this result could be that competitive markets
contain larger retailers, and these larger retailers may have been less likely to use voice.
Years with the Wholesaler
Years with the wholesaler was positively correlated with satisfaction and cost-of-exit. This suggests that
long-lived wholesaler-retailer relationships were associated with increased satisfaction and higher cost-of-exit
as Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) and others predict. Because satisfied firms and those with high cost-of-exit in
turn were likely to be more vocal, this implies that years with the wholesaler was positively (but indirectly)
associated with voice. This in turn suggests that longer-lived retailer-wholesaler relationships were associated
with higher levels of voice via satisfaction and cost-of-exit. However because this relationship involves
correlations, it is not the case that longer-lived relationships (indirectly) make voice more likely, only that they
somehow positively covary.
IMPLICATIONS
While generalizing from a single study is risky, assuming the cultivation of voice is as desirable as it
appears, the study results suggest that wholesalers interested in relationship maintenance may want to maintain
or increase retailer satisfaction and retailer cost-of-exit, and encourage voice from their newer retailer
relationships, retailers with higher revenue, and retailers with fewer employees. These retailers were either less
likely to use voice, or they were associated with reduced voice in the study.
Satisfaction
Overall satisfaction had the largest overall effect on voice in the study. For relationship managers
interested in relationship maintenance who may prefer to concentrate on only a few relationship factors, overall
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satisfaction maintenance and its improvement may be the best defensive strategy to cultivate retailer voice.
In addition, it is likely that favorable resolution of relationship problems would increase the overall
satisfaction of the retailers involved (Fornell and Wernerfelt 1987, Frazier 1983, Thibaut and Kelly 1959), and
in turn should increase the likelihood of their voice in the future (see Ping 1993). This plausible circle of
overall satisfaction, problem recognition, voice, problem resolution, and increased overall satisfaction may also
reduce relationship neglect and exiting (Ping 1993), and should help strengthen the relationship (Dwyer,
Schurr and Oh 1987; Frazier 1983).
Cost-of-Exit
The study results suggest that increasing retailer cost-of-exit is likely to increase their voice. While the
direct effect of cost-of-exit on voice was equivalent to that of satisfaction, its total effect was less than
satisfaction because alternative attractiveness positively affected voice. Nevertheless, wholesalers interested in
relationship maintenance may wish to increase retailer cost-of-exit to help stimulate retailer voice. Wholesalersponsored proposals that increase mobility barriers, such as retailer investment in such areas as employee
training, and switching costs, such as contracts and pledges (Anderson and Weitz 1992), and incentives such as
cumulative discounts (i.e., discounts calculated on year-to-date orders), may produce the additional benefit of
increasing retailer voice.
Encouraging Voice
Recalling Ping's (1993) remarks regarding satisfaction with a relationship event versus overall relationship
satisfaction, increased overall retailer satisfaction may be accomplished one event at a time, and to increase
overall relationship satisfaction, the percentage of satisfactory relationship events should be increased so that it
is noticed by the retailer. To increase retailer cost-of-exit in the study context, alternative attractiveness could
be manipulated by for example publicity involving the return of unhappy defectors (as AT&T is currently
doing), additional retailer investments in the relationship could be actively merchandized, and switching costs
could be increased with cumulative discounts for example.
Authors have also suggested directly soliciting complaints and working to resolve them (e.g., providing
800 numbers, and quick and competent complaint processing) (Hirschman 1970, 1974; Fornell and Wernerfelt
1987). Further, authors have argued that voice is affected by the expectation of the success of voice, the
advantage to be gained by using voice (i.e., the costs versus the benefits to the subject), the importance of the
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relationship to the subject firm, and voice response style (e.g., no response to an irate response-- see Singh
1990b). For these reasons, wholesalers interested in relationship maintenance may wish to consider additional
means of increasing retailer voice such as publicizing successful retailer outcomes resulting from their use of
voice, and having wholesaler sales reps actively solicit retailer voice in retailing firms that might be likely to be
persistently non-vocal (i.e., newer relationships, retailers in competitive areas, and those with higher revenue or
fewer employees) (For example in subsequent contact with the interview firms, one supplier had assumed that
all non-vocal customers had relationship problems by instructing sales reps to solicit relationship problems
from all nonvocal customers. Because most of their customers were non-vocal, we suggested they experiment
with encouraging voice in their newer customers, and customers in competitive markets, with higher revenue,
or fewer employees. Some of the ideas resulting from their internal contest to identify voice generating ideas
included supplier executives visiting customer executives to identify and solicit relationship problems,
customer-council board meetings at non-vocal customer locations with an invitation to the non-vocal customer
host to participate in the board meetings, and lotteries involving problems submitted by nonvocal customers).
FUTURE RESEARCH
Much work remains to be done in understanding voice. The squared multiple correlation (R2= .27) for
voice observed in this study suggests that it has other antecedents in the study context. As previously
mentioned Hirschman (1970) argued that voice should be affected by the expectation of the success of voice,
the advantage to be gained by using voice (see Banfield 1961, Singh 1990a), the importance of the relationship
to the subject firm, and the availability of mechanisms to communicate complaints inexpensively and
effectively should increase voice.
There may also be other firm demographic variables that are related to their voice (see Pfeffer 1983 for a
summary of organizational demographic variables). Hirschman (1970) also argued that industry structure
should affect voice (we thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this plausible antecedent of voice).
Specifically he proposed that in what he termed loose monopolies there should be little voice. Andreasen
(1985) characterized loose monopolies as industries in which a near-monopoly exists, and he proposed that
physicians, for example, are a loose monopoly. Based on Hirschman's (1970) argument, it is plausible that
industry structure is also an antecedent of voice.
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Table 1
MEASURE SUMMARY
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Construct
Voice
(VOI)

Conceptual Definition
Operational Definition
Constructive attempts
Intention to notify constructo change objectiontively and work with the
able relationship
primary wholesaler to solve
conditions. relationship problems.

Items
4

Sample Item
I will try to discuss any primary-wholesaler
related problems with them.

Satisfaction
(SAT)

Global evaluation of
relationship fulfillment.

Belief that the relationship
is satisfactory.

5

All in all, my relationship with my
primary wholesaler is very satisfactory.

Alternative
Attractiveness
(ALT)

Global evaluation of the
relationship fulfillment
available in the best
available alternative
relationship.

Satisfaction believed to be
available in the best
alternative relationship.

4

Overall the alternative wholesaler
would be a much better company to do
business with than the current wholesaler.

Investment
(INV)

Cost to build and maintain the current relationship in anticipation of
future exchanges.

Magnitude of the cost that
went into building and maintaining the current
relationship.

4*

A lot of energy, time and effort have
gone into building and maintaining the
relationship with the current wholesaler.

Switching
Cost
(SWC)

Costs to change to an
alternative relationship.

Cost and loss required to terminate the current relationship
and secure an alternative
relationship.

4

Generally speaking the costs in time,
money, effort and grief to switch
primary wholesalers would be high.

Years with
Wholesaler
(YRS)

Number of years
the retailer has
done business
with the supplier.

How many years have you
done business with your
primary wholesaler?

1

Years in
Business
(OPN)

Number of years
the retailer has
been in business.

How many years has your
store been open?

1

Employees
(EMP)

Retailer's number
of employees.

The number of employees
at your store?

1

Revenue
(REV)

Retailer's revenue.

Your last year's sales?

Competitors
(CMP)

Number of competitive
stores in retailer's
service area.

The number of competing
stores in your service area?

1

ROI

Retailer return on
investment.

Last year's return on investment
was (circle one)
a. negative
b. 0-4 percent
:
j. 50 percent or more

1

Revenue/ Revenue per employee.
Employee
(R/E)

1

Revenue divided by number
of employees.

_____
* The uniqueness item in Ping's (1993) scale was deleted to attain internal consistency. The deletion was based on an examination of the fit statistics available
in a single factor analysis, and content validity. The deletion substantially improved internal consistency, and did not appear to impair content validity.
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Table 2
COST-OF-EXIT MEASUREMENT MODEL RESULTS
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Parameter Estimatea
λa1
0.92
λa2
0.90
λa3
1.00
λa4
0.77
λi1
0.85
λi2
0.94
λi3
1.00
λi4
0.94
λsc1
0.89
λsc2
0.97

Parameterb Estimatea Parameter
λsc3 0.96
εi2
0.12
λsc4 1.00
εi3
0.08
γALT,COE
-0.61*
εi4
γINV,COE
0.89
εsc1
γSCT,COE
0.86
εsc2
εa1
0.27
εsc3
εa2
0.24
εsc4
εa3
0.07
ζALT
εa4
0.24
ζINV
εi1
0.45
ζSCT
φCOE

Fit Indicesa:
Chi-Square Statistic Value
Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom
p-Value of Chi-Square Value
Bentler (1990) Comparative Fit Indexc
GFI
AGFI
Steiger (1990) RMS Error of Approximation (RMSEA)d
p-value RMSEA < .05

Estimatea

0.12
0.29
0.20
0.17
0.20
0.67
0.23
0.48
1.00

143
57
.00
.96
.90
.86
.08
.00

Average Variance Extracted

.58

Latent Variable Reliability

.80

───────────────────────
a Maximum likelihood.
b COE = Cost-of-Exit, etc. (see the definitions in Table 1).
c .90 or better indicates acceptable model-to-data fit (see McClelland and Judd 1993).
d Values up through .08 indicate acceptable model-to-data fit (Brown and Cudeck 1993, Jöreskog
1993).
* While it is customary to reverse code an indicator that loads negatively on a concept (see for
example Dwyer and Oh 1987), it is not required.
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Table 3
MEASUREMENT MODEL ESTIMATION RESULTS a
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Latent Variable Covariancesb c (φ's):
Latent
Variable

1

1. Satisfaction
.51*
d
2. Alt. Attract.
d
3. Investment
d
4. Switching Cost
5. Voice
.09
6. Years With
.98
7. Open
1.29
8. Employees
.23
9. Revenue
-.09
10. Competitors -.08
11. ROI
-.16
12. Revenue/
.19
Employee
13. Cost-of-Exit .45

2

3

4

Latent Variable
6
7

5

8

9

10

11

12

(not specified) .30* .11
.06
.02
-.00
-.00 -.08
.04
d
.85* d
d
.60* d
(not specified)
d
d
.96*
.18* -.00
.00
.10
-.07
-.04 -.01 -.06
-.02 148.09*
.40*
.09
.09
.14* .00
.01
.03 132.40 726.83*
.06
.06
.05 -.01 -.06
.61 14.81 24.03 173.58*
.51*
.39* -.02
.00
(not specified) -.50 19.22 26.99 109.41 263.81*
.19* .01 -.07
-.22 22.11 18.47 65.51 40.44 157.25* -.00
.05
-.01
.05 -1.16
-.80
.80
-.19 6.57* -.01
-.19
1.04 -11.94
.00 -8.61
4.79 -.17 48.01*
(not specified)

.15

2.51

-2.38

Fit Indicesc:
Chi-Squared Statistic Value
Chi-Squared Degrees of Freedom
p-Value of Chi-Squared Value
Bentler (1990) Comparative Fit Indexe
GFIf
AGFIf
Steiger (1990) RMS Error of Approximation (RMSEA)g
p-value RMSEA < .05

3.00

.89

-1.70 -.40

13
.59*
d
d
d

.33*
.20*
-.08
.22*
.05
-.13
-.15*
.02

.16 1.00

485
309
.00
.96
.86
.82
.05
.47

Average Variance Extracted:
1
Average Variance Extracted

.77

Variables
2
3
4
.77

.74

5

.80

.75

Variables
3
4

5

Latent Variable Reliabilities:

Latent Variable Reliabilities

1

2

.94

.93

.92

.94

.93

────────────────────────────
a See Table 4 for the loadings and error variances.
b Covariances on and below the diagonal, correlations above.
c Maximum likelihood.
d Not specified.
e .90 or better indicates acceptable model-to-data fit (see McClelland and Judd 1993).
f Shown for completeness only-- GFI and AGFI may be inadequate for fit assessment in larger models (see Anderson and
Gerbing 1984).
g Values up through .08 indicate acceptable model-to-data fit (Brown and Cudeck 1993, Jöreskog 1993).
* t-value greater than 2.
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Table 4
STRUCTURAL MODEL ESTIMATION RESULTS a
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Parameter Estimate Parameterb Estimate Parameterb
λs1
λs2
λs3
λs4
λs5
λa1
λa2
λa3
λa4
λi1
λi2
λi3
λi4
λsc1
λsc2
λsc3
λsc4
λv1
λv2
λv3

0.79
0.88
1.00
0.88
0.93
0.92
0.90
1.00
0.78
0.85
0.94
1.00
0.93
0.89
0.97
0.95
1.00
0.86
0.97
0.88

λv4
1.00
γALT,COE -0.61
γINV,COE 0.89
γSCT,COE 0.86
εs1
0.16
εs2
0.13
εs3
0.10
εs4
0.11
εs5
0.10
εa1
0.26
εa2
0.24
εa3
0.07
εa4
0.24
εi1
0.45
εi2
0.12
εi3
0.08
εi4
0.12
εsc1
0.29
εsc2
0.21
εsc3
0.17

εsc4
εv1
εv2
εv3
εv4
φ's
ζVOI
ζREV
ζROI
γVOI,SAT
γVOI,COE
γVOI,YRS
γVOI,EMP
γVOI,OPN
βVOI,REV
βVOI, ROI
γVOI,R/E
γREV,CMP
γROI,CMP

Estimatec t-value
0.21
0.06
0.03
0.06
0.04
d

0.15
253.40
6.57
0.28
0.31
-0.05
0.15
0.02
-0.14
0.04
-0.09
0.19
-0.00

3.26
2.58
-0.79
2.37
0.38
-2.43
0.70
-1.49
3.02
-0.08

Fit Indices
Chi-Square Statistic Value
Chi-Squared Degrees of Freedom
p-Value of Chi-Square Value
Bentler (1990) Comparative Fit Indexe
GFIf
AGFIf
Steiger (1990) RMS Error of Approximation (RMSEA)g
p-value RMSEA < .05

546
328
.00
.95
.85
.82
.05
.13

Squared Multiple Correlation for VOI

.27

───────────────────────
a Maximum likelihood.
b COE = Cost-of-Exit, etc. (see the definitions in Table 1).
c Structural coefficients (e.g., γ's and β's) are standardized.
d See the Table 3 values.
e .90 or better indicates acceptable model-to-data fit (see McClelland and Judd 1993).
f Shown for completeness only-- GFI and AGFI may be inadequate for fit assessment in larger models (see Anderson
and Gerbing 1984).
g Values up through .08 indicate acceptable fit (Brown and Cudeck 1993, Jöreskog 1993).
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Figure 1
STRUCTURAL MODEL*

SAT
saj
m,n

saj (j=1,5)
saj (j=1,5)

COST-OF-EXIT
•,COST-OF-EXIT
ALT
aj
aj (j=1,4)

VOI,•

aj (j=1,4)
VOI

INV
ij
ij (j=1,4)

VOI

ij (j=1,4)

vj
vj (j=1,4)
vj (j=1,4)

SWC
scj
scj (j=1,4)
scj (j=1,4)
YRS
OPN
EMP
R/E
REV
REV
REV,CMP VOI,•
CMP
ROI,CMP
ROI
ROI

__________
* SAT = Satisfaction, etc. (see the definitions in Table 1).
The demographic variables (e.g., REV) have =1 and =0.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Because voice (attempts to change rather than escape from objectionable relationship conditions) may
play an important role in relationship maintenance, the paper investigated antecedents of interfirm voice,
including the cost to exit the relationship, overall relationship satisfaction, and firm demographic variables.
After summarizing what is known about interfirm voice, including the confusing empirical results
involving voice (e.g., alternative attractiveness typically has had a positive association with voice, rather
than negative as theory predicts), the paper proposes that a firm’s voice is affected by their cost to exit (a
second-order latent variable, with the latent variable “indicators” alternative attractiveness, relationship
investment, and switching cost), plus their overall relationship satisfaction and firm demographic variables
(e.g., their revenue and number of employees). These proposals are tested in a field survey of hardware
retailer voice involving their primary wholesalers. Using structural equation analysis, the results provide
support for the proposed voice associations with satisfaction, cost to exit, and several firm demographic
variables. The results suggest a firm’s voice was likely to be increased by their overall relationship
satisfaction and cost to exit; newer customers, and subject firms with many competitors, higher revenue, or
few employees, were either less likely to be vocal, or associated with reduced voice in the study context.
Further, the results suggested that because voice may reduce relationship exit, interfirm relationship
managers interested in relationship maintenance may wish to increase partner firm voice by increasing
their satisfaction and their cost-of-exit.
The results also suggested that several firm demographic variables might be useful to relationship managers
interested in the maintenance of important relationships. Relationship problems are known to the offended firm
but not necessarily to the offending firm. In absence of their voice or some other means of identifying them,
offended firms are likely to remain unidentified, remediation of their problem(s) is therefore less likely, and the
likelihood of their exiting the relationship is increased. Hence relationship managers interested in relationship
maintenance may wish to use several firm demographic variables to identify individual firms by name that may
be likely to be persistently non-vocal when there are interfirm relationship problems (newer relationships, and
partner firms with many competitors, higher revenue, or comparatively few employees were associated with the
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reduced voice in the study).
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Some Uninvestigated Antecedents of Retailer Exit Intention
Abstract
The article reports a study of the effects on exit intention of
retailer revenue and productivity, in a wholesaler-retailer context.
The study involved hardware retailers and their primary wholesalers,
and some associations were hypothesized to be nonrecursive (bidirectional). The analysis involved structural equations, and the results
included that the retailer's intention to exit the relationship with
their primary wholesaler was negatively affected by retailer revenue,
revenue-per-employee, and the number of competitive stores in the
retailer's service area. In addition, the retailer's exit intention was
positively affected by return on investment. Finally, the number of
competitive stores was positively associated with retailer revenue, and
negatively associated with their return on investment. These results
and their implications are discussed.

In addition to recognizing the existence of long term buyer seller
relationships in channel relationships (Arndt 1979, Wind 1970) (see
Dwyer,

Schurr

and

Oh

1987;

and

Ford

1980),

researchers

and

practitioners have recognized the benefits of these relationships (see
Frazier, Spekman, O'Neil 1988; Turnbull and Valla 1986; and Webster
1979). Despite implications that the development and maintenance of
long term relationships is a recent phenomenon, (see Business Week
1987),

these

relationships

have

existed

for

years,

especially

in

retailing: a hardware retailer reported to the authors that they have
done business with their primary wholesaler for 76 years.
Yet these relationships are terminated. Except for coverage of the
legal aspects of these relationship terminations (see "Legal Developments in Marketing," in the Journal of Marketing), however, there is
little

empirical

relationships.

knowledge

of

the

termination

of

these

channel

There has been a trickle of articles lately that addresses channel
relationship termination (e.g., Ping and Dwyer 1991, and Ping 1993).
These articles reported investigations of response intentions such as
intention

to

exit

a

channel

relationship.

They

also

investigated

antecedents of these response intentions such as overall relationship
satisfaction, the attractiveness of alternative exchange relationships,
the

perceived

magnitude

of

relationship-specific

investments,

and

switching costs. While the explanatory power of some of these variables
was impressive, the absence of traditional economic variables such as
revenue and return on investment is noteworthy.
That these variables are important in the evaluation of a channel
relationship is hardly news to practitioners. In fact, some channel
texts go to considerable lengths to discuss the use of these variables
to evaluate the channel relationship (e.g., Stern and El-Ansary 1988;
and Stern, El-Ansary and Brown 1989). However, our knowledge of how
well these variables are tied to the actual termination of channel
relationships is limited to anecdotal reports.
The
channel

purpose

of

relationship

this

study

termination

is

to

by

expand

focusing

our

understanding

on

several

of

economic

antecedents of exit intention. The research fills a gap in the channel
reactions-to-dissatisfaction

literature,

and

extends

Ping's

(1993)

findings by providing a broader understanding of the antecedents of
exit intention. It also provides empirical support for the economic
view of long term buyer-seller relationships proposed in Stern and
Reve's

(1980)

political-economic

framework,

as

a

companion

to

the

psycho social view of these relationships (Ping 1993; Dwyer, Schurr and
Oh

1987).

relationship

After

briefly

termination,

summarizing
the

paper

the

research

proposes

that

on

channel

revenue

and

productivity measures such as return on investment are antecedents of
exit intention. The results of a test this proposal using a field

survey

of

retailers

is

reported,

and

managerial

implications

are

discussed.
We

begin

with

a

summary

of

the

research

related

to

channel

relationship termination.
Background
The marketing channel literature has addressed channel relationship

termination

argued

that

consists

of

the

in

several

process

awareness,

articles.

of

Dwyer,

buyer-seller

exploration,

Schurr

and

relationship

expansion,

Oh

(1987)

development

commitment,

and

dissolution phases (see also Ford 1980). In their description of the
dissolution phase of the relationship, they offered as a framework for
the process of terminating an interfirm relationship, Duck's (1982)
process of interpersonal relationship dissolution. Duck argued that
individuals progress through four broad stages on the way to personal
relationship

termination:

intrapsychic,

dyadic,

social,

and

grave

dressing stages.
Ping and Dwyer (1991) subsequently proposed that the committed and
dissolution phases of buyer-seller relationship formation consist of
stages. They argued that firms progress through seven stages on the way
to channel relationship termination: positive or negative affect stages
regarding the partner firm; intrapersonal and intracompany stages; then
intercompany, public and aftermath stages.
Ping (1993) studied the antecedents of responses to problems in
channel

relationships,

satisfaction,

including

alternative

exit

intention.

attractiveness,

He

investments,

argued
and

that

switching

costs were associated with exit intention. He reported that satisfaction

and

the

unattractiveness

of

the

alternative

relationship

were

negatively associated with exit intention, and that investments and
switching costs were not associated with exit intention.

The

resulting

picture

of

channel

relationship

termination

is

cloudy at best. We talked to firms that were contemplating or had
recently

completed

channel

terminations.1

relationship

In

these

conversations we consistently heard that economic variables such as
revenue and revenue-per-employee were important. They were either a
deciding

or

justifying

factor

in

switching

to

a

new

supplier,

or

demoting a major supplier and giving more business to a minor supplier.
We propose that economic variables such as revenue, return on
investment, and revenue-per-employee also affect exit intention. The
balance of the paper describes a field survey that tests this proposition.
Hypotheses
In addition to latent variables such as satisfaction, economic
variables such as revenue should be associated with exit intention in a
channel relationship. Ping (1993) argued that increases in a firm's
overall satisfaction should make economic exchanges with its partner
firm

perceptually

similar

effect

on

more
the

valuable.

The

relationship

firm's
with

its

revenue

should

exchange

have

partner.

a
As

satisfaction and revenue increase, the firm should be disinclined to
exit a relationship from which these are derived, because there is much
to lose. Thus,
H1: Satisfaction and revenue are negatively associated with exit
intention.

1

The six companies interviewed represented a convenient sample in
a geographically localized area. They had estimated gross revenues of
three million to eighty million dollars, and represented distributors
and retailers in diverse markets such as tires, hardware, and
electrical supplies. We contacted at least one key informant in each
company who was responsible for one or more "up-channel" or "downchannel" relationships, and was directly involved in the target
relationship termination. These informants had various titles including
president, owner, and general manager.

Previous

studies

lend

some

support

to

these

assertions.

Ping

(1993) observed that satisfaction was negatively associated with exit
intention. In romantic relationships, Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn (1982)
reported

that

prior

satisfaction

was

negatively

associated

with

exiting. Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers, and Mainous (1988) reported similar
findings in the employment relations literature.
However, the interviews mentioned earlier suggested that revenue
was affected by the decision to exit the current exchange relationship.
The firms generally reported that their intention to exit an existing
relationship and secure or increase business with an alternative was
accompanied by or resulted in improved revenue. It seems plausible that
as firms become more concerned about their relationship with a major
exchange partner they become more concerned about their business. The
interview informants reported activities aimed at increasing revenue
ranging

from

increased

promotion

to

adding

new

merchandise

lines.

Hence,
H2: Exit intention positively affects revenue.
In the interviews we also noticed that better managed firms seemed
to be over represented. Many of these firms focused on efficiency in
their business, and appeared to be very aware of productivity measures
such as revenue-per-employee and return on investment. For this reason,
we

propose

that

productivity

is

negatively

associated

with

exit

intention, and that less productive firms should be more inclined to
exit an exchange relationship when there are problems. In particular,
productivity measures such as return on investment and revenue-peremployee should be negatively associated with exit intention. Formally,
H3: Return on investment negatively affects exit intention,
and
H4:

Revenue-per-employee
intention.

is

negatively

associated

with

exit

However, exit intention should in turn be associated with return
on investment. Intending to change exchange partners should increase
the subject firm's investments in non-revenue producing areas of the
business, and reduce return on investment. The interview informants
reported non-revenue producing activities ranging from attending trade
shows to meet prospective wholesalers, to hiring a marketing research
firm to do competitive research. Specifically, exit intention should
increase

the

firm's

search,

evaluation

and

negotiating

costs,

and

return on investment should decrease as a result. Hence,
H5: Exit intention negatively affects return on investment.
In retailing, the number of competitors in a retailer's market
area is plausibly related to the retailer's revenues and return on
investment.
competitors

In

mature

increases

retailing

in

the

categories,

subject

as

retailer's

the

number

service

area,

of
an

established firm's revenue and return on investment should decrease. It
could be argued that competition weeds out the poor performers, and in
effect only the strong survive. Thus, for established retailers
H6: The number of competitors negatively affects retailer revenue
and return on investment.
How long the retailing firm has been in business, and the number
of years the firm has done business with their primary wholesaler
should also affect exit intention. Retailers that have been in business
for

many

wholesalers

years
(Ping

should

be

1993),

more
and

knowledgeable

experienced

in

of

the

dealing

alternative
with

their

wholesaler (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987). Because these may be sources of
countervailing

power

(Dwyer

1980),

these

retailers

should

be

less

dependent on the wholesaler (Emerson 1962).2 This in turn should make
them more willing to change wholesalers. Hence,

2

A reviewer suggested that established retailers may have more

H7: The number of years the retailer has been in business is
positively associated with their exit intention.
On

the

wholesaler
together

other

hand,

the

length

have

done

business

likely.

In

long-lived

of

together
exchange

time

the

should

retailer

make

future

relationships,

and

the

business

relationship

specific investments have increased, commitment has grown, and there is
a pressure to adjust rather than dissolve an exchange relationship
(Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987). Thus,
H8: The number of years the retailer has done business with their
primary

wholesaler

is

negatively

associated

with

exit

intention.
The balance of this article presents the results of a test of
these hypotheses.
Method
We conducted a field survey of hardware retailers concerning their
relationship

with

their

primary

wholesaler:

their

top

full

line

wholesaler. The results were used to estimate the Figure 1 structural
equation model using EQS.
Measures
The measurement of the study variables used a combination

of

balanced five point Likert items, forced choice, and open-ended scales.
For example satisfaction, the firm's global evaluation of relationship
fulfillment (Dwyer and Oh, 1987), was measured using a modification of
the Dwyer and Oh satisfaction scale inspired by Gaski and Nevin (1985).
The domain of channel member satisfaction includes all the characteristics of the exchange relationship that the firm deems "rewarding,
profitable, or instrumental" (Rukert and Churchill, 1984), or costly,
unfair

or

frustrating

(Ping

1993).

The

items

in

the

satisfaction

power in dealing with wholesalers compared to relatively new retailers.

measure

assessed

the

retailer's

overall

satisfaction

with

the

wholesaler, fairness in the exchange relationship, and the degree to
which the wholesaler was a good company with which to do business (see
Table 1).
Exit intention, the intention to physically leave the exchange
relationship, was operationalized as the propensity to terminate the
primary

wholesaler

relationship

(Ping

1993).

This

conceptualization

taps the degree of inclination to discontinue the relationship with the
primary wholesaler. The items in the exit intention measure concerned
thinking of exiting the relationship, looking for a replacement primary
wholesaler, considering a replacement primary wholesaler, and resolving
to end the relationship with the primary wholesaler.
The economic variables, the retailer's annual revenue, the number
of years the retailer has done business with the primary wholesaler,
the number of years the retailer has been in business, the number of
competitive stores in the retailer's service area, and a variable used
to compute the retailer's revenue-per-employee, the retailer's number
employees, were measured using open-ended questions.

These measures

asked for last year's revenue, the number of years the retailer has
done business with the primary wholesaler, the number of years the
retailer has been in business, the number of competitive stores in the
retailer's

service

area,

and

the

retailer's

number

of

employees.

Revenue-per-employee was computed by dividing the retailer's revenue by
the number of employees, and return on investment was measured using a
forced choice scale (see Table 1).
Sample
The study sampled hardware retailers. The key informant within
these sampling units was the store operator or executive. We randomly
drew samples of these informants from the subscription list for a

hardware

retailing

industry

publication

that

appeared

to

be

representative of U.S. hardware retailers in all 50 states.
The survey questionnaire was mailed to 100 pretest retailers and
600 final test retailers, and a follow-up post card mailing in the
final test produced one hundred eighty-five usable responses.
An analysis of the postmarks and demographics of the responding
retailers suggested that the set of responses was generally representative of the population of U.S. hardware retailers. Table 2 shows the
sample profile.
Results
Reliability
The

pretest

properties
measures

of

responses

the

appeared

consistent

(see

were

satisfaction
to

be

Gerbing

used
and

to

exit

unidimensional,
and

Anderson,

assess

the

intention
internally

1984),

and

psychometric

measures.
and
had

The

externally
coefficient

alpha's of .8 or above. The psychometric properties of the measures
were

reexamined

correlations,

using

the

coefficient

final
alpha

test

responses

calculations,

and

item-to-total

ordered

similarity

coefficients (Hunter, 1973), multiple group analysis (Anderson, Gerbing
and Hunter, 1987), and single factor analysis (Jöreskog, 1993, pp. 297,
313). The measures were unidimensional, and internally and externally
consistent. In addition, they had latent variable reliabilities of .95,
and an average variance extracted of .76 or above (Fornell and Larker,
1981) (see Table 3).
Validity
The

satisfaction

and

exit

intention

measures

appeared

to

be

content valid, and the Table 4 intercorrelations of the study variables
were below .65, which suggests discriminant validity.
They also appeared to be construct valid. The study variables were
significantly and plausibly correlated with at least one other study

variable (see Table 4), except return on investment (ROI), which was
not correlated with any study variable. In particular, satisfaction was
negatively correlated with exit intention as hypothesized. The number
of

years

the

retailer

had

done

business

with

the

wholesaler

was

positively correlated with the number of years the retailer had been
open. The number of years the retailer had been open was positively
correlated

with

the

number

of

competitive

stores,

and

revenue

was

positively correlated with revenue-per-employee. However, revenue was
positively correlated with the number of competitive stores rather than
negative as hypothesized.
The lack of at least the hypothesized correlation between ROI and
exit intention was due to the non-recursive relationship between these
two variables in the sample. In addition, the unexpected correlation
between revenue and the number of competitive stores is explainable,
and will be discussed later.
Structural Model Estimation
The Figure 1 relationships between exit intention, and revenue and
return on investment were unbiased (see the Appendix for a discussion
of

the

potential

associations).

In

for

biased

addition,

coefficient
the

Figure

estimates
1

in

nonrecursive

nonrecursive
structural

equation model was identified (see the Appendix for an identification
proof).
The measurement and structural models corresponding to Figure 1
appeared to fit the data, based on the Comparative Fit Index (Bentler
1990) and the Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (see Tables 4 and 5).3
3

A path between revenue-per-employee and exit intention was added
to Figure 1 to obtain admissible structural coefficient estimates
between exit intention and revenue. Little is known about the
sensitivity of non recursive latent variable models to structural model
misspecification, but in the present analysis the non recursive
coefficient estimates were biased by omitting a path that was
significant in the measurement model.

Table 5 shows maximum likelihood structural parameter estimates, and
maximum likelihood-"Robust" standard error and chi-squared estimates,4
along with two stage least squares structural parameter estimates for
reference.5
Hypotheses Tests
The hypothesized associations received mixed support (see Table
5). Revenue and ROI affected exit intention, as hypothesized, and exit
intention was associated with the satisfaction, also as hypothesized.
In addition, revenue was associated with the number of competitive
stores, as hypothesized, but ROI was positively associated with the
number

of

associated

competitive
with

exit

stores.
intention

Revenue-per-employee
indirectly

via

a

was

negatively

significant

path

connecting it and revenue. Among the associations not observed were the
H2 and H5 revenue- and ROI-to-exit intention associations. In addition,
the H7 and H8 associations with exit intention for years in business,
and years with the wholesaler were not significant.
Discussion

4

While maximum likelihood estimates of measurement and structural
parameters are robust to departures from normality in the data
(Anderson and Amemiya 1985, 1986; Boomsma 1983; Browne 1987; Harlow
1985; Sharma, Durvasula and Dillon 1989; Tanaka 1984), maximum
likelihood standard errors and chi-squared statistics are believed to
be sensitive to departures from normality (see Bollen 1990 p. 406;
Jöreskog and Sörbom 1989). Because, as is frequently the case, the
study variables were not particularly normally distributed, Table 4
shows maximum likelihood "Robust" estimates of the standard error and
chi-squared statistic (Satorra and Bentler 1988; see Bentler 1989,
p.217 et seq.; and Hu, Bentler and Kano 1992). This Robust chi-squared
estimate was also used to calculate the Comparative Fit Index shown in
Table 4.
5

The Table 5 regression estimates were produced using summed
indicators for satisfaction and exit intention, and two stage least
squares (see Goldberger 1964 or Berry 1984 for details). The two stage
least squares coefficient estimates were then used to verify the
reasonableness of the EQS coefficient estimates.

In summary, the study found five associations with exit intention.
Revenue

had

a

negative

effect

on

exit

intention,

as

hypothesized.

However, ROI had a positive effect on exit intention, rather than the
hypothesized

negative

effect.

Revenue-per-employee

was

negatively

associated with exit intention through a path involving a significant
association

between

revenue-per-employee

and

revenue,

and

the

significant association between revenue and exit intention. Similarly,
the number of competitive stores had a surprising negative association
with exit intention. However, the number of years the retailers did
business with their wholesalers, and the years the retailers were in
business were not related to their exit intention. Finally, retailer
satisfaction was negatively associated with their exit intention, as
hypothesized.

This

last

result

is

consistent

with

prior

channel

research (Ping 1993).
The

positive

association

between

exit

intention

and

ROI

was

interesting. Based on the interviews, we expected ROI to be negatively
associated with exit intention. However, the study results suggest that
higher ROI retailers also had higher exit intentions. One explanation
for this positive association would be that higher ROI retailers are
somehow less dependent on their primary wholesaler. This should make
such

retailers

relationship

more

when

inclined

there

are

to

exit

relationship

their

primary

problems.

These

wholesaler
retailers

might invest little in relationship specific assets (Williamson 1975)
to attain high ROI, and this in turn could make them more able to
switch primary wholesalers. These retailers could be located in less
competitive

markets

competitors

was

selective

demand

(the

correlation

negative)
may

be

where

between

ROI

own

efforts

the

primary

their

sufficient,

and

and
to

number

of

stimulate

wholesaler

is

nothing more than a source of goods. While it is risky to generalize
from a single study, this suggests that wholesalers may want to devote

extra

attention

to

these

retailers

when

there

are

relationship

problems, because these retailers were more inclined to exit in this
study.
Turning to the indirect effect between revenue-per-employee and
exit intention, the non-significant direct effect between these two
variables was unexpected. We anticipated that productivity of any type
would be positively associated with exit intention. While ROI, a type
of productivity, was positively associated with exit intention, the
direct

effect

of

revenue-per-employee

on

exit

intention

was

non

significant. However, the indirect effect on exit intention of revenueper-employee, through the path from revenue-per-employee to revenue,
was

negative

and

significant,

because

each

of

these

paths

was

significant.6 This suggests that as revenue-per-employee increases, exit
intention declines, and the high revenue-per-employee retailers in this
study had lower exit intentions toward their wholesaler. In addition,
revenue-per-employee

was

uncorrelated

with

ROI

(see

Table

4).

This

suggests that high ROI and high revenue-per-employee were different
productivity strategies in this context, and the two strategies may
have been independently pursued.
The

significant

associations

between

competitive

stores

and

revenue, and between competitive stores and ROI were also interesting.
We

anticipated

that

increased

competition

would

depress

retailer

revenues and ROI. In this study, the number of competitive stores was
associated

with

decreased

ROI

and

increased

retailer

revenues.

One

explanation for the latter association would be that more competitive
stores may have increased the level of promotion in the local market.
6

The indirect effect on exit intention of revenue-per-employee
through revenue is determined by the coefficients on the path from
revenue-per-employee to exit intention (see Bollen 1990). The effect is
the product of the path coefficients for the path connecting revenueper-employee, revenue, and exit intention (=.61*(-.25) = -.15).

This in turn may have increased primary demand in that market. If this
were the case, increased promotion could have lead to increased revenue
for all the retailers. However, it could also have been the case that
in markets with many competitors, only the larger hardware retailers
survived.
Combining the two paths between the number of competitive stores
and exit intention (the competitive stores-revenue-exit intention path
and

the

competitive

stores-ROI-exit

intention

path)

produced

an

indirect negative effect on exit intention. This indirect effect of the
number of competitive stores on exit intention was significant, because
each component of these paths was significant.7 This suggests that the
association between the number of competitive stores and exit intention
was negative, and as the number of competitive stores increased, exit
intention

declined.

competitive

markets

One
in

explanation
this

context

for

this

were

result

populated

could
by

be

that

established

retailers (years in business was positively correlated with competitive
stores). This, plus the attractiveness of the market to the wholesaler,
could have made it more likely that problems between the retailer and
the wholesaler would be resolved to the retailer's satisfaction.
Turning to the negative association between the number of competitive stores and ROI, as the number of competitive stores increased,
retailer financial efficiency in terms of ROI declined. Because revenue
also increased with the number of competitive stores, this suggests
that competition decreased at least one type of efficiency, contrary to

7

The indirect effect on exit intention of competitive stores
through revenue and ROI is determined by the combination of the paths
from competitive stores to exit intention. The effect is the path
coefficient for the path connecting competitive stores, revenue, and
exit intention, plus the path coefficient for the path connecting
competitive stores, ROI, and exit intention (=.29*[-.25] +[-.13]*.35 =
-.11).

economic theory. However, in this context customer proximity to the
smaller

retailers,

customer

price

insensitivity

for

smaller

and

emergency purchases, and retailers willing to accept lower ROI's may
have

combined

consumers,

and

to

reduce

thereby

opportunity
increased

costs

another

for
type

"convenience
of

minded"

efficiency.

This

suggests smaller hardware stores may attract purchases related to small
repairs and projects, emergency repairs, and special orders. The larger
stores such as HQ and Builders Square may attract purchases for major
projects and shopping goods such as lawn mowers and wooden decks. The
smaller stores may in effect be operating as hardware "convenience
stores."
Both the length of time the retailer had been in business and the
length of time the retailer and the wholesaler had done business with
each

other

were

unrelated

to

exit

intention.

We

expected

newer

retailers and longer term wholesaler relationships to be negatively
associated with exit intention. These results suggest that retailer
experience

was

no

predictor

of

exit

intention,

and

a

long-lived

wholesaler relationship may or may not protect the relationship when
there are relationship problems. While these results may be due to the
correlations between the years variables and other exogenous variables
such as the number of competitive stores, we suspect there may be many
attractive primary wholesalers in this context. Experienced and novice
hardware retailers may be equally aware of them. This in turn may mean
that exit and therefore exit intention is perceived as possible: there
are attractive alternatives (Ping 1993). For wholesalers, this may mean
that retailer inexperience and relationship longevity cannot be assumed
to work in the wholesaler's favor when there are relationship problems- they had little to do with retailer exit intention in this study.
Turning to the lack of exit intention effects on revenue and ROI,
these results suggest that for retailers that intended to exit, doing

so was not generally related to their revenue and ROI. In other words,
the activities, mental and physical, which attended exit intention did
not necessarily reduce retailer revenues or make their business less
efficient. For a retailer bent on exiting a wholesaler relationship,
this suggests long term gains from exiting may not necessarily come at
a cost to the retailer's revenue and ROI in the short term.
Several

significant

measurement

model

correlations

were

also

interesting. The large positive correlation between the length of time
the retailer had been in business and the length of time the retailer
and the wholesaler had done business with each other (φ = .46) suggests
that in this context the retailers did not switch wholesalers often.
The positive correlation between the length of time the retailer
had been in business and the
retailer's

service

area

(φ

=

number of
.15)

competitive stores in the

suggests

that

the

experienced

retailer was slightly more likely to be found in the more competitive
markets.
Finally, the positive correlation between revenue-per-employee and
revenue

(φ

=

.61)

suggests

that

the

larger

retailers

were

more

productive in terms of labor productivity in this context. Curiously
the correlation between revenue and ROI was not significant, suggesting
that these larger retailers did not necessarily enjoy higher ROI's.
A comment on the estimation techniques used in the study may be of
interest. The two stage least squares regression estimates for Figure 1
were similar in direction and size to the structural equation estimates
(see Table 5). However, the significance estimates for the nonrecursive
effects were attenuated, and as a result, two stage least squares
estimation missed the significant revenue-exit intention and ROI-exit
intention effects (see Table 5). This suggests that while coefficient
estimates from regression involving reliable latent variables such as
satisfaction and exit intention are generally trustworthy (see Aiken

and West 1991), significance estimates for non recursive effects may
not be. For this reason, structural equation analysis may be preferred
to two stage least squares in estimating non recursive effects for
latent variables.
Much work remains to be done in this area. The study was designed
to investigate plausible economic antecedents of exit intention, and it
was limited by the lack of inclusion of other known antecedents such as
alternative

attractiveness,

investments,

or

switching

costs

(Ping

1993). Because of exogenous variable intercorrelations, it is possible
that a model of exit intention that includes these known or other
unknown antecedent variables would produce non significant effects for
one or more of the significant effects observed in the present study.
In addition, exit intention may or may not be related to actual
exiting behavior. Ping's (1993) results suggest that there is at least
one alternative to exit intention, neglect. Ping (1993) characterizes
neglect as emotional, rather than physical withdrawal from the exchange
relationship. Because neglect was strongly positively correlated with
exit intention (.70) in that study, it is possible that some of the
present study retailers could neglect their wholesaler relationship
rather than physically exit it.
Future research should attempt to determine the antecedents of
actually

exiting

an

exchange

relationship.

Because

exit

intention

certainly precedes actual exiting, determining the antecedents of exit
intention is an important first step. However, the existence of a
neglect option observed by Ping (1993) suggests that not all who intend
to exit may actually do so. Ping found no association between exit
intention

and

relationship

investments

or

switching

costs.

Perhaps

these variables affect actual exiting rather than exit intention.
Summary

These significant exit intention associations suggest there may be
additional factors that bear on exit intention beyond those observed in
Ping (1993). While the negative satisfaction-exit intention association
was observed by Ping (1993) and the present study, the present results
suggest that increased retailer exit intention was also associated with
higher

retailer

ROI,

and

reduced

retailer

revenues,

revenue-per-

employee, and number of competitive stores. Retailers in this study
with higher ROI, and lower revenue, satisfaction, competitive stores,
and revenue-per-employee had higher
primary

wholesaler

relationship.

exit intentions
These

results

regarding their
suggest

that

a

wholesaler's efforts to maintain retailer satisfaction, revenue, and
revenue-per-employee may help attenuate retailer exit intention. In
addition,
stores

in

higher

ROI

their

retailers,

service

area

and
may

retailers
merit

with

few

special

competitive

attention

from

wholesalers when there are relationship problems: for these retailers
in the study, as their ROI increased, or the number of competitive
stores in their service area was lower, their exit intention increased.
The exit intention associations with revenue, ROI, revenue-peremployee, and competitive stores had coefficients of -.25, .35, -.15,
and -.11, respectively. However, the associations between satisfaction
and exit intention were larger-- -.62 or more (see Table 4). This
suggests that satisfaction was the most important antecedent of exit
intention

in

this

study.

Revenue,

ROI,

revenue-per-employee,

and

competitive stores were about half or less as influential on exit
intention

by

comparison.

For

wholesalers,

this

in

turn

suggests

retailer satisfaction with the wholesaler is an important antecedent of
exit

intention,

and,

while

not

unimportant,

retailer

revenue-per-employee, and competitive stores may be
important.

revenue,

ROI,

relatively

less
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Table 1
SCALE ITEMS
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
SATisfaction: (Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree)
1. All in all, my primary wholesaler is very fair with me.
2. Overall, my primary wholesaler is a good company to do business with.
3. In general am pretty satisfied with my relationship with my primary wholesaler.
4. Overall, my primary wholesaler treats me very fairly.
5. All in all, my relationship with my primary wholesaler is very satisfactory.
EXIT intention: (Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly
Disagree)
1. Occasionally I will think about ending the business relationship with my
primary wholesaler.
2. I am looking for a replacement wholesaler.
3. I am not likely to continue the business relationship with my primary
wholesaler.
4. I will probably consider a replacement primary wholesaler in the near
future.
5. I am looking at replacement wholesalers.
6. I will probably stop doing business with my primary wholesaler in the near
future.
YRS with the current primary wholesaler:
How many years have you done business with your primary wholesaler? _________
Number of years business has been OPEN:
How many years has your store been open? ________
Number of employees:
The number of employees at your store? _____
REVenue:
Your last year's sales? _____
Number of COMPETitors:
The number of competitive stores in your service area? _____
Return On Investment:
Last year's return on investment was (circle one):
a. negative
b. 0-4 percent
c. 5-9 percent
d. 10-14 percent
e. 15-19 percent
f. 20-24 percent
g. 25-29 percent
h. 30-34 percent
i. 35-49 percent
j. 50 percent or more
Revenue/EMP = REV/(Number of Employees)

Table 2
PROFILE OF THE SAMPLE
══════════════════════════════════════════════════
First Title Mentioned
Owner, partner
President
General Manager
Chief Financial Officer
Other
Not reported
Total

Reported Last
Year's Sales
>$10MM
$3-9.99MM
$1.2-2.99MM
$0.6-1.199MM
$0.25-0.599MM
$0.1-0.299MM
$.01-.099MM
$<.01MM
Unreported
Total
Years With
Primary Wholesaler
1-2
3-5
6-10
11-20
21-30
31+
Unreported
Total

Frequency
98
57
5
4
15
6
185

Frequency
4
7
24
28
35
33
20
0
34
185

Frequency
14
44
42
50
17
17
1
185

Table 3
FINAL TEST SATISFACTION AND EXIT STATISTICS
══════════════════════════════════════════════════
Construct

Parametera

Fit Statistics

Satisfaction

Items
df
Chi-Squared
p-value
GFI
AGFI
RMS Residual
Alpha

5
5
3.5
.61
.98
.96
.005
.95

Exit Intention

Items
df
Chi-Squared
p-value
GFI
AGFI
RMS Residual
Alpha

6
9
21.5
.01
.95
.90
.016
.95

───────────────────────
a Items = Number of items in the scale.
df = LISREL Chi-squared statistic degrees of freedom.
Chi-Squared = LISREL Chi-squared statistic value.
p-value = Attained significance of the LISREL chi-squared
statistic.
GFI = LISREL goodness of fit index.
AGFI = LISREL adjusted goodness of fit index.
RMS Residual = LISREL root mean squared residual.
Alpha = Coefficient (Cronbach) alpha value.

Table 4
MEASUREMENT MODEL RESULTS
══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Latent Variable Covariancesa (φ's):
SAT
EXIT
YRS
OPEN
REV
COMPET
ROI
R/EMP

SAT
.59
-.48
1.55
3.02
.33
.87
.05
-.17

EXIT
-.63*
.95
-1.99
-1.86
-.90
-1.50
-.17
.05

YRS
.14
-.14
185.81
175.67
18.89
9.86
1.48
6.27

OPEN
.14
-.06
.46*
757.19
45.03
48.70
1.26
5.54

REV
.02
-.05
.07
.09
301.63
60.98
-2.66
41.36

COMPET
.09
-.13
.06
.15*
.30*
134.68
-2.61
-.12

Parameter Estimates:
λs1
λs2
λs3
λs4
λs5

.86
.91
.96
.95
1.00

θεs1
θεs2
θεs3
θεs4
θεs5

.17
.11
.13
.12
.08

λe1
λe2
λe3
λe4
λe5
λe6

.85
.91
.83
1.00
.96
.88

θεe1
θεe2
θεe3
θεe4
θεe5
θεe6

.54
.15
.22
.09
.23
.19

Fit Indices:
Chi-Squared Degrees of Freedom
= 97
Chi-Squared Statistic Value
= 91.98
p-Value of Chi-Squared Value
= .625
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI)
= .96
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = .94
RMS Residual
= .127
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)
Bentler (1990)
= 1.00
Average Variance Extracted:
Variables
SAT EXI
Average Variance Extracted

.80

.76

Latent Variable Reliabilities:
Variables
SAT EXI
Latent Variable Reliabilities

.95

.95

────────────────────────────
* t-value greater than 2.
a Covariances on and below the diagonal, correlations above.

ROI
.03
-.08
.05
.02
-.07
-.10
4.46
.44

R/EMP
-.05
.01
.11
.05
.61*
-.00
.05
15.14

Table 5
ESTIMATION RESULTS
══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Structural Equation Analysis Estimates:
Figure 1 EXI-REV Structural Model
Parameter
Estimate t-valuea
b
λ's
b
ε's
b
φ 's
ζEXI
.59
ζREV
160.75
ψEXI,REV
2.67
γEXI,SAT
-.62
-6.05
γEXI,YRS
-.08
-1.24
γEXI,OPEN
.06
1.18
γEXI,R/EMP
.13
1.38
βEXI,REV
-.25
-2.28
βREV,EXI
-.04
-.55
γREV,COMPET
.29
2.05
γREV,R/EMPL
.61
3.38
Fit Statisticsa
Chi-Squared
83
Degrees of Freedom
90
Chi-Squared p-Value
.733
RMS Residual
.238
GFI
.94
AGFI
.91
CFI
1.00
EXI Squared Mult. Corr. .38
REV Squared Mult. Corr. .46

Figure 1 EXI-ROI Structural Model
Parameter
Estimate t-valuea
b
λ's
b
ε's
b
φ's
ζEXI
.71
ζROI
4.37
ψEXI,ROI
2.67
γEXI,SAT
-.65
-6.05
γEXI,YRS
-.08
-1.23
γEXI,OPEN
.06
1.15
γEXI,R/EMP
-.01
-.51
βEXI,ROI
.35
4.76
βROI,EXI
-.07
-.76
γROI,COMPET
-.13
-2.15

Chi-Squared
87
Degrees of Freedom
91
Chi-Squared p-Value
.577
RMS Residual
.163
GFI
.93
AGFI
.90
CFI
1.00
EXI Squared Mult. Corr. .25
REV Squared Mult. Corr. .02

Two Stage Least Squares Regressionc:
Figure 1 EXI-SLS Structural
Dependent Independent
Variable
Variable
β
EXIT
SAT
-.59
YRS
-.10
OPEN
.07
R/EMP
.14
REVENUE
-.14
REVENUE
EXIT
-.04
COMPET
.29
R/EMP
.61

Model
p
.00
.13
.31
.31
.23
.63
.00
.00

Figure 1 EXI-ROI Structural Model
Dependent Independent
Variable
Variable
β
p
EXIT
SAT
-.62
.00
YRS
-.12
.20
OPEN
.05
.53
R/EMP
-.04
.61
ROI
.65
.35
ROI
EXIT
-.06
.59
COMPET
-.11
.12

───────────────────────
a ML estimate with EQS ROBUST option (Satorra and Bentler 1988) (see Bentler
1989, p.217 et seq.; and Hu, Bentler and Kano 1992).
b See Table 4

Figure 1
MODEL OF THE PROPOSED RELATIONSHIPS
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Appendix
The next section summarizes the use of the control variables to obtain
unbiased and identified estimates for the Figure 1 structural equation models.
The subsequent section presents the identification proofs for Figure 1.
Nonrecursive Bias
In

structural

equation

modeling

it

is

assumed

that

the

exogenous

variables and the structural disturbance terms are uncorrelated. Violations of
this assumption produce biased structural coefficient estimates (Goldberger
1964, see Berry 1984). Recursive models are easily specified to accommodate
this assumption. However in nonrecursive models this assumption requires some
specification effort. For example, in the upper Figure 1 structural equation
model, specifying the relationship between EXIT and REVENUE as shown in Figure
A

violates

the

uncorrelatedness

assumption:

ζE

is

correlated

with

REVENUE

through the EXIT-to-REVENUE association, and ζR is correlated with EXIT through
the REVENUE-to-EXIT association. For this reason antecedents of EXIT, REVENUE,
and ROI were added as control variables to the Figure 1 structural equation
model to change the status of EXIT, REVENUE, and ROI to that of endogenous
variables.
Figure A
EXIT

ζE

REVENUE

ζR

These antecedents should be of theoretical interest and they should be
specified so they are not associated with both EXIT and REVENUE, for example.
If these antecedent control variables are specified with paths to both EXIT and
REVENUE,

the

resulting

structural

equation

model

may

be

underidentified.

Underidentified structural models do not produce unique parameter estimates
(see Berry 1984).
However, if these control variables are specified with no path to a
variable with which they are associated, the structural equation model may not
fit the data. For these reasons we chose control variables of theoretical
interest that would not be associated with both target variables. Relationship
satisfaction, how long the retailer has been in business (open), and the number
of years the retailer has done business with their primary wholesaler should
not be associated with revenue or ROI. The subject retailer's revenue-peremployee should also not be associated with ROI, but it should be positively

correlated with revenue. Similarly the number of competitors should not be
associated with EXIT.
Identification Proof
Turning to the identification of the Figure 1 structural equation models,
the identification of the measurement and structural parameters is established
by showing that these parameters are uniquely determined by the elements of the
observed variables' covariance matrix. Bollen (1990) suggested a sufficient two
step procedure to establish the identification of a structural equation model.
In step 1, the identification of the measurement model is established, and in
step 2 the identification of the structural model is demonstrated.
For the step 1 measurement model, the loading and error parameters of the
single indicator latent variables are fixed at 1 and zero respectively. The
variance of a single indicator latent variable X is therefore determined by the
variance of the observed single indicator x. In symbols,
V(x) = V(λxX+εx) = V(1X+0) = φXX ,
where V(x) is the variance of the observed variable x; λx and εx are the loading
and error of x; and φXX is the variance of the latent variable X. As a result
the

single

indicator

latent

variable

loadings,

errors,

and

variances

are

identified.
The

loadings,

errors,

and

variances

for

SAT

and

EXI

are

determined

similarly. For the indicators s1 and s2 of SAT, the covariance of s1 and s2 is
given by
σ12 = C(s1,s2) = C(λs1SAT+εs1,λs2SAT+εs2) = λs1λs2V(SAT) ,
where σ12 is the covariance of s1 and s2, C(a,b) is the covariance of a and b,
λs1, λs2, εs1, and εs2 are the loadings and errors of s1 and s2, SAT is the latent
variable satisfaction, and V(SAT) is the variance of SAT.
Similarly, the covariance of s1 and s5 is determined by
σ15 = λs1λs5V(SAT) = λs1V(SAT) ,
since λs5 is fixed at 1 (see Table 4). Thus λs1 = σ15/V(SAT) , and σ12 =
[σ15/V(SAT)]λs2V(SAT) = σ15λs2 . Thus
λs2 = σ12/σ15 .
Similarly λs3 = σ13/σ15 , and λs4 = σ14/σ15 .
Because σ25 = λs2λs5V(SAT) = λs2V(SAT) , and λs2 was determined above, the
variance of SAT is given by
V(SAT) = φSAT,SAT = σ25/λs2 = σ25/[σ12/σ15] = σ25σ15/σ12 ,
where φSAT,SAT is the variance of SAT. As a result
λs1 = σ15/φSAT,SAT = σ15/[σ25σ15/σ12] = σ15σ12/σ25σ15 = σ12/σ25 .
Thus the loadings and the variance of SAT are identified.
For the errors of the indicators of SAT, since σ11 = V(λs1SAT+εs1) =
λs12φSAT,SAT+V(εs1)

,

V(εs1) = θεs1 = σ11 - λs12φSAT,SAT ,

where θεs1 is the variance of εs1 . The remaining errors, θεs2, θεs3, θεs4, and θεs5,
are determined similarly.
The loadings, errors and variance of EXIT are determined similarly.
For the single indicator latent variable intercorrelations with SAT,
σx,s5 = C(x,λs5SAT+εs5) = λs52C(x,SAT) = C(x,SAT) = φX,SAT ,
where φX,SAT

is the correlation of x with SAT, and x Є {YRS,OPN,R/E,REV,CMP,

ROI}.
The correlation between SAT and EXI is determined by
σs5,e4 = C(λs5SAT+εs5,λe4EXI+εe4) = λs52λe42φSAT,EXI = φSAT,EXI

,

since λs5 = λe4 = 1 (see Table 4).
Therefore the Figure 1 measurement parameters are identified.
For

the

step

2

structural

model

parameters,

we

will

show

the

identification of the upper half of the Figure 1 structural equation model. The
lower half is determined similarly. The structural model parameters of the
upper half of the Figure 1 structural equation model are given in matrix
notation by

where γ and β are the structural coefficients, and ζ is a disturbance term.
Using this equation for the determination of EXI, the covariance of SAT
and EXI is given by
φSAT,EXI = C(SAT,EXI)
= C(SAT,γEXI,REVREV+βEXI,SATSAT+βEXI,OPNOPN+βEXI,YRSYRS+βEXI,R/ER/E+0CMP+ζEXI)
= γEXI,REVφSAT,REV+βEXI,SATφSAT,SAT+βEXI,OPNφSAT,OPN
+βEXI,YRSφSAT,YRS+βEXI,R/EφSAT,R/E .
The covariance of OPN, YRS, R/E and CMP with EXI can be written similarly and
the result is five equations in five unknowns, the five structural coefficients
for EXI (γEXI,REV, βEXI,SAT, βEXI,OPN, βEXI,YRS, and βEXI,R/E). Because this system of
equations is solvable for the five structural coefficients, the structural
coefficients for EXI are identified.
For the structural coefficients of REV
φEXI,REV = C(EXI,REV)
= C(EXI,γREV,EXIEXI+βREV,CMPCMP+ζREV)
= γREV,EXIφEXI,EXI+βREV,CMPφEXI,CMP .
The covariance of CMP and R/E with REV is similar and produces a system of
three equations in three unknowns, the three structural coefficients for REV
(γREV,EXI, βREV,CMP, and βREV,R/E). Thus the structural coefficients for REV are
identified.
For the structural disturbance terms
φEXI,EXI = V(EXI)
= V(γEXI,REVREV+βEXI,SATSAT+βEXI,OPNOPN+βEXI,YRSYRS+βEXI,R/ER/E+ζEXI)

= γEXI,REV2φREV,REV+βEXI,SAT2φSAT,SAT+βEXI,OPN2φOPN,OPN
+βEXI,YRS2φYRS,YRS+βEXI,R/E2φR/E,R/E+v(ζEXI)
+2[γEXI,REVβEXI,SATφREV,SAT+γEXI,REVβEXI,OPNφREV,OPN+γEXI,REVβEXI,YRSφREV,YRS
+γEXI,REVβEXI,R/EφREV,R/E+βEXI,SATβEXI,OPNφSAT,OPN+βEXI,SATβEXI,YRSφSAT,YRS
+βEXI,SATβEXI,R/EφSAT,R/E+βEXI,OPNβEXI,YRSφOPN,YRS+βEXI,OPNβEXI,R/EφOPN,R/E
+βEXI,YRSβEXI,R/EφYRS,R/E]
= A + V(ζEXI) + B ,
where
A = γEXI,REV2φREV,REV+βEXI,SAT2φSAT,SAT+βEXI,OPN2φOPN,OPN+βEXI,YRS2φYRS,YRS+βEXI,R/E2φR/E,R/E
and
B = 2[γEXI,REVβEXI,SATφREV,SAT+γEXI,REVβEXI,OPNφREV,OPN+γEXI,REVβEXI,YRSφREV,YRS+γEXI,REVβEXI,R/EφREV,R/E
+βEXI,SATβEXI,OPNφSAT,OPN+βEXI,SATβEXI,YRSφSAT,YRS+βEXI,SATβEXI,R/EφSAT,R/E
+βEXI,OPNβEXI,YRSφOPN,YRS+βEXI,OPNβEXI,R/EφOPN,R/E+βEXI,YRSβEXI,R/EφYRS,R/E] .
Thus V(ζEXI) = φexi,EXI - A - B . The variance of ζREV is determined similarly.
For the covariance of ζEXI and ζREV,
φEXI,REV = C(EXI,REV)
= C(γEXI,REVREV+βEXI,SATSAT+βEXI,OPNOPN+βEXI,YRSYRS+βEXI,R/ER/E+ζEXI,
γREV,EXIEXI+βREV,CMPCMP+ζREV)
= γEXI,REVγREV,EXIφREV,EXI+γREV,EXIβEXI,SATφREV,CMP+βEXI,SATγREV,EXIφSAT,EXI
+βEXI,SATβREV,CMPφSAT,CMP+βEXI,OPNγREV,EXIφOPN,EXI+βEXI,OPNβREV,CMPφOPN,CMP
+βEXI,YRSγYRS,EXIφYRS,EXI+βEXI,YRSβREV,CMPφYRS,CMP+βEXI,R/EγREV,EXIφR/E,EXI
+βEXI,R/EγREV,EXIφR/E,CMP+C(ζEXI,ζREV)
= D + C(ζEXI,ζREV) ,
where
D = γEXI,REVγREV,EXIφREV,EXI+γREV,EXIβEXI,SATφREV,CMP+βEXI,SATγREV,EXIφSAT,EXI
+βEXI,SATβREV,CMPφSAT,CMP+βEXI,OPNγREV,EXIφOPN,EXI+βEXI,OPNβREV,CMPφOPN,CMP
+βEXI,YRSγYRS,EXIφYRS,EXI+βEXI,YRSβREV,CMPφYRS,CMP+βEXI,R/EγREV,EXIφR/E,EXI
+βEXI,R/EγREV,EXIφR/E,CMP .
Thus C(ζEXI,ζREV) = φEXI,REV - D , and the upper half of Figure 1 is identified.
The measurement and structural parameters of the lower half of Figure 1
are determined similarly, and are identified.
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Does Marketing Channel Satisfaction Moderate
the Association Between Alternative Attractiveness
and Exiting? An Application of Ping's Technique
Abstract
The article investigates the moderating effect of overall
relationship satisfaction on the relationship between the
attractiveness of the alternative relationship and exiting the
relationship in a marketing channel. The investigation involves a
structural equation modeling technique proposed by Ping (1993a). The
technique specifies the satisfaction-alternative attractiveness
interaction using products of the indicators of satisfaction and
alternative attractiveness, as Kenny and Judd (1984) suggested.
However it uses fixed values for the indicator loadings and error
variances that are determined in a measurement model.
The results suggest that overall relationship satisfaction
moderates the alternative attractiveness-exiting effect. The article
provides several interesting observations and suggestions regarding
the use of the estimation technique proposed by Ping (1993a).
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Does Marketing Channel Satisfaction Moderate
the Association Between Alternative Attractiveness
and Exiting? An Application of Ping's Technique

Channel relationship termination has received some attention
recently (Ping and Dwyer, 1991; Ping, 1993b). These studies generally
contend that exiting a channel relationship has several antecedents,
among them overall satisfaction, and the attractiveness of the best
alternative relationship. The associations between these variables
have rightly been modeled using linear effects, and plausible nonlinear effects have been assumed to be absent. This study investigates
a plausible nonlinear association involving channel relationship
exiting, the interaction of overall satisfaction and alternative
attractiveness in their effect on exiting.
The investigation uses a field survey and a proposed structural
equation technique due to Ping (1993b) that estimates interaction and
quadratic effects for latent variables under certain conditions. The
technique involves structural equation analysis, and is carried out in
two steps, paralleling the two-step estimation approach for structural
equation suggested by Anderson and Gerbing (1988) (i.e., estimate the
measurement model before estimating the structural model).
In particular, the loadings and error variances for the
indicators of the linear latent variables are estimated in a measurement model. Then these loadings and error variances are used to
calculate the loadings and error variances for the indicators of
latent interaction and quadratic variables. The relations among the
linear and nonlinear latent variables are then estimated in a
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structural model. The indicators of the interaction and quadratic
latent variables in the structural model are specified as the products
of the indicators of the linear latent variables that comprise the
nonlinear latent variables. The calculated loadings and error
variances for these indicator products are specified as fixed rather
than free variables in the structural model under the appropriate
conditions.
After summarizing the current picture of channel relationship
exiting, we propose and test the satisfaction-alternative
attractiveness effect using a field survey and Ping's technique. We
then discuss the implications of the test, and the use of the
estimation technique.
Channel Relationship Termination
In an investigation of generalized responses to channel
relationship problems Ping (1993b) observed that the inclination to
exit a channel relationship was negatively associated with overall
relationship satisfaction, and positively associated with the
attractiveness of the best available alternative relationship. The
specification of these relationships involved a structural equation
analysis of a model that implicitly posited only linear relationships
among the variables in these relationships.
In a conceptualization of the history of a buyer-seller
relationship Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) proposed that these
relationships pass through several phases (also see Ford, 1980; and
Gadde and Mattsson, 1987). Both parties to the buyer-seller
relationship, they argued, pass through awareness, exploration,
expansion, commitment, and, ultimately, dissolution phases of the

4

relationship. In the committed phase they noted that the exchange
partners achieve a level of satisfaction that precludes other primary
exchange partners. They stated that awareness of alternative
relationships is maintained but without constant comparisons to the
current relationship. One plausible result of this preclusionary state
is that for satisfied subject firms increases in the attractiveness of
alternative relationships would not affect relationship exiting
intention. However since Ping (1993b) observed a positive association
between alternative attractiveness and exiting, this suggests that
this association is contingent on the level of overall relationship
satisfaction. In particular when overall satisfaction is lower,
changes in alternative attractiveness are positively associated with
exiting. At higher levels of satisfaction, however, this association
is not significant. Accordingly we postulate that,
H1: Overall relationship satisfaction moderates the
association between alternative attractiveness and exiting.
Specifically,
H2a: At higher levels of overall relationship satisfaction
there is no association between alternative attractiveness
and exiting,
and
H2b: At lower levels of overall relationship satisfaction
alternative attractiveness is positively associated with
exiting.
In the balance of the article we will test these assertions using
data provided by a field survey. We begin by describing the
measurement of the study variables, satisfaction, alternative
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attractiveness, and exiting.
Measurement
Satisfaction, the global evaluation of relationship fulfillment
by the subject firm (Dwyer and Oh, 1987), was measured using a modification of the Dwyer and Oh satisfaction scale inspired by Gaski and
Nevin (1985). The domain of satisfaction includes all the characteristics of the buyer-seller relationship that the subject firm deems
"rewarding, profitable, or instrumental" (Rukert and Churchill, 1984),
or costly, unfair or frustrating (Ping 1993b). The items in the
satisfaction measure assessed overall satisfaction with the
relationship, fairness in the exchange relationship, and the degree to
which partner was a good company with which to do business.
The attractiveness of the best alternative relationship, the
subject firm's estimate of the satisfaction available in the best
available alternative relationship, was operationalized as the subject
firm's perception of the overall fulfillment available from the best
alternative supplier, in addition to the overall fulfillment available
in the existing relationship (Ping 1993b). This conceptualization
encompasses the subject firm's generalized perceptions of the rewards
and costs available in the most salient available relationship
alternative. The items in this measure dealt with the subject firm's
evaluation of how good a supplier company the alternative would be,
its fairness, products and services, and policies; and, in general,
how satisfied the subject firm would be the alternative supplier.
Exiting, physically leaving the relationship, was operationalized
as the propensity to terminate the primary supplier relationship (Ping
1993b). This conceptualization taps the degree of inclination to
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discontinue the relationship with the primary supplier. The items in
the exiting measure concerned thinking of exiting, looking for a
replacement relationship, considering a replacement, and the intention
to exit.
These measures were combined into a self administered
questionnaire that was mailed to a sample of the study population. The
analysis of the resulting data was conducted using structural equation
analysis with a satisfaction-alternative attractiveness latent
variable interaction specified using Ping's technique. Before
describing the study, some background on this approach would be
appropriate.
Non-linear Latent Variables
Kenny and Judd (1984) proposed that interaction and quadratic
effects for latent variables could be estimated using structural
equation analysis and products of observed variables. Kenny and Judd
proposed that, for example, the products the observed indicators for
the linear latent variables X and Z could be used to specify the
latent interaction variable XZ. Specifically, if

and Z had indicators

x1, x2, z1, and z2, XZ could be specified using products of these
indicators, i.e., x1z1, x1z2, x2z1, and x2z2.
In addition Kenny and Judd showed that, under certain conditions,
the variance of these indicator products is determined by the variance
of their constituent indicators. They showed that, for example, the
variance of the indicator x1z1 depends on x1, z1, Var(X), Var(Z), x1,
and z1, where Var(X) and Var(Z) are the variances of the latent
variables X and Z, x1, and z1 are the loadings of x1 on X and z1 on Z,
and x1 and z1 are the variances of the error terms x1 and x1. Assuming
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the latent variables X and Z are independent of the error terms x1 and
z1, the error terms are independent of each other, and x1, z1, x1 and z1
are normally distributed, they showed the variance of x1z1 is given by
Var(x1z1) = Var[(x1X + x1)(z1Z + z1)]
= x12z12Var(XZ) + x12Var(X)z1
+ z12Var(Z)x1 + x1z1 .

(1

Then they specified latent variables such as XZ with indicators
such as x1z1 by constraining the indicator loading and error term for
x1z1 (x1z1 and x1z1) to be the combinations of linear-terms-only model
parameters shown in equation 1, i.e.,
x1z1 = x1z1 ,

(2

and
x1z1 = x12Var(X)z1 + z12Var(Z)x1 + x1z1 .

(3

They also used COSAN (currently a subprocedure of the SAS procedure
CALIS) which is particularly suited to modeling structural equations
with nonlinear terms such as those in equations 2 and 3.
While the Kenny and Judd technique is an important theoretical
contribution, the technique has proven difficult for most researchers
to implement (Aiken and West, 1991). Ping (1993a) noted that the
number of dummy variables required to specify each indicator of a nonlinear variable using the Kenny and Judd technique (e.g., one for each
term in equations 2 and 3) can become overwhelming for models with
many indicators or several non-linear latent variables.
Hayduk (1987) and others have proposed a variation of the Kenny
and Judd technique that can be implemented using LISREL (Jöreskog and
Sörbom, 1989) and EQS (Bentler, 1989). The technique is difficult to
summarize, however, and the interested reader is directed to chapter 7
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of Hayduk (1987) for the details of the technique. Unfortunately, this
technique also requires the creation of many dummy variables.
As a result Ping (1993b) proposed an additional variation of the
Kenny and Judd technique that requires no dummy variables and can be
implemented in LISREL and EQS. Under the Kenny and Judd normality
assumptions stated above and assuming the unidimensionality of the
latent variable indicators, Ping argued that the loadings and error
variances for the Kenny and Judd product indicators of an interaction
or quadratic latent variable need not be estimated in the structural
model. Specifically he demonstrated that parameter estimates from the
measurement model (e.g., x1, z1, Var(X), Var(Z), x1, and z1), can be
combined into structural model constants (e.g., x1z1 = x1z1 and x1z1 =
x12Var(X)z1 + z12Var(Z)x1 + x1z1). Then the structural model can be
estimated with the interaction indicator loadings and error variances
(e.g., x1z1 and x1z1) specified as fixed values (equal to x1z1 and
x12Var(X)z1 + z12Var(Z)x1 + x1z1) . This is possible, he argued,
because with sufficient unidimensionality the measurement parameters
for a latent variable's indicators (e.g., x1, z1, Var(X), Var(Z), x1,
and z1) are trivially variant between the measurement and structural
models (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). In different words the
measurement parameter estimates for the indicators of a unidimensional
latent variable change very little between the measurement and
structural models (frequently only in the third decimal place).
Therefore measurement model estimates can be specified as constants in
the structural model, and the loadings and error variances of the
indicators of non-linear latent variables need not be estimated in a
structural model.
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He argued further that the unidimensionality assumption enables
the omission of the non-linear constructs from the measurement model
with no effect on the parameter estimates for the linear constructs
because, by the definition of unidimensionality, unidimensional constructs are unaffected by other latent variables. Similarly adding or
deleting unidimensional constructs in the structural model does not
affect the measurement parameter estimates for the added or other
latent variables in the structural model.
In summary, Ping's technique involves,
o verifying indicator normality-- however, maximum
likelihood and generalized least squares estimates are
robust to departures from normality (Anderson and Amemiya,
1985, 1986; Boomsma, 1983; Browne, 1987; Harlow, 1985;
Sharma, Durvasula and Dillon, 1989; Tanaka, 1984),
o assuming the latent variables are independent of the
error terms, and the error terms are independent of each
other,
o unidimensionalizing the linear latent variables,
o estimating loadings and error variances for the linear
independent variable indicators using a measurement model,
then combining these estimates into equation 2 and 3
estimates of the loadings and error variances for the
nonlinear latent variable indicators,
o specifying these equation 2 and 3 estimates as fixed
values in a structural model, and estimating that model.
The balance of the paper will describe the use of Ping's
technique in a field survey that tests the hypothesized satisfaction-
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alternative attractiveness interaction.
Method
Returning to the study, the satisfaction, alternative
attractiveness, and exiting items were combined with five point
balanced Likert scales. The survey population was hardware retailers,
and the sampling frame was the subscription list of a popular hardware
trade publication. Sampling involved n-th name selects of 100 pretest
names and 600 final test names. The pretest responses were used to
verify the psychometric properties of the measures. The resulting
measures appeared to be content valid, unidimensional, internally and
externally consistent (see Gerbing and Anderson, 1984), and had
coefficient alpha's of .8 or above. The final test produced 288
responses after two postcard follow-ups. The psychometric properties
of the measures were reexamined using these responses and item-tototal correlations, coefficient alpha calculations, ordered similarity
coefficients (Hunter, 1973), multiple group analysis (Anderson,
Gerbing and Hunter, 1987), and LISREL single factor analysis
(Jöreskog, 1993, pp. 297, 313). The measures were content valid,
unidimensional, internally and externally consistent, and had latent
variable reliabilities of .9 or above and average variance extracteds
of .7 or above (Fornell and Larker, 1981). Table 1 summarizes the
psychographic properties of the final test scales.
The normality of the indicators of satisfaction, alternative
attractiveness and exiting was then assessed, and the measurement
model for the linear-terms-only model shown in Figure 1 was estimated
using EQS and maximum likelihood. The resulting measurement parameter
estimates for satisfaction and alternative attractiveness are shown in
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Table 2. These estimates were combined to produce the equations 2 and
3 loadings and error variances for the satisfaction-alternative
attractiveness interaction indicators shown in the Figure 2 structural
model. This structural model was then estimated using EQS and maximum
likelihood by fixing the loadings and error variances for the product
indicators at the Table 2 values. The results are shown in Table 3.
Because the use of product indicators in a structural equation
model renders the model formally non normal, estimates of the standard
errors for the structural effect coefficients cannot be trusted (Hu,
Bentler and Kano, 1992). For emphasis the effect estimates are robust
to departures from normality but the standard errors do not. The
structural model was therefore re-estimated using EQS's "ROBUST"
option to produce more appropriate standard error and chi squared
statistics (Satorra and Bentler, 1988) (see Bentler, 1989, p.217 et
seq.; and Hu, Bentler and Kano, 1992). We also estimated the Figure 2
model using ordinary least squares regression for comparison. These
regression estimates were produced by averaging the indicators for
satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, and exiting, and forming the
interaction term by forming the product variable satisfactionalternative attractiveness in each case. These regression results are
also shown in Table 3.
We will discuss these results and their implications next.
Discussion
The hypothesized associations were supported. Satisfaction
moderated the alternative attractiveness-exiting association: the
alternative attractiveness-exiting interaction effect coefficient was
significant (see Table 3). In addition Table 4 shows the alternative
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attractiveness-exiting effect coefficient with the interaction effect
of satisfaction at selected levels of satisfaction. As shown in this
table, satisfaction attenuated the alternative attractiveness-exiting
association as the level of satisfaction increased. In particular, at
higher levels of satisfaction (e.g., above 4 which corresponded to
"Agree") the alternative attractiveness-exiting association was non
significant. At lower levels of satisfaction the alternative
attractiveness-exiting association, however, was significant.
These results may have implications for practitioners. The
observed lack of association between exiting and alternative
attractiveness at higher levels of satisfaction in this study suggests
that increases in the attractiveness of an alternative (competition)
by itself may not necessarily tempt satisfied customer firms to exit
their current buyer-seller relationship. In other words an
alternative's efforts to be more attractive may not, by itself,
increase exiting inclinations: decreased satisfaction may also be
required. Viewing these results from a lower satisfaction perspective,
increases in alternative attractiveness were associated with increases
in exiting inclinations for less satisfied buyers in the study. This
suggests that less satisfied customer firms may be vulernable to
competitive moves aimed at increasing competitor attractiveness.
In addition the model explained 65% of the variance in exiting
(see "Squared Multiple Correlation for EXI," Table 3), which is
notable for marketing studies. While unmodeled antecedents of exiting
may remain to be identified, their combined contribution to explaining
variance in exiting in this context may not be large. For the busy
channel manager this in turn suggests that satisfaction maintenance
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may be sufficient for relationship maintenance.
Turning to the use of Ping's technique in this study, the
efficacy of the technique was apparent in the study. The coefficient
estimates were directionally similar to the regression estimates. In
addition specifying the Figure 2 interaction involved considerably
less effort than a Kenny and Judd/COSAN specification would have
required, we suspect. A Kenny and Judd/COSAN specification of the
Figure 2 model would have required the creation of 80 additional dummy
variables, one for each term in equations 2 and 3.
While the regression estimates were similar to the structural
equation estimates, they cannot be trusted for variables measured with
error: OLS regression estimates are known to be biased and inefficient
for variables measured with error (Busemeyer and Jones, 1983). The
regression standard error estimates were different from those from the
structural equation analysis, however, especially for the interaction
coefficient, the key parameter in the study. While there are
regression techniques for variables measured with error (see Feucht,
1989 for a summary), these techniques currently lack standard error
estimators, and as a result regression is inappropriate for estimating
effects among latent variables.
However, regression estimates of the satisfaction, alternative
attractiveness, and the interaction effects are useful as starting
values for the structural equation analysis. We used a personal
computer version of EQS, and the starting values from regression
reduced the EQS execution times dramatically.
Starting values from several other sources were also used for the
remaining free parameters in the structural model. Measurement model
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estimates were used for the starting values for the linear variable
variances, covariances, loadings and error variances. A starting value
for the variance of the satisfaction-alternative attractiveness
variable was determined by averaging the indicators of satisfaction
and alternative attractiveness in each case, forming the product of
these two averaged variables in each case, and then calculating the
variance of the result using standard descriptive statistics software.
An estimate of the variance of the structural disturbance term was
calculated by hand using the regression value of R2 and the measurement
model estimate of the variance of exiting (i.e., Var()Var(EXI)(1-R2)).
Several additional comments on the utilization of Ping's
technique may be of interest. Despite the apparent unidimensionality
of the latent variables the measurement and structural model estimates
for the measurement parameters of satisfaction and alternative
attractiveness were different, typically in the third decimal place.
As a result an iterative approach was used to produce the Table 3
results. This was accomplished by recomputing the equation 2 and 3
values using the first structural equation estimates of the
measurement parameters for satisfaction and alternative attractiveness
(i.e., 's, 's, variances and covariances), and re- estimating the
structural model with these revised equation 2 and 3 values fixed.
Table 3, as a result, contains the estimates from the second
structural model run. The effect of this second structural model
estimation was to base the equation 2 and 3 values on structural model
estimates, rather than measurement model estimates. Parenthetically
these refined equation 2 and 3 values had little effect on the
coefficient, standard error or chi-squared estimates between the two
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structural equation estimations.
We obtained inadmissible solutions when the linear terms and the
non linear terms were specified as correlated in the structural model.
As a result the Figure 2 structural model shows correlations between
the linear variables only. Because an interaction is clearly
correlated with its unadjusted linear constituents, this may be a
limitation of Ping's technique. Kenny and Judd (1984) also appeared to
fix the linear-interaction term covariances at zero (although they
freed the covariance between a linear term X and the interaction X*(Z2)
in their third example).
The t-values for the ML coefficient estimates and those for ML
estimates with EQS's ROBUST option were similar (see Table 3). This
suggests that the standard errors produced by Ping's technique (and
indicator product techniques in general) may be robust to formal
departures from normality.
The chi-squared statistic, however, appeared to be distorted by
the formal non normality of the product indicators (see Table 3). The
unscaled null (independence) model and the Figure 2 model chi-squared
statistics were large and misleading because the null model appeared
to fit the data better than the Figure 2 model. As a result the
Comparative Fit Index (Bentler, 1990), which relies on the chi-squared
statistic, was also distorted. The scaled chi-squared statistic
available with the ROBUST option appeared to be more useful. Using the
scaled chi-squared statistic the Figure 2 model appeared to fit the
data (the Chi-Squared p-value was 1), and it produced a Comparative
Fit Index of 1.
These observations suggest there is more work needed in this
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important area.
Summary
The study investigated an hypothesized moderating effect of
overall relationship satisfaction on the association between exiting
and the attractiveness of the alternative relationship in a marketing
channel. The results suggest that the moderating effect is present in
the study context, and that at higher levels of satisfaction, there is
no alternative attractiveness-exiting effect in the study population.
The investigation used Ping's technique for estimating non-linear
latent variable effects. The results suggest that the technique is
reasonably easy to use with existing popular estimation software, in
this case EQS. The effect and standard error estimates appeared to be
robust to the formal departure from normality inherent when product
indicators are used. However the chi-squared estimates appeared to be
affected by the formal non normality, and the scaled chi-squared
estimates available in EQS's ROBUST option appeared to be more
appropriate.
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Table 1
Psychometric Properties of the Measures

Concept

Measure
Parametera

Statistic

Satisfaction

Items
5
df
5
Chi-Squared
5
p-value
.40
CFI
1.00
Avg. Std. Resid. .006
AVE
.77
LV Reliability
.97
Alpha
.92

Alternative
Attractiveness

Items
df
Chi-Squared
p-value
CFI
Avg. Std. Resid.
AVE
LV Reliability
Alpha

Exit

Items
6
df
9
Chi-Squared
9
p-value
.43
CFI
1.00
Avg. Std. Resid. .009
AVE
.72
LV Reliability
.91
Alpha
.96

4
2
1
.19
.99
.004
.78
.91
.91

____________________________
a Items = Number of items in the scale.
df = Chi-squared statistic degrees of freedom.
Chi-Squared = Chi-squared statistic value.
p-value = Attained significance of the chi-squared
statistic.
CFI = Comparative Fit Index (Bentler 1990).
Avg. Std. Resid. = The average of the standardized
covariance matrix residuals.
AVE = Average Variance Extracted (Fornell and Larker
1981).
LV Reliability = Latent Variable Reliability (Fornell
and Larker 1981).
Alpha = Coefficient (Cronbach) alpha value.
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Table 2
Measurement Model Results
Parameter
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
a1
a2
a3
a4
o1
e2
e3
e4
e5
e6
s1
s2
s3

Estimate
0.79
0.88
1.00
0.87
0.94
0.92
0.90
1.00
0.78
0.84
0.83
1.00
0.94
0.96
0.92
0.16
0.13
0.10

Parameter
s4
s5
a1
a2
a3
a4
e1
e2
e3
e4
e5
e6
SAT
SATALT
SATEXI
ALT
ALTEXI
EXI

Equations 2 and 3 Values:
Parameter
Value Parameter
s1a1
s1a2
s1a3
s1a4
s2a1
s2a2
s2a3
s2a4
s3a1
s3a2
s3a3
s3a4
s4a1
s4a2
s4a3
s4a4
s5a1
s5a2
s5a3

.533
.509
.625
.384
.669
.639
.784
.482
.852
.815
1.000
.615
.657
.628
.770
.473
.755
.722
.885

s1a1
s1a2
s1a3
s1a4
s2a1
s2a2
s2a3
s2a4
s3a1
s3a2
s3a3
s3a4
s4a1
s4a2
s4a3
s4a4
s5a1
s5a2
s5a3

Estimate
0.12
0.10
0.27
0.24
0.07
0.24
0.52
0.19
0.11
0.32
0.09
0.12
0.51
-0.37
-0.43
0.84
0.51
0.79
Value
.257
.239
.180
.207
.242
.224
.151
.198
.251
.231
.140
.208
.231
.213
.142
.189
.227
.209
.128
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s5a4

.544

s5a4

.188

Table 3
Structural Model Estimation Results
Structural Equation Analysis Estimates:
Parameter
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
a1
a2
a3
a4
o1
e2
e3
e4
e5
e6
s1
s2
s3
s4

Estimate
0.79
0.88
1.00
0.87
0.94
0.92
0.90
1.00
0.78
0.84
0.83
1.00
0.94
0.96
0.92
0.16
0.13
0.10
0.12

Parameter
s5
a1
a2
a3
a4
e1
e2
e3
e4
e5
e6
SAT
SATALT
ALT
SATALT
EXI
EXI,SAT
EXI,ALT
EXI,SATALT

Estimate
0.10
0.27
0.24
0.08
0.23
0.53
0.19
0.11
0.32
0.09
0.12
0.50
-0.37
0.84
17.95
0.34
-0.35
0.65
-0.05

t-value
ML
ROBUSTa

4.59
10.58
5.64

4.79
9.61
5.45
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Fit Indices
Chi-Squared Statistic Value
p-Value of Chi-Squared Value
Bentler (1990) Comparative Fit Index
Null Model 2
Chi-Squared Degrees of Freedom
Squared Multiple Correlation for EXI
Total Coef. of Determination

ML
88248
.000
.000
25884
595
.65
.65

ROBUSTa
380
1.000
1.000
18831
595

OLS Regression Estimates:
Dependent
Variable
EXI
EXI
EXI

Independent
Variable
SAT
ALT
SATALT

b Coefficient
-.287
.745
-.100

F-value
p-value
and (p)
.07
79.52 (.00)
.00
.07

___________________________________
a ML = Maximum Likelihood estimate.
ROBUST = ML estimate with EQS ROBUST option (Satorra and
Bentler 1988) (see Bentler 1989, p.217 et seq.; and Hu,
Bentler and Kano 1992).

R2
.52
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Table 4
Satisfaction Moderation of the Alternative
Attractiveness-Exiting Association
SAT
Valuea
1
2
3
4
5

ALT
Coefficientb
0.596
0.539
0.482
0.425
0.368

SE of the
Coefficientc
0.1239
0.1859
0.2510
0.3173
0.3841

t-value
4.80
2.89
1.91
1.33
0.95

__________________________
a Satisfaction ranged from 1 (=low) to 5 in the study.
b The coefficient of ALT is given by .65ALT-.05SAT*ALT =
(.65-.05SAT)ALT.
c The Standard Error of the ALT coefficient is given by
______________
√Var(bALT-bSATSAT)
______________________________________
= √Var(bALT)+SAT2Var(bSAT)+2SATCov(bALT,bSAT)) .
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Fig. 1. Linear-Terms-Only Measurement Model

's
SATa
si's
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5

ALT

EXI

ai's

ei's

a1 a2 a3 a4
a1 a2 a3 a4

e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6

e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6

_______________________
a SAT = Satisfaction, ALT = Alternative Attractiveness, EXI = Exiting.
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Fig. 2. Structural Model

s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
si's
SATa
ei's

ALT

EXI

ai's

e1
e2
e3
e4
e5
e6

e1
e2
e3
e4
e5
e6

a1 a2 a3 a4
a1 a2 a3 a4

SAT*ALT
siaj's
s1a1 s1a2...s1a4 s2a1...s5a4
s1a1 s1a2...s1a4 s2a1...s5a4

________________________
a SAT = Satisfaction, ALT = Alternative Attractiveness,
SAT*ALT = Satisfaction-Alternative Attractiveness Interaction,
EXI = Exiting.

The Effects of Satisfaction and Structural Constraints on
Retailer Exiting, Voice, Loyalty, Opportunism and Neglect

Abstract
This article reports the results of a field survey of the relationship between hardware retailers' satisfaction and their response intentions when there are channel relationship problems. The
objective was to test a model from the social psychology literature due to Rusbult, Zembrodt and
Gunn (1982) of the relationships between the response intention variables; exiting, voice, loyalty,
opportunism, and neglect, and their antecedents; satisfaction, and the "structural constraints"
(Johnson 1982) of alternative attractiveness, investments and switching cost, using structural
equation analysis. The results suggest that the model does apply to a channel context, and the study
sheds some light on interfirm response intentions to interfirm relationship problems.

The channel legal literature1 regularly provides hints of responses to channel relationship
problems (e.g., Business Electronics v. Sharp 1988, and Continental TV v. Sylvania 1977). One
could ask several interesting questions about these troubled relationships, including what caused
them to flounder and eventually terminate? Diminished relationship satisfaction is probably
necessary, but is it always sufficient? Most Chrysler dealers did not terminate their Chrysler
franchise during their satisfaction nadir accompanying Chrysler's restructuring in the 1970's.
As a result one could ask, what holds a troubled channel relationship together? Unattractive
alternatives or high switching cost are plausible candidates, but are there other "structural constraints" in a channel relationship?
For a firm having supplier or institutional customer problems, are there other viable
responses besides exiting? Anecdotal evidence suggests that channel relationship problems
generate complaints. But, are there other responses as well?
This research proposes and tests a model, derived from the romantic relationships research
of Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn (1982), which relates general responses to relationship problems
1

See for example "Legal Developments in Marketing," topic 4.2, in the Journal of Marketing.
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(exiting, voice, loyalty, opportunism, and neglect), to antecedents of these responses (satisfaction,
alternative attractiveness, investments, and switching cost). The research question was simply,
does this model apply to buyer-seller relationships in an institutional context such as a marketing
channel?
Conceptually this investigation concentrates on the committed and dissolution phases of
Dwyer, Schurr and Oh's (1987) framework for buyer-seller relationship development. This channel
relationship life cycle framework was comprised of several stages through which buyer-seller relationships pass to reach what Macneil (1974) described as relational exchanges, and Dwyer, Schurr
and Oh termed the committed phase of the buyer-seller relationship.
While the committed phase is the locus of much of the current channel research2, until
recently channel research has paid little attention to the last phase: dissolution. As a result we know
little, for example, of the factors affecting the termination of marketing channel relationships.
Illuminating the termination phase could help avoid channel relationship termination and
its associated costs both economic and psychic. Anecdotal evidence suggests that once problems
become endemic, relationship satisfaction declines, conflict increases, and monitoring costs
increase on both sides of the relationship. The low satisfaction firm's relationship investments
slow, and without exit barriers (Porter 1980) such as switching costs, the low satisfaction firm may
exit the relationship. Exiting, in turn, involves costs. Exiting may obsolete transaction specific
assets on both sides of the relationship. In addition it may require both firms to incur additional
costs such as search, negotiation and monitoring costs, and make additional investments in transaction specific assets to establish and build a new exchange relationship.

2

An incomplete enumeration of recent articles would include Dwyer and Walker (1981); Frazier (1983a) (1983b);
Frazier and Summers (1984); John (1984); Dwyer and Welsh (1985); Anderson and Narus (1984); Kale (1986);
Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987); Heide and John (1988); and Frazier, Spekman and O'Neal (1988).
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Researchers have commented on the need for research on troubled marketing channel
relationships. In summarizing the aftermath of a marketing channel relationship termination,
Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) called for research into marketing channel relationship dissolution.
Ping and Dwyer (1988) noted that knowledge of dissolution forces provides closure in channel
research, and promises significant implications for channel management (p. 245).
After reporting the results of interviews with firms with troubled relationships, we will
argue that the Rusbult et al. (1982) model applies in a channel context, then test this argument with
a field survey and structural equation analysis of hardware retailers involving their relationship
with their primary supplier.
We begin with a summary of related research that also introduces the study concepts.
Background
Economics
In the economics literature Hirschman (1970) proposed that exit (relationship termination)
was one of several responses to exchange relationship problems. He argued that members or clients
(customers) of person-organization dyads had three behavioral options when responding to organizational performance "lapses" or problems: they could exit the relationship, they could use voice,
or they could do nothing and remain loyal. Exit was the individual's cessation of buying the firm's
product(s), or leaving the organization. Voice involved remaining in the relationship and actively
working with the relationship partner to remedy problems. Loyal behavior also involved remaining
in the relationship but the loyal individual suffered in silence, with confidence that things would
get better. Hirschman proposed that these exit, voice and loyalty responses depended on the level
of overall relationship satisfaction, the attractiveness of an alternative relationship, and the
switching costs associated with leaving the current relationship and establishing the alternative.
Social Psychology

4
The romantic relationships literature has also addressed responses to inter-person
problems3. In a study of couples Rusbult et al. (1982) proposed that responses to problems
included Hirschman's exit, voice and loyalty responses, and Farrell's (1983) neglect response.
Neglect involved reducing contact with the relationship partner. Rusbult et al. also proposed that
these general responses to problems depended upon, in addition to the Hirschman antecedents
(satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, and switching cost), relationship investments: the time,
effort and money spent to build and maintain the relationship.
Organizational Behavior
Similarly, the organizational behavior literature has addressed employee responses to
employer-employee problems4. Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers, and Mainous (1988) argued that declined
employee satisfaction lead to employee exit, voice, loyalty or neglect. In addition, they proposed
and tested a model identical with Rusbult et al.'s (1982) romantic relationships model described
above.
Marketing
The marketing channel literature has addressed interfirm relationship dissolution. Dwyer,
Schurr and Oh (1987) argued that the process of buyer-seller relationship development consisted of
awareness, exploration, expansion, commitment, and dissolution phases. In their description of the
dissolution phase, they offered Duck's (1982) process model of interpersonal relationship dissolution as a framework for the process of interfirm relationship termination. Duck's model was comprised of four broad stages: intrapsychic, dyadic, social, and "grave dressing" stages.
3

This area has received considerable theoretical and empirical attention. A partial list of relevant articles includes
Baxter (1983) (1985) (1986); Duck (1981) (1982); Hatfield and Walster (1985); Johnson (1982); Rodin (1982);
Rusbult (1980) (1983); Rusbult and Zembrodt (1983); Rusbult, Johnson, Morrow (1986a) (1986b); and Rusbult,
Farrell, Rodgers, Mainous (1988).
4

This literature is also extensive and relevant articles include Mobley, Griffeth, Hand and Meglino (1979); Porter,
Steers, Mowday and Boulian (1974); Price (1977); and Rosse and Hulin (1985).
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Offering a graph-based view of a marketing channel relationship, Ping and Dwyer (1988)
argued that the perceptual distance between partner firm's role performance (Frazier 1983b) and
the role performance available from an alternative firm, was positively associated with propensity
to terminate.
Paralleling Johnson (1982), Ping (1990) noted that firms remained in a buyer-seller relationship because they either want to or have to. He proposed that satisfaction and the availability of
alternative relationships interacted to affect buyer-seller propensity to terminate. Ping's laboratory
results suggested that propensity to terminate was negatively affected by satisfaction and positively
affected by the availability of alternatives, but the interaction of these variables was not significant.
The consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction literature has addressed responses to consumer
purchase dissatisfaction. Richins (1987) argued that the responses to consumer purchase
dissatisfaction were complaints (see Singh and Howell 1985 for a review), negative word of mouth
(Diener and Grayser 1978, Richins 1983), and brand switching (LaBarbra and Mazursky 1983).
Although she did not cite Hirschman (1970), complaints and brand switching appeared remarkably
similar to voice and exit. Singh (1990) has explicitly proposed exit and voice as responses to
consumer purchase dissatisfaction.

The picture that emerges is that there are several general reactions to relationship problems:
loyalty, voice, exit, and neglect. And, these responses are generally associated with satisfaction,
alternative attractiveness, investments, and switching cost. In the following paragraphs we
investigate these matters in a marketing channel context.
Responses to Channel Relationship Problems
In exploratory interviews with firms that were contemplating or had recently completed
channel relationship terminations, we found hints of the responses to relationship problems just
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discussed. These interviews involved suppliers, distributors, and retailers in an area surrounding a
major metropolitan university. We contacted key informants responsible for "up-channel" or
"down-channel" relationships with titles ranging from owner to purchasing manager.
The informants in the distributor and retailer group generally reported problems created
either by the partner firm's actions, or their inaction. These problems prompted subject firm
responses including ignoring the problem (loyalty), or complaining to the partner firm (voice).
Chronic unsuccessful resolution of these problems may have reduced the subject firm's overall
satisfaction, and produced opportunism, neglect or thoughts of exiting.
However, the informants reported that decisions regarding exiting were complex. While not
consistently reported, lack of an attractive alternative, many relationship investments, and the high
cost associated with switching to an alternative buyer-seller relationship appeared to make the
exiting decision difficult. In addition, there were hints of these variables' associations with the
other responses to relationship problems. For example, an attractive alternative, few relationship
investments, and low switching cost also seemed to be associated with opportunism and neglect.
Encouraged by these anecdotal reports, the favorable model validation results in other
dyads (Rusbult, et al. 1982; Rusbult, et al. 1988), and the channel political-economic arguments
that "sentiments," such as overall satisfaction, should be associated with behaviors such as exiting5,
we maintain that responses to channel relationship problems include exiting, voice, loyalty,
opportunism, and neglect. In addition, satisfaction, and the structural constraint variables, alterna-

5
Stern and Reve (1980) proposed that a marketing channel can be viewed as an institution with internal and external
economic and political structures and processes. Achrol, Reve and Stern (1983) argued that the political economy
domains (external, internal, polity, and economy) were associated, and Dwyer and Oh (1987) among others have
confirmed some of these associations. Stern and Reve proposed that sentiments and behaviors were associated, and
specifically mentioned the link between satisfaction and exiting.
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tive attractiveness, investments and switching cost, should be associated with these responses as
shown in Figure 1.
Hypotheses
It is our contention that in channel relationships satisfaction and the structural constraint
variables are associated with the responses to problems attributed to the relationship partner.
Increases in the levels of the subject firm's overall satisfaction, investments and switching cost
should make economic exchanges with its partner firm perceptually more valuable. As satisfaction,
relationship investments, and switching cost increase, subject firms should respond positively to
relationship problems by working with the partner firm (voice), or not rocking the boat (loyalty). In
these circumstances, subject firms should be likely to be disinclined to exhibit relationship destructive (Rusbult et al. 1982) responses such as opportunism, reduced contact with the partner firm
(neglect), or exiting because there is much to lose. Thus,
H1: Satisfaction, investments and switching cost are positively associated with loyalty and
voice, and negatively associated with exiting, opportunism, and neglect.
Previous studies lend some support to these assertions. As we mentioned earlier Ping
(1990) reported that satisfaction was negatively associated with exiting. Anderson (1988) reported
that investments were negatively associated with opportunism for sales reps. In romantic
relationships Rusbult et al. (1982) reported that prior (relationship) satisfaction and relationship
investments were negatively associated with exiting and neglect, and positively associated with
loyalty and voice.
The subject firms' perception of the attractiveness of the best alternative exchange
relationship should have a different consequence. As the attractiveness of the alternative
relationship increases, subject firms should be less likely to be passive (Rusbult et al. 1982) in the
face of problems. Subject firms should actively respond to problems by confronting the incumbent
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(voice), looking out for number one (being opportunistic), or exiting, and should be disinclined to
respond passively by being loyal or neglectful. Hence,
H2: Alternative attractiveness is positively associated with voice, opportunism,
and exiting, and negatively associated with loyalty and neglect.
There is also some empirical support for these statements. In the employment relationship
literature Rusbult et al. (1988) reported that alternative quality was positively associated with exit
and voice. Ping (1990) reported that alternative attractiveness was positively associated with exiting.

The balance of this paper presents the results of a test of these hypotheses.
Method
The test involved a field survey and a LISREL structural equation analysis to determine the
associations among these concepts. We gathered data from hardware retailers concerning their
loyalty to their primary supplier, and their voice, opportunism, neglect and exit propensity6
responses, along with their satisfaction with that supplier, the attractiveness of the best alternative
supplier, relationship investments and perceived switching cost.
Sample Design
The study surveyed hardware retailers in the 50 U.S. states. The key informant within these
sampling units was the store owner or executive. We randomly drew the sample of these
informants from the subscription list for a hardware retailing industry publication that appeared to
represent all the U.S. hardware retailers.

6

Because this study surveyed existing supplier relationships, we operationalized exit as the propensity to terminate
the existing relationship.
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The final test mailer sent to 600 names and addresses included a $2 response incentive and
it, with two follow-up post card mailings, produced 288 responses (a 47% response rate-- 9
questionnaires were returned as undeliverable). Two hundred and twenty two of these responses
ultimately were deemed usable (incomplete cases were deleted). Table 1 profiles the final test
responses.
Measures
The measurement of the study concepts used a combination of new and existing multi item
Likert scales. For example satisfaction, the firm's global evaluation of relationship fulfillment
(Dwyer and Oh 1987), was measured using a modification of the Dwyer and Oh (1987)
satisfaction scale inspired by Gaski and Nevin (1985). Satisfaction's domain includes all relationship characteristics that the subject firm deems "rewarding, profitable, instrumental" (Rukert and
Churchill 1984), or costly, unfair or frustrating. The satisfaction scale items addressed overall
satisfaction, fairness, and a good company to do business with. Appendix A presents the final test
versions of this and the other study measures.
Opportunism, self interest seeking with guile (Williamson 1975), was also measured using
a modification of an existing scale: Dwyer and Oh's (1987) opportunism scale, that was derived
from John's (1984) scale. John characterized the items in his scale as distortion of information,
failure to fulfill promises, and a shirking of obligations. The scale items involved non-compliance
when the relationship partner will not notice, not volunteering information, exaggeration/alteration
of reports, and shirking.
New scales were developed for the other study measures. Alternative attractiveness, the
subject firm's estimation of the satisfaction available in an alternative channel relationship, was
operationalized as the perceived global evaluation of the additional relationship fulfillment available in the best alternative supplier relationship. Alternative attractiveness' conceptualization
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encompasses the subject firm's generalized perceptions of the rewards, and costs available in the
most salient alternative economic exchange relationship. The scale items concerned a good
supplier company, their fairness, supplier products and services, their policies, and overall satisfaction with the supplier.
Investments, the costs the subject firm electively incurs to build and maintain the channel
relationship in anticipation of future exchanges, were operationalized as the perceived magnitude
of the relationship assets that would be lost or no longer useful if the relationship were terminated.
Its conceptual domain involves sunk economic and opportunity costs such as money, time, and
effort. The investment items dealt with overall relationship investments, investment uniqueness,
and the time, effort and energy put into building and maintaining the exchange relationship.
Switching cost, the perceptions of the magnitude of the additional costs required to
terminate the current channel relationship and secure the alternative, were operationalized as the
perceived additional cost and effort to change suppliers. The domain of switching cost
encompasses monetary expenses to end the current relationship and secure the alternative, and the
psychic costs incurred in expenditures of time and effort. The switching cost scale items involved
costs/spending time and money to switch suppliers, and losses in switching suppliers.
Because this study investigated existing buyer-seller relationships, we operationalized
exiting, the subject firm physically leaving the relationship, as the propensity to terminate the
current primary wholesaler-- the disinclination to continue the current relationship with the top full
line wholesaler. The resulting items dealt with thinking of exiting, looking for a replacement
relationship, considering a replacement, and the intention to exit.
We measured voice, the subject firm's active and constructive attempts to change conditions, as the intention to work directly with the partner firm to attempt to change conditions
actively and constructively. Its domain includes seeking joint problem removal and relationship
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maintenance, confronting the partner firm with problems in a positive way, and discussing and
working cooperatively with the partner firm to improve the situation. The voice items addressed
talking to partner, suggesting and discussing changes, and working with partner to solve mutual
problems.
The study operationalized loyalty, abiding relationship problems in silence with confidence
that things will get better, as the predisposition to live with the situation rather than confront the
partner firm. The conceptual domain of loyalty involves viewing problems as transitory phenomena that correct themselves: they go away and are forgotten. Problems either work themselves out or
the partner firm fixes them, so there is little reason to worry. The loyal firm either ignores problems
or assumes they will go away, and concentrates on continuing with business as usual. Loyalty
items addressed not mentioning problems, disregarding/overlooking/ignoring problems, and belief
that problems fix themselves.
We measured neglect, reduced physical contact with the partner firm, as the intention to
reduce physical contact with the principal wholesaler. Its conceptualization encompasses partially
reduced physical contact, in which little effort is expended to maintain the relationship, and the
relationship is a succession of discrete exchanges (Macneil 1980). In more extreme cases it
includes ignoring the partner firm's attempts to resolve problems, and just letting the exchange
relationship deteriorate. The resulting neglect scale items dealt with letting the relationship deteriorate, taking no action to improve relations, not caring about partner, and letting the relationship die.
To develop the new measures we generated definitions of the concept domains guided by
existing theorizing in the marketing channel, economics, romantic relationships, and employment
relations literatures. Many items were developed from pre-survey interviews with hardware retailer
key informants.
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The resulting Likert scale items were evaluated by a jury of academicians, and then
combined with the satisfaction and opportunism scales to produce a multipage questionnaire with
five point balanced Likert scale items. We administered this questionnaire to a convenient group of
hardware retailers, and then tested it in a pretest mailer.
Using the pretest responses we gauged the psychometric properties of the measures using
item-total correlations, ordered similarity coefficients (Hunter 1973), apparent construct validity,
and coefficient alpha calculations. The resulting measures were face valid, unidimensional, and
internally/externally consistent7, and had coefficient alphas of .8 or above. Appendix A presents
the final scale items.
When the final test responses were available we reexamined the psychometric properties of
the measures before structural equation coefficient estimation using item-total correlations, ordered
similarity coefficients, LISREL single factor analysis (Joreskog and Sorbom 1984), multiple group
analysis (Anderson, Gerbing and Hunter 1987), and coefficient alpha calculations. Table 2
summarizes the psychographic properties of the final test scales.
Several measures required single item deletions to attain internal consistency (see
Appendix A). The bases for dropping an item were an examination of construct validity, LISREL
single factor analysis, normalized residuals, and multiple group analysis communalities. For
example the study measured voice with items addressing talking to partner, suggesting and
discussing changes, and working with partner to solve mutual problems. Before structural equation
parameter estimation was accomplished the "will suggest changes . . ." item (item 1) was dropped.

7

Based on the ordered similarity coefficients (Hunter 1973) for the items (see Gerbing and Anderson 1988).
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Similarly,

loyalty

items

addressed

not

mentioning

problems,

disregard-

ing/overlooking/ignoring problems, and belief that problems fix themselves. Item 5, "overlook
problems . . .," was dropped for parameter estimation.
The opportunism measure was comprised of items dealing with non-compliance when the
relationship partner will not notice, not volunteering information, exaggeration/alteration of
reports, and shirking. An item involving "shirking" (item 5) was dropped.
We measured neglect with items dealing with letting the relationship deteriorate, taking no
action to improve relations, not caring about partner, and letting the relationship die. A "not caring"
item (item 2) was dropped before parameter estimation.
Items from the domain of alternative attractiveness concerned the alternative's being a good
company, their fairness, products and services, policies, and estimated overall satisfaction. The
fairness item (item 1) was dropped.
The items from the domain of switching cost dealt with costs/spending time and money to
switch partners, and losses in switching partners. One of the spending time and money items (item
1) was deleted for parameter estimation.
The resulting measures were face valid, unidimensional, and internally and externally
consistent. The coefficient alpha (Table 2), latent variable (Fornell and Larker 1981) reliabilities
(Table 3), and the average variances extracted8 (Table 3) suggested that the measures are reliable.
The average variances extracted also suggested discriminant validity9.
8

Fornell and Larker (1981) proposed that a latent variable's average variance extracted, which ranges between 0 and
1, measures the fraction of latent variable construct (non-error) variance. As a result, a latent variable's average variance
extracted value of more than .5 suggests that the latent variable's measurement error variance is less than the variance
due to the construct, and convergent validity (reliability) is indicated.
9

Fornell and Larker (1981) argued that discriminant validity for a pair of latent variables is suggested by average
variance extracted values (Table 3) for each of these variables that are both larger than the squared standardized path
coefficient between them (this coefficient is the squared correlation between these variables, which is given by the
square of the relevant above diagonal value in the Table 3 covariance matrix).
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Results
Specifying Figure 1 as a measurement model produced the measurement model results
shown in Table 3. Although the traditional fit statistics (GFI and AGFI) for this measurement
model were low, the number of normalized-residuals greater than 2 and the comparative fit index
(Bentler 1990) suggested an acceptable measurement model specification.
We then specified the Figure 1 model as the structural model shown in Figure 2 and
produced the maximum likelihood parameter estimates10 shown in Table 4.
The traditional fit statistics for this structural equation model were also low, but the normalized residual behavior and the comparative fit index statistics were acceptable (see Table 4).
Hypotheses Tests
Of the satisfaction, investments and switching cost hypothesis 1 associations, six were
significant11 (see Table 4). Satisfaction's associations with exiting, voice, and neglect were significant and as hypothesized. In addition, investment's associations with voice and neglect were as
hypothesized, as was switching cost's association with loyalty.
The hypothesis 2 alternative associations were also selectively significant. The alternative
attractiveness-opportunism, and exiting associations were as hypothesized. The alternativeattractiveness-neglect association was significant but negative, rather than positive as
hypothesized.
The observed results' consistency with prior research was mixed. Table 5 compares prior
research results with the present study. For example the present study's significant satisfactionexiting and alternative attractiveness-exiting associations were consistent with prior research, while

10

The Figure 2 structural equation model is an identified Type 1 model (Long 1983) so the identification proof is
omitted.
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the lack of an observed investments-exiting association was not. Similarly, the satisfaction-voice
association in the present study was consistent with prior research, but the significant investmentsvoice association has not been consistently reported. The lack of a significant alternative
attractiveness-voice association in the present study was also consistent with some prior research
results but inconsistent with others. Similarly the satisfaction-neglect and investments-neglect
results were consistent but the alternative attractiveness-neglect association and the loyalty results
were not.
Discussion
These results prompt several observations. First, despite the selective support for the
hypotheses, the model appears to apply to a channel context. Each exogenous variable was
significantly associated with one or more endogenous variables. And, each endogenous variable
was associated with one or more exogenous variables.
Second, as suggested above, several hypothesized associations were context sensitive. For
example, alternatives was not associated with voice in romantic relationships, it positively affected
voice in employment relationships, and was not associated with voice in this study. Similarly
loyalty variously had alternatives and investment antecedents in studies in other contexts, but did
not in this study's channel context. However, neglect was not associated with alternative attractiveness in other dyads, but the association was significant in this study.
Third, the model explained less variation in loyalty, voice and opportunism than in exiting
and neglect. Table 4 shows the squared multiple correlations for exiting and neglect were .35 or
above, but this value for voice and opportunism is .13 and .12, respectively, and .04 for loyalty.
This suggests that there were unmodeled antecedents of these variables. Indeed, while plausible

11

Based on the traditional minimum critical ratio (t-statistic) of coefficient to standard error of 2.
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reasons for the lack of explained variation in loyalty are not immediately obvious, Hirschman
argued that the expectation of the success of voice and the advantage to be gained by voice
affected voice (Hirschman 1970), and that voice itself was rewarding (Hirschman 1974).
Hirschman (1970) also contended that industry characteristics (e.g., concentration, competition, or
loose monopoly) affected exiting, voice and loyalty. Similarly, Bandura (1978) argued that the size
of the gain to be realized and the expectation of success affected instrumental aggression, which
may be related to opportunism. The exclusion of these plausible antecedents in the present study
suggests opportunities for additional investigation exist.
Fourth, several disconfirmed associations are interesting. Exiting, for example, was not
associated with investments or switching cost, contrary to Porter's (1980) and Thibaut and Kelly's
(1959) predictions. A comparison between the significant Table 3 latent variable correlations
between exiting and these two variables, and the structural model coefficients for these two
relationships shown in Table 4, suggests these two relationships may be mis-specified. That is,
exiting may actually affect investments and switching cost, rather than the other way around as
specified in the Figure 2 model. Stated another way, as propensity to exit increased investments
and switching cost may somehow have been perceptually discounted, and thereby reduced.
Similarly opportunism was not associated with investments or switching cost, contrary to
expectations and Transaction Cost Analysis (Williamson 1975) predictions. Here misspecification
may not account for the observed lack of a switching cost association because the measurement
model switching cost-opportunism association was not significant. There may, however, be an
unmodeled variable such as goal congruence (see Anderson 1988) that explains the variance in
both switching cost and opportunism.
Returning to the lack of explained loyalty variance, while the alternative-loyalty and
investments-loyalty associations appeared context sensitive (see Table 5), the satisfaction-loyalty
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association has been consistently significant in previous studies. None of these associations were
significant in the measurement model, and it is possible that this is a different type of
misspecification. While it is not clear how, or even if, such relationships could be hypothesized,
these variables may be non-linearly related to loyalty. Such non-linear associations would fail to
produce significant measurement model or linear-terms-only structural equation coefficients.
Fifth, several confirmed and disconfirmed associations have management implications. For
example satisfaction was significantly associated with exiting, voice, and neglect, and not
associated with loyalty and opportunism. This supports the channel management maxim that satisfaction is necessary for relationship maintenance. In addition, while voice does not encompass all
complaint behavior, in this study as satisfaction increased positive "complaining" did too. In other
words some "complainers" were satisfied customers. This underscores the complexity of satisfaction in long term exchange relationships: an exchange partner may be dissatisfied with an
individual event, yet still satisfied with the relationship overall. Hirschman (1970) hinted at both in
referring to a firm's "repairable lapses" and deterioration of a firm's performance (p.1). Repairable
lapses referred to negative evaluations of individual events: event dissatisfaction. Deterioration of
performance referred to the overall evaluation of the performer or the relationship. Thibaut and
Kelly (1959) also suggested this distinction between the evaluation of relationship events and the
relationship itself in their focus on both the rewards/costs of an interaction, and the evaluation of
the relationship (CL and CLAlt). It is easy to speculate that event satisfactions built overall
relationship satisfaction, which then increased buyer-seller relationship commitment (Dwyer,
Schurr and Oh 1987), and thereby the satisfactory disposition of a voice built a buyer-seller
relationship.
For channel managers neglect may spell trouble when it comes to gaining down-channel
cooperation. In the interviews neglect produced relationships that were a succession of discrete
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exchanges (Macneil 1980). These relationships were characterized by for example, ordering in
writing not over the phone, and delegating contact to low level staff. In extreme cases neglect
included dropping several product lines, ignoring the partner firm's attempts to resolve problems,
and just letting the exchange relationship drift. In this study neglect was negatively associated with
satisfaction and investments, and positively associated alternative attractiveness. Based on effect
sizes, maintained satisfaction and reduced perceptions of alternative attractiveness were important
for reduced neglect, and by implication increased potential for cooperation and coordination.
Returning to opportunism, it was associated only with alternative attractiveness: satisfaction, investments and switching cost did not affect opportunism. This suggests that the much
hypothesized (Williamson 1975) effects of investments and switching cost on opportunism were
either contextual or more complicated than originally proposed (e.g., involving goal congruence-see p. 17). However based on this study, the antecedents of opportunism included the opportunists'
perception of alternative attractiveness: the alternative attractiveness-opportunism effect was
among the largest in the study.
The study firms reported generally low levels of all reactions except voice. This suggests
that as a group they preferred voice and working to improve relationship problems. It is tempting
to speculate on the likelihood of favorable long term relationship impact of this apparent voice
bias. The study's relatively satisfied subject firms sought opportunities to contact the supplier with
problems (voice). Satisfactory resolution of these problems increased the likelihood of future
contact, and satisfaction built. This upward satisfaction spiral, in turn, reduced neglect and exiting.
The satisfaction-exiting association was the largest in the study, and satisfaction, with
alternative attractiveness, explained over half the variance in exiting. Increased satisfaction was
therefore essential to reducing these firms exiting propensity. This was followed closely by the
need for the supplier firm to differentiate itself and reduce the attractiveness of the subject firm's
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alternative buyer-seller relationship. These results cast some doubt on the channel management
maxim that the mobility barriers of investments and switching cost reduce a buyer firm's
inclination to exit. The significant satisfaction and alternative attractiveness effects on exiting
suggest that increased satisfaction and the relationship partner's decreased perception of attractive
alternatives were the key to reduced exit inclination.
Limitations
As we have seen the Figure 2 model may have been was somewhat mis-specified. The
measurement model also showed significant interrelationships within both the exogenous and
endogenous variables, but the structural model reflected these relationships only vaguely using
correlations. While the effects of this lack of specification are uncertain, the study results should be
considered preliminary and suggestive.
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Table 1
PROFILE OF THE FINAL TEST RESPONSES
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════
First Title Mentioned

Frequency

Owner, partner
President
General Manager
Chief Financial Officer
Other
Not reported

120
67
6
4
18
7

Total

222

Reported Last
Year's Sales
>$10MM
$3-9.99MM
$1.2-2.99MM
$0.6-1.199MM
$0.25-0.599MM
$0.1-0.299MM
$.01-.099MM
$<.01MM
Unreported
Total
Years With
Primary Wholesaler
1-2
3-5
6-10
11-20
21-30
31+
Unreported
Total

Frequency
5
8
28
34
47
39
22
0
39
222

Frequency
19
54
51
57
21
19
1
222

Table 2
PSYCHOMETRIC PROPERTIES OF THE FINAL TEST SCALES
══════════════════════════════════════════════════

Construct

Parameter*

Satisfaction

Items
df
Chi-Squared
p-value
GFI
AGFI
RMS Residual
Alpha

Alternative
Attractiveness

Items
df
Chi-Squared
p-value
GFI
AGFI
RMS Residual
Alpha

Fit Statistics
Final Test
Parameter EstiScale
mation Scale
5
6
6
.26
.99
.98
.009
.94
5
6
20
0

.93

Investments

Items
df
Chi-Squared
p-value
GFI
AGFI
RMS Residual
Alpha

Switching
Costs

Items
df
Chi-Squared
p-value
GFI
AGFI
RMS Residual
Alpha

5
6
11
.038

Items
df
Chi-Squared
p-value
GFI
AGFI
RMS Residual
Alpha

5
6
53
0

Loyalty

4
3
4
.12
.99
.99
.011
.92
5
6
18
.003
.97
.96
.021
.91

.94

.86

4
3
.87
.64
.99
.99
.004
.94
4
3
2.5
.47
.99
.99
.014
.81

Table 2 (Continued)
PSYCHOMETRIC PROPERTIES OF THE FINAL TEST SCALES
══════════════════════════════════════════════════

Construct

Parameter*

Voice

Items
df
Chi-Squared
p-value
GFI
AGFI
RMS Residual
Alpha

Opportunism

Neglect

Exit

Fit Statistics
Final Test
Parameter EstiScale
mation Scale

Items
df
Chi-Squared
p-value
GFI
AGFI
RMS Residual
Alpha
Items
df
Chi-Squared
p-value
GFI
AGFI
RMS Residual
Alpha

5
6
75
0

.91
6
10
84
0

.86
5
6
65
0

.92

Items
df
Chi-Squared
p-value
GFI
AGFI
RMS Residual
Alpha

───────────────────────
* Items = Number of items in the scale.
df = LISREL Chi-squared statistic degrees of freedom.
Chi-Squared = LISREL Chi-squared statistic value.
p-value = Attained significance of the LISREL chi-squared statistic.
GFI = LISREL goodness of fit index.
AGFI = LISREL adjusted goodness of fit index.
RMS Residual = LISREL root mean squared residual.
Alpha = Coefficient (Cronbach) alpha value.

4
3
2
.30
.99
.99
.007
.92
5
6
8.72
.19
.98
.97
.015
.80
4
3
1
.40
.99
.99
.008
.91
6
10
54
0
.94
.89
.020
.95

Table 3
MEASUREMENT MODEL RESULTSa
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Latent
Variable

1

1. Satisfaction
2. Alt. Attract.
3. Investments
4. Switching Cost
5. Loyalty
6. Voice
7. Opportunism
8. Neglect
9. Exit
Meanb
Standard Deviationb

3

Latent Variable
4
5
6

7

8

9

.35*
-.28*
.86
.46
-.03
.22
-.13
-.29
-.23
3.73
.75

.26* .01
.30*
-.40* .04 -.09
.54* -.04
.25*
.84
.10
.15*
.09
.85 -.31*
.13 -.26
.84
-.04
.24 -.21
-.22
.11 -.33
-.20
.04 -.21
3.25 2.36 4.09
.98
.71
.42

-.21*
.30*
-.17*
-.05
.31*
-.28*
.69
.35
.32
2.24
.61

-.55*
.46*
-.34*
-.26*
.12*
-.39*
.45*
.85
.61
1.85
.62

-.67*
.62*
-.27*
-.23*
.04
-.25*
.41*
.70*
.87
2.13
.84

2

.82 -.56*
-.48
.91
.30 -.25
.22 -.35
.01
.04
.25 -.08
-.16
.24
-.46
.41
-.57
.56
4.16 2.54
.67
.86

Fit Indices:
Chi-Squared Degrees of Freedom
Chi-Squared Statistic Value
p-Value of Chi-Squared Value
Goodness of Fit Index
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index
RMS Residual
Normalized Residuals greater than 2
Bentler (1990) Comparative Fit Index

= 743
= 1562
=
0
= .79
= .74
= .055
=
40 (41 expected at 5%)
= .91

Average Variance Extracted:
1
Average Variance Extracted

2

3

Variables
4
5
6

7

8

9

.76 .76 .69 .80 .55 .75 .52 .73 .75

Latent Variable Reliabilities:
1
Latent Variable Reliabilities

2

3

Variables
4
5
6

7

8

9

.94 .92 .91 .91 .82 .92 .80 .91 .94

────────────────────────────
* t-value greater than 2.
a
Covariances on and below the diagonal, correlations above.
b
Using summed indicants.

Table 4
STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL RESULTS
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Structural Equations
LOYALTY(η1) = γ11SAT(ξ1) + γ21ALT(ξ2) + γ31INVEST(ξ3) + γ41SWITCH(ξ4) + ζ1
VOICE(η2)
= γ12SAT(ξ1) + γ22ALT(ξ2) + γ32INVEST(ξ3) + γ42SWITCH(ξ4) + ζ2
OPPORT(η3) = γ13SAT(ξ1) + γ23ALT(ξ2) + γ33INVEST(ξ3) + γ43SWITCH(ξ4) + ζ3
NEGLECT(η4) = γ14SAT(ξ1) + γ24ALT(ξ2) + γ34INVEST(ξ3) + γ44SWITCH(ξ4) + ζ4
EXIT(η5)
= γ15SAT(ξ1) + γ25ALT(ξ2) + γ35INVEST(ξ3) + γ45SWITCH(ξ4) + ζ5
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
CoefCoefficient
ficient
Parameter
Estimate
T-value
Parameter
Estimate
T-value
γ11
.09
1.14
ε14
.69
11.25
γ12
.31
4.03
ε22
.30
9.81
γ13
-.02
- .32
ε23
.16
7.21
γ14
-.38
-5.60
ε24
.31
9.96
γ15
-.47
-8.08
ε25
.19
8.06
γ21
.15
1.80
ε31
.83
11.43
γ22
.15
1.92
ε32
.75
11.20
γ23
.31
3.74
ε33
.30
7.34
γ24
.21
3.05
ε34
.32
7.63
γ25
.37
6.46
ε36
.47
9.74
γ31
-.15
-1.87
ε41
.42
10.71
γ32
.17
2.28
ε43
.28
9.76
γ33
-.15
-1.96
ε44
.13
6.72
γ34
-.14
-2.08
ε45
.27
8.64
γ35
-.02
- .41
ε51
.47
11.32
γ41
.23
2.88
ε52
.24
10.46
γ42
.04
.59
ε53
.12
8.65
γ43
.15
1.89
ε54
.31
10.87
γ44
.00
.06
ε55
.12
8.77
γ45
.06
1.05
ε56
.16
9.50
δ11
.34
10.59
λx11
.89
18.82
δ12
.24
9.77
λx12
.96
22.06
δ13
.17
8.73
λx13
1.00
0.00*
δ14
.23
9.72
λx14
.96
22.23
δ15
.17
8.85
λx15
.99
24.27
δ22
.27
9.95
λx22
.89
22.76
δ23
.26
9.86
λx23
.89
23.11
δ24
.08
5.08
λx24
1.00
0.00*
δ25
.31
10.31
λx25
.86
21.18
δ31
.48
11.11
λx31
.77
15.37
δ32
.17
8.62
λx32
.97
25.51
δ33
.14
7.60
λx33
1.00
0.00*
δ34
.16
8.30
λx34
.98
26.08
δ35
.56
11.31
λx35
.70
13.27
δ42
.26
9.93
λx42
.93
21.29
δ43
.18
8.71
λx43
.98
24.36
δ44
.16
8.09
λx44
1.00
0.00*
δ45
.17
8.58
λx45
.98
24.59
ε11
.31
7.78
λy11
.88
16.01
ε12
.12
3.02
λy12
1.00
0.00*
ε13
.66
11.17
λy13
.61
10.22

Table 4 (Continued)
STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL RESULTS
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Parameter
λy14
λy22
λy23
λy24
λy25
λy31
λy32
λy33
λy34
λy36
λy41
λy43
λy44
λy45
λy51
λy52
λy53
λy54
λy55
λy56
ζ1
ζ2
ζ3

Coefficient
Estimate
.59
.91
1.00
.90
.98
.49
.59
1.00
.98
.86
.81
.91
1.00
.95
.77
.92
1.00
.88
.99
.97
.84
.72
.61

T-value
9.77
19.90
0.00*
19.41
23.32
6.62
8.17
0.00*
14.39
12.53
16.77
20.81
0.00*
23.39
16.03
23.77
0.00*
20.89
30.01
28.02
9.40
9.67
7.84

Parameter
ζ4
ζ5
ψ12
ψ13
ψ14
ψ15
ψ23
ψ24
ψ25
ψ34
ψ35
ψ45
φ11
φ12
φ13
φ14
φ22
φ23
φ24
φ33
φ34
φ44

Coefficient
Estimate
.55
.39
-.27
.21
.10
.03
-.16
-.18
-.06
.22
.15
.24
.82
-.48
.30
.22
.91
-.25
-.35
.86
.46
.84

T-value
9.58
9.61
-5.03
4.17
2.29
.77
-3.56
-4.23
-1.67
5.12
4.22
6.74
9.78
-7.64
5.31
4.04
10.63
-4.43
-5.90
10.11
7.43
9.90

Fit Indices
Chi-Squared Degrees of Freedom
Chi-Squared Statistic Value
p-Value of Chi-Squared Value
Goodness of Fit Index
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index
RMS Residual
Normalized Residuals greater than 2
Bentler (1990) Comparative Fit Index
Total Coefficient of Determination
for Structural Equations

= 743
= 1562
=
0
= .79
= .74
= .055
=
38 (41 expected at 5%)
= .91
=

.64

Squared Multiple Correlations
Squared Multiple
Correlations

5

6

.04

.13

Variables
7
8
.12

.35

9
.55

───────────────────────
* = Parameter fixed
a
SAT = Satisfaction, SWITCH = Switching Cost, ALT = Alt. Attractiveness,
INVEST = Investments, OPPORT = Opportunism.

Table 5
PRESENT STUDY AND
PRIOR RESEARCH RESULTS
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Association

Present
Study

Anderson
(1988)

Ping
(1990)

Provan et
Rusbult et
al. (1989)a al. (1982)

Rusbult et
al. (1988)

Schultz et
al. (1987)b

Sat-Exic
-d
Alt+
+
+
+
Invns
Swins
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Sat-Voi
+
+
+
Altns
ns
+
Inv+
+
ns
Swins
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Sat-Loy
ns
+
+
Altns
ns
+
Invns
+
ns
Swi+
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Sat-Neg
Alt+
ns
ns
InvSwins
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Sat-Opp
ns
Alt+
ns
Invns
Swins

────────────────────────────
a

Provan and Skinner (1989).
Schultz, Bigoness and Gagnon (1987).
c
Sat = Satisfaction, Alt = Alt. Attract., Inv = Investments, Swi = Switch. Cost,
Exi = Exiting, Voi = Voice, Loy = Loyalty, Neg = Neglect, Opp = Opportunism.
d
- = Significant negative association, + = Significant positive association,
ns = Not significant.
b

Figure 1
A MODEL OF THE GENERAL RESPONSES TO PROBLEMS
IN CHANNEL RELATIONSHIPS AND THEIR ANTECEDENTS
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════

Figure 2
STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELa
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════

───────────────────────────────────────────
See Table 4 for ξ's and η's.
φij is the correlation between ξi and ξj.
c
γij is the effect of ξi on ηj.
d
ψij is the correlation between ζi and ζj.
a

b

APPENDIX
FINAL TEST SCALE ITEMS
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════
SATISFACTION
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

All in all, my primary wholesaler is very fair with me.
Overall, my primary wholesaler is a good company to do business with.
In general am pretty satisfied with my relationship with my primary wholesaler.
Overall, my primary wholesaler treats me very fairly.
All in all, my relationship with my primary wholesaler is very satisfactory.

SWITCHING COSTS
*1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

On the whole, I would spend a lot of time and money to change primary wholesalers.
All things considered, the company would lose a lot in changing primary wholesalers.
Generally speaking, the costs in time, money, effort and grief to switch primary
wholesalers would be high.
Overall, I would spend a lot and lose a lot if I changed primary wholesalers.
Considering everything, the costs to stop doing business with the current wholesaler and
start up with the alternative wholesaler would be high.

NEGLECT
1.
*2.
3.
4.
5.

I won't plan to do anything to improve relations with my primary wholesaler and will
expect things will become worse.
At times I care very little about what happens to my primary wholesaler as long as I get
what I need from them.
I have quit caring about my primary wholesaler and will let conditions get worse and
worse.
I will passively let the relationship with my primary wholesaler slowly deteriorate.
If things are not right with my primary wholesaler I sometimes consider letting the
relationship die a slow death.

*Item deleted for coefficient estimation.

APPENDIX (Continued)
FINAL TEST SCALE ITEMS
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════
ALTERNATIVE ATTRACTIVENESS
*1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

All in all, the alternative wholesaler would be ______ fair than/as the current wholesaler
is. (Circle a letter)
a. Much more b. Slightly more c. As d. Slightly less e. Much less
Overall, the alternative wholesaler's policies would benefit my company than/as the
current wholesaler's policies. (Circle a letter)
a. Much more b. Slightly more c. As much d. Slightly less e. Much less
I would be _____ satisfied with the product and service available from the alternative
wholesaler than/as the product and service provided by the current wholesaler. (Circle a
letter)
a. Much more b. Slightly more c. As d. Slightly less e. Much less
In general, I would be _____ satisfied with the alternative wholesaler than/as I am with the
current wholesaler. (Circle a letter)
a. Much more b. Slightly more c. As d. Slightly less e. Much less
Overall, the alternative wholesaler would be a/an _____ company to do business with
than/as the current wholesaler. (Circle a letter)
a. Much better b. Slightly better c. As good a d. Slightly worse
e. Much worse

INVESTMENTS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Overall I have invested a lot in the relationship with the current wholesaler.
A lot of energy, time and effort have gone into building and maintaining the relationship
with the current wholesaler.
All things considered the company has put a lot into the relationship with the current
wholesaler.
I have put a considerable amount of time, effort and energy into building the relationship
with the current wholesaler.
Much of my investment with the current wholesaler is unique to the relationship.

LOYALTY
1.

I will not say anything to my primary wholesaler about mutual problems because they
seem to go away by themselves.
2. I disregard problems with my primary wholesaler because they just seem to work
themselves out.
3. Problems with my primary wholesaler will often fix themselves.
4. Sometimes I ignore problems with my primary wholesaler.
*5. I often overlook problems with my primary wholesaler because they frequently fix
themselves.
*Item deleted for coefficient estimation.

APPENDIX (Continued)
FINAL TEST SCALE ITEMS
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════
EXIT
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Occasionally I will think about ending the business relationship with my primary
wholesaler.
I am not likely to continue the business relationship with my primary wholesaler.
I will probably consider a replacement primary wholesaler in the near future.
I am looking at replacement wholesalers.
I will consider a replacement wholesaler soon.
I will probably stop doing business with my primary wholesaler in the near future.

VOICE
*1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Occasionally I will suggest changes to my primary wholesaler if there is a mutual problem.
If there are problems with my primary wholesaler I will work jointly with them to help
improve the situation.
I will work with my primary wholesaler to correct any mutual problems.
I will try to discuss any primary wholesaler related problems with them.
I will cooperatively discuss mutual problems with my primary wholesaler.

OPPORTUNISM
1.
2.
3.
4.
*5.
6.

I will not volunteer much information regarding my business to my primary wholesaler.
There will be some things I will do only if my primary wholesaler checks up and insists on
it.
Sometimes, I will have to alter the facts slightly in order to get what I need from my
primary wholesaler.
I may purposefully exaggerate the sales opportunities in my market in order to get
additional allowances or assistance from my primary wholesaler.
Occasionally I may shrink certain contractual obligations to my primary wholesaler when I
see profit opportunities from doing so.
I may neglect my program responsibilities when my primary wholesaler is not likely to
notice my noncompliance.

*Item deleted for coefficient estimation.

The Effects of Satisfaction and Structural Constraints on
Retailer Exit, Voice, Loyalty, Opportunism and Neglect
Executive Summary
Because we know little empirically of the relationships between affects such as
satisfaction and behavioral intentions such as exiting in marketing channel relationships, this
article reports the results of a field survey of the associations between hardware retailers'
satisfaction and their response intentions to channel relationship problems. The objective was to
determine the relationships between the response intention variables, exiting (intention to
terminate the buyer-seller relationship), voice (actively work with the relationship partner to
remedy the problem), loyalty (suffer problems in silence with confidence that things will get
better), opportunism (seek self interest with guile), and neglect (reduce contact with the buyerseller relationship partner), and their antecedents, satisfaction, and the "structural constraints"
(Johnson 1982) of alternative attractiveness, investments and switching cost, using structural
equation analysis.
The study introduces concepts such as neglect into the marketing literature, and tested a
model from the social psychological literature due to Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn (1982) in a
channel context. In addition it provided hints of the dynamics operating within the committed
and dissolution phases of Dwyer, Schurr and Oh's (1987) buyer-seller relationship development
framework, and generalized Ping's (1990) model of marketing channel relationship termination
to a more comprehensive view of interfirm response intentions to relationship problems.
The results provided selective support for the hypotheses and the Rusbult et al. model,
and the model appeared to apply to a channel context.
Findings included that several hypothesized associations were context sensitive. For
example investments and switching cost were not associated with exiting, contrary to Porter
(1980) and Thibaut and Kelly's (1959) predictions. In the discussion the authors proposed that

the effect may be the other way around-- exiting may affect investments and switching cost.
Similarly, investments and switching cost were not associated with opportunism, contrary to
Transaction Cost analysis (Williamson 1975) arguments.
While the study supplies no direct evidence, the discussion of the results also proposed two types
of satisfaction in long term buyer-seller relationships: event satisfaction and overall relationship
satisfaction. Previously hinted at by other authors, event satisfaction or dissatisfaction was
argued to proceed from the evaluation of a relationship event, while overall relationship
satisfaction was the overall evaluation of the buyer-seller relationship. The study results
suggested the retailers could be dissatisfied with an event yet satisfied overall.
The results also suggested that the effectiveness of increased mobility barriers (Levinger
1979) such as investments and switching cost in decreasing exiting was situationally dependent.
In this study maintaining satisfaction and decreasing the perception of the retailers' alternative
attractiveness were more appropriate for reducing exiting.
Similarly, maintaining satisfaction and reducing alternative attractiveness appeared to be
more effective in reducing neglect than increasing switching cost, which had no effect on
neglect, or increasing investments, which had a small effect on neglect.
The survey firms reported low levels of all reactions except voice. This suggested as a
group they preferred working to improve relationship problems to the more passive (Rusbult et
al. 1982) loyalty reaction, or negative (Rusbult et al. 1982) reactions such as opportunism,
neglect or exit.

